Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Vermont Supreme Court
In re L.M.
The father of L.M. appealed the trial court's finding L.M. to be a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). He raised numerous arguments. The Supreme Court found that while father's unstable living situation, standing alone, might not be sufficient to support a CHINS determination, there were multiple elements of risk under the facts of this case leading to the trial court's conclusion that father and L.M. could end up in an unsafe living situation. Furthermore, father's inability to follow through on recommendations designed to promote L.M.'s safety enhanced the potential risk of harm to L.M.'s well-being. Given these factors, including mother's concession, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court record supported the decision that there was a risk of prospective harm to the child sufficient to justify the State’s temporary intervention to ensure that L.M. was safe.
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Paine v. Buffa
The mother in this case appealed the family division's decision to place sole legal parental rights and responsibilities for the parties' two daughters with the father. She also appealed the family division's award of a share of the equity in the marital home to father. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the family division's decision.
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Posted in:
Family Law, Vermont Supreme Court
In re S.C.
In consolidated appeals of a termination-of-parental-rights judgment, appointed counsel for the appellant parent moved to withdraw on the ground that continued representation was barred by Rule 3.1 of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon review of the attorney's brief on the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that, absent client consent, a motion to withdraw by appointed appellate counsel in termination proceedings will generally not be granted, and therefore denied the motions. View "In re S.C." on Justia Law
Pahnke v. Pahnke
The Father, Jonathan Pahnke, appealed the modification of a foreign child support order. He argued that he was never properly served with the motion to modify child support, that the Vermont family division lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over him and this matter, and that the magistrate improperly ruled that mother did not owe him arrears for the period preceding the modification. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded the case for recalculation of the mother's child support arrearage. View "Pahnke v. Pahnke" on Justia Law
In re A.W. and J.W.
Father appealed the family court’s denial of his motion to modify a final order terminating his parental rights to his children, A.W. and J.W., born in November 2000 and October 2006, respectively. On appeal, he argued that there were changed circumstances sufficient to modify or set aside the termination decision and that the court’s basis for denial in this case lacked evidentiary support. Finding no abuse of discretion by the family court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.W. and J.W." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Vermont Supreme Court
In re Lowry
In 2005, petitioner lived with his girlfriend (witness) and their two young children. Their infant daughter was hospitalized for symptoms and injuries consistent with head trauma. A year later, petitioner was charged with two counts of first-degree aggravated domestic assault for allegedly causing the child's injuries. Petitioner appealed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the State and dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Petitioner was assigned counsel; trial was scheduled for February 2007. As a defense strategy, counsel wanted to highlight that other people had access to the child and could have injured her. In particular, counsel contemplated that if the witness claimed her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when called to testify at trial, the jury might infer that she was involved in the crime and therefore reasonably doubt petitioner's participation. Counsel's affidavit acknowledges that the strategy was his idea, stating that it "came to [him]" during a meeting with witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel discussed the strategy at that meeting with both the witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel also advised witness to discuss the proposed tactic with her own counsel. The witness did consult with an attorney and ultimately decided not to claim her Fifth Amendment privilege at trial. Instead, she testified as a prosecution witness that petitioner had encouraged her to invoke the Fifth Amendment when testifying. Petitioner's counsel objected to this testimony based on attorney-client privilege. After his objection was denied, Petitioner's counsel failed to address the matter on cross-examination or in his closing argument. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the PCR court disregarded material disputed facts on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and prematurely concluded that, as a matter of law, counsel's performance was professionally reasonable and did not prejudice the outcome of petitioner's trial. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found that the trial court record was inadequate to determine on summary judgment whether counsel reasonably anticipated the consequences of suggesting the risky defense strategy, including sufficiently informing petitioner about its risks; and, if he did not, whether petitioner's defense was therefore prejudiced. The Court reversed the PCR court's grant of summary judgment to the State and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Lowry" on Justia Law
In re Harwood
Petitioner Catherine Harwood appealed a Human Services Board decision that applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to uphold the substantiation of her abuse of a vulnerable adult, and thereby placed her name on the adult abuse registry. Petitioner argued that she should not have been precluded from appealing the abuse substantiation because she was never given a full and fair opportunity to challenge the allegations. Petitioner is the mother of M.T., a thirty-five-year-old woman who had significant developmental disabilities and was unable to care for herself. Upon review of the Board's decision, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that she did not receive an opportunity to challenge the allegations. The Court reversed the Board's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Harwood" on Justia Law
Meyncke v. Meyncke
Ex-husband and ex-wife each appealed a post-judgment order of the superior court that awarded the wife maintenance arrears and attorney’s fees, and construed a provision in the final divorce order distributing the parties’ retirement accounts, including husband’s 401k account, which decreased in value substantially before it could be divided because of delay in issuance of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found that the superior court miscalculated the husband's maintenance arrears, and remanded for recalculation.
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Posted in:
Family Law, Vermont Supreme Court
In re D.D.
Father appealed a trial court’s conclusion that his son D.D. was a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because he was without proper medical care necessary for his well being. Father argued on appeal that the record did not support the trial court’s factual findings, which in turn did not support the trial court’s legal conclusion. The State challenged the timeliness of father’s appeal and, on the merits, argued that the trial court’s findings and conclusions were adequately supported. Upon careful review of the trial court's conclusion, the Supreme Court concluded father’s appeal was untimely, but reached the merits in this instance and affirmed the trial court’s substantive determination.
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In re R.M., R.M., and C.M.
Following a permanency review hearing, the superior court amended its initial disposition order from a goal of reunification to a concurrent plan for either reunification or adoption. The mother appealed, claiming that the court erred in modifying the disposition order and finding that a reasonable period of time for her to complete needed services under the new plan was six months. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was a reasonable time and affirmed the judgment. View "In re R.M., R.M., and C.M." on Justia Law