Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mother and father appealed a family court order adjudicating the minor A.W. to be a Child in Need of Care and Supervision (CHINS). They argued on appeal: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA); and (2) the evidence did not support the trial court's finding that the child was without proper parental care. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.W." on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, defendant Christopher Moreau challenged the Washington family court's dismissal of his emergency petition for child custody and parentage complaint over children with whom he shares no biological or other established legal connection, as well as the Caledonia family court’s issuance of a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order denying him visitation with the children. Defendant contended that he was the children's de facto parent and entitled to assert and be heard on custody, parentage and visitation rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with defendant's arguments and affirmed the family courts' decisions. View "Moreau v. Sylvester" on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant Richard Hardie borrowed money from Brattleboro Savings & Loan Association in order to purchase a vacation home in Weathersfield. The loan was secured by a mortgage on the property and included a "second home rider" clause, asserting that the property was not a primary residence. Hardie was married to intervenor-appellee Lisa Mangini at the time, but was the sole owner of the property, and Mangini did not sign either the promissory note or the mortgage. Hardie twice refinanced the property without Mangini's participation, both with second home riders. By 2007, Hardie and Mangini's marriage was deteriorating. Mangini left the couple's New Jersey home and moved into the Weathersfield property. In 2008, Mangini filed for divorce in Vermont. In her divorce filing, Mangini claimed that the property had become her primary residence as of May 2007. Also in the divorce filing, Mangini requested "an award of the Weathersfield home and the adjoining land either without any encumbrances, or, in the alternative, that [Hardie] be responsible for paying off and releasing the mortgage[] to [Brattleboro Savings]." While Mangini was occupying the property and the divorce was pending, Hardie refinanced the mortgage on the Weathersfield property. The 2008 refinancing was completed without Mangini's participation, and Hardie again claimed that the property was a second home. In 2011, Brattleboro Savings commenced a foreclosure action on the property, naming only Hardie as a defendant. Despite not being named in the foreclosure case, Mangini filed an answer asserting an affirmative defense that she had established a homestead interest in the property prior to the 2008 mortgage, and that therefore the 2008 mortgage was "inoperative to convey" her homestead interest. Brattleboro Savings filed two motions for summary judgment, one requesting a foreclosure judgment against Hardie and the second seeking judgment against Mangini on her homestead claim. Mangini filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, detailing for the first time her claim that she had acquired an equitable interest in the property by her divorce filing. Brattleboro Savings appealed a superior court's decision denying its motions for summary judgment and granting Mangini's cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that Mangini held title to the Weathersfield property free and clear of a mortgage to plaintiff. The superior court ruled that the mortgage was inoperative because Hardie, mortgaged the property without the participation of Mangini in violation of 27 V.S.A. section 141(a). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of Mangini's motion for summary judgment and the denial of Brattleboro Saving's motions for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brattleboro Savings & Loan Assn. v. Hardie, et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal stems from a final judgment of divorce: whether, as husband contended, the trial court erred in its division of the marital estate by including an offset for the disparity in value between the parties' projected Social Security retirement benefits. The parties did not agree on the assets to be included in the marital estate. Wife submitted a list of assets with a total value of $1,152,325.86, including $88,158 identified as the difference between the present value of husband's and wife's projected Social Security benefits. The value was determined by wife's accountant and credited toward husband's suggested share of the marital estate, with a corresponding offset in value for wife. Wife proposed that she be awarded either sixty percent of the value of the entire estate plus spousal maintenance, or eighty percent without maintenance. Husband submitted a separate list of marital assets which totaled $978,504 and did not include the Social Security differential. Husband proposed an award to wife of sixty percent of the value of the estate plus rehabilitative maintenance for a period of several years. In its written ruling, the trial court found that wife's proposed property division was "a reasonable one" and gave her the option of choosing either the eighty/twenty division that she had proposed or an award of sixty percent plus maintenance until she reached the age of sixty-seven. Wife subsequently opted for the higher percentage of the marital estate without the maintenance, and the trial court entered a final judgment consistent with that choice and with wife's proposed division. Husband's two subsequent motions to reconsider were denied. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in treating the parties' respective anticipated Social Security benefits as assets of the marital estate, reducing them to a purported present value, allocating the differential to husband, and awarding wife a direct offset on account. "Omitting the value of these benefits only marginally affects the marital estate, valued at over $1 million, and we therefore remand for the trial court to recalculate the award pursuant to the original percentage division of eighty percent for wife and twenty percent for husband." View "Manning v. Schultz" on Justia Law

The father of L.M. appealed the trial court's finding L.M. to be a child in need of care or supervision (CHINS). He raised numerous arguments. The Supreme Court found that while father's unstable living situation, standing alone, might not be sufficient to support a CHINS determination, there were multiple elements of risk under the facts of this case leading to the trial court's conclusion that father and L.M. could end up in an unsafe living situation. Furthermore, father's inability to follow through on recommendations designed to promote L.M.'s safety enhanced the potential risk of harm to L.M.'s well-being. Given these factors, including mother's concession, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court record supported the decision that there was a risk of prospective harm to the child sufficient to justify the State’s temporary intervention to ensure that L.M. was safe. View "In re L.M." on Justia Law

The mother in this case appealed the family division's decision to place sole legal parental rights and responsibilities for the parties' two daughters with the father. She also appealed the family division's award of a share of the equity in the marital home to father. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the family division's decision. View "Paine v. Buffa" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals of a termination-of-parental-rights judgment, appointed counsel for the appellant parent moved to withdraw on the ground that continued representation was barred by Rule 3.1 of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct. Upon review of the attorney's brief on the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that, absent client consent, a motion to withdraw by appointed appellate counsel in termination proceedings will generally not be granted, and therefore denied the motions. View "In re S.C." on Justia Law

The Father, Jonathan Pahnke, appealed the modification of a foreign child support order. He argued that he was never properly served with the motion to modify child support, that the Vermont family division lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction over him and this matter, and that the magistrate improperly ruled that mother did not owe him arrears for the period preceding the modification. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, but remanded the case for recalculation of the mother's child support arrearage. View "Pahnke v. Pahnke" on Justia Law

Father appealed the family court’s denial of his motion to modify a final order terminating his parental rights to his children, A.W. and J.W., born in November 2000 and October 2006, respectively. On appeal, he argued that there were changed circumstances sufficient to modify or set aside the termination decision and that the court’s basis for denial in this case lacked evidentiary support. Finding no abuse of discretion by the family court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re A.W. and J.W." on Justia Law

In 2005, petitioner lived with his girlfriend (witness) and their two young children. Their infant daughter was hospitalized for symptoms and injuries consistent with head trauma. A year later, petitioner was charged with two counts of first-degree aggravated domestic assault for allegedly causing the child's injuries. Petitioner appealed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the State and dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Petitioner was assigned counsel; trial was scheduled for February 2007. As a defense strategy, counsel wanted to highlight that other people had access to the child and could have injured her. In particular, counsel contemplated that if the witness claimed her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when called to testify at trial, the jury might infer that she was involved in the crime and therefore reasonably doubt petitioner's participation. Counsel's affidavit acknowledges that the strategy was his idea, stating that it "came to [him]" during a meeting with witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel discussed the strategy at that meeting with both the witness and petitioner. Petitioner's counsel also advised witness to discuss the proposed tactic with her own counsel. The witness did consult with an attorney and ultimately decided not to claim her Fifth Amendment privilege at trial. Instead, she testified as a prosecution witness that petitioner had encouraged her to invoke the Fifth Amendment when testifying. Petitioner's counsel objected to this testimony based on attorney-client privilege. After his objection was denied, Petitioner's counsel failed to address the matter on cross-examination or in his closing argument. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the PCR court disregarded material disputed facts on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and prematurely concluded that, as a matter of law, counsel's performance was professionally reasonable and did not prejudice the outcome of petitioner's trial. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found that the trial court record was inadequate to determine on summary judgment whether counsel reasonably anticipated the consequences of suggesting the risky defense strategy, including sufficiently informing petitioner about its risks; and, if he did not, whether petitioner's defense was therefore prejudiced. The Court reversed the PCR court's grant of summary judgment to the State and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Lowry" on Justia Law