Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Robert Manzanares and Carie Terry conceived a child in Colorado. Appellant filed a paternity action in Colorado, seeking to enjoin any adoption proceeding. In Utah, a couple signed a petition for the adoption of Terry's baby. After the baby was born, the couple filed their adoption petition. Meanwhile, a Colorado court granted Appellant's petition for paternity. Appellant then filed in Utah a motion to dismiss the couple's adoption petition. The district court eventually terminated Appellant's parental rights in his biological daughter, Baby B., holding that Appellant's consent to the adoption was not required under Utah law. The court based this conclusion on a finding that Appellant either knew or through reasonable diligence could have known of at least one of several qualifying circumstances defined by Utah law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's conclusions ran counter to a proper understanding of the relevant statute and were unsupported by the evidence. Remanded for further findings regarding (1) whether Appellant fully complied with Colorado's requirements to establish his parental rights in Baby B. and to preserve the right to notice of a Colorado adoption proceeding, and (2) whether Appellant demonstrated a full commitment to his parental responsibilities.

Husband and Wife divorced in 2005. During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Wife brought a separate civil suit seeking various forms of equitable relief and monetary damages, which the district court granted. At issue in the civil suit was certain property on which the couple ran an equestrian business but which a Husband's corporation owned. Husband filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erroneously found that an express oral agreement existed between Husband and Wife to purchase, hold, and develop the property, and the equestrian business therein, for their mutual enjoyment and benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in imposing a constructive trust and declaring the property part of the marital estate; but (2) the district court erred in its determination that an enforceable agreement existed, as the purported agreement lacked sufficient specificity. Remanded.

Father and Mother, who were not married, gave birth to a child. Father filed a paternity petition but failed to include a sworn affidavit stating that he was willing to pay child support and take custody of the child. Mother subsequently executed her consent to an adoption. Father then amended his original petition to include the sworn affidavit. The district court dismissed the amended petition as being untimely. Father appealed, arguing that Utah R. Civ. P. 15 permitted amendment of his paternity petition and that his amended petition related back to the date of his original petition. The issues on appeal centered on Utah Code 78B-6-121, which requires that an unwed father file a paternity petition and a sworn affidavit stating his willingness to pay child support and take custody of the child before the mother executes her consent to the adoption The Supreme Court affirmed, holding because section 78B-6-120 requires strict compliance with the affidavit requirement, a paternity petition cannot be amended to include a sworn affidavit after the mother has executed her consent to adoption.

Husband and Wife divorced pursuant to a divorce decree that required Husband to pay monthly alimony to Wife. Wife later moved in with her parents and developed a relationship with one of her parents' foster children, M.H. Husband then filed a petition to modify the divorce decree, seeking to terminate his alimony obligation on the basis of Wife's alleged cohabitation with M.H. The district court concluded that Wife had cohabitated with M.H. and terminated Wife's right to alimony. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding (1) although a spouse's alimony duty terminates by statute upon a finding of cohabitation, cohabitation under the statute contemplates a relationship akin to a marriage and requires more than a finding of two individuals living under the same roof; and (2) Wife's relationship with M.H. did not rise to the level of marriage-like cohabitation, and Husband's alimony duty was accordingly not affected by it.

In this case the juvenile court terminated Father's parental rights to T.E., his biological child, after finding that Father had abandoned T.E. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, even if Father did not abandon T.E., there was another permissible ground to terminate Father's parental rights because it was apparent that Father made only "token efforts" to communicate with T.E. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in concluding that Father had abandoned T.E. because the court evaluated Father's rebuttal evidence under an incorrect standard; (2) the court of appeals erred in affirming the juvenile court on the alternative ground because it was not apparent on the record that Father made only "token efforts" to communicate with T.E.; and (3) the court of appeals was correct in upholding the juvenile court's use of Father's outbursts at the termination hearing as evidence because they were probative of whether termination of parental rights was in T.E.'s best interest. Remanded.

Mother and Stepfather filed a petition in the district court to terminate the parental rights of Father. At the same time, Stepfather filed an adoption petition in which he sought to adopt Father's children. The district court terminated Father's parental rights. The court of appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded, concluding that it was unclear whether the district court had jurisdiction to to terminate Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err when concluding that an adoption petition must be filed before a district court has jurisdiction to consider a petition to terminate parental rights; and (2) the court of appeals erred in concluding that, in the context of a stepparent adoption, a stepparent must satisfy the requirements contained in section 78B-6-135(7)(b) of the Utah Adoption Act before a district court is vested with authority to consider a petition to terminate parental rights. Remanded.

After a Robin Doyle and Doug Doyle obtained a litigated custody decree, Robin petitioned the trial court for a modification of the custody of her son, maintaining that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances when Robin moved from Colorado back to the same neighborhood as her son. The court granted her petition, transferring custody from the child's father, Doug, to Robin. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded for recalculation of child support. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) formal bifurcation of the changed circumstances and best interests proceedings was not required by Utah law and the trial court appropriately received evidence regarding changed circumstances and best interest; (2) the trial court correctly found a change in circumstances even when there was no change in the custodial parent's circumstances; and (3) the trial court had ample authority to modify the child support order in the absence of a specific request in Robin's petition for modification of custody.

Baby E.Z., the child of John Wyatt and the birth mother, who were never married, was born in Virginia. After the birth, the birth mother consented to an adoption, after which Wyatt initiated custody and visitation proceedings in a Virginia court. The prospective parents then filed a petition for adoption in Utah district court. Wyatt filed a motion in the Utah court contesting the adoption and requesting permission to intervene. The Utah court denied Wyatt's motion, holding that he had waived his rights to the child, that he could not intervene, and that his consent to the adoption was not required. Subsequently, the Virginia court issued an order granting Wyatt custody of the baby. On appeal, Wyatt argued that the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) deprived the Utah district court of jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding and required enforcement of the Virginia court order awarding him custody of the baby. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Wyatt's motion, holding (1) the PKPA applied to the adoption proceedings, but that Wyatt waived any claim under the PKPA by failing to raise the statute below; and (2) Wyatt failed to timely assert his parental rights under Utah law.

Victims-Appellants T.C. and N.C. are the minor victims of sexual abuse perpetrated by their adopted older brother Zachariah Clark. As part of the restitution ordered during sentencing, the trial court required the defendant to pay the costs of the victimsâ therapy. But as defendant was also sentenced to prison, he had no means to pay those costs. Because defendant was adopted through the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS), Appellants requested that DCFS be ordered to pay their treatment costs pursuant to state law. That request was ultimately denied. On appeal, Appellants raise several grounds for challenging the district courtâs refusal to order DCFS to pay for their treatment. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of these contentions because it found that the Appellants had no statutory right to appeal the decision.