Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

William Hannifin took Willis Nakai when he was fourteen years old and raised him as his own child. Nakai's biological parents did not assert parental control over him or support him financially. Hannifin and Nakai referred to each other as father and son and held themselves out to the community as such. When Hannifin died, he was intestate and had no spouse or biological descendants. Nakai petitioned to be appointed as personal representative of Hannifin's estate, and the district court granted the petition. Max Hill, acting on behalf of himself and other collateral relatives of Hannifin, contested Nakai's claim to the estate. The trial court held that under the doctrine of equitable adoption, Nakai was entitled to inherit from Hannifin's estate as though he were Hannifin's legally adopted son. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the common law doctrine of equitable adoption has been preempted by Utah's enactment of the Probate Code; and (2) because Nakai did not qualify under the Probate Code's intestate succession provisions, the district court erred in concluding that he was entitled to inherit from Hannifin. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Hannifin" on Justia Law

Child was removed from his home by the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). The juvenile court later terminated Mother's parental rights. Subsequently, both the child's grandmother and foster parents filed competing petitions to adopt Child. The juvenile court granted procedural priority to Foster Parents and dismissed Grandmother's petition without first holding a hearing to consider the merits of her petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Grandmother preserved her claim to a hearing on the merits of her petition for relief; and (2) to properly evaluate the best interests of a child, courts must hold a hearing on the merits of competing adoption petitions, and accordingly, that the juvenile court erred in prioritizing Foster Parents' adoption petition and dismissing Grandmother's petition without first holding a hearing on its merits. Remanded. View "S.C. v. State" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife separated in 2005 and spent the next several years litigating their divorce. Ultimately, the divorce court awarded Wife all of her attorney fees and out-of-pocket expenses and a disproportionate amount of the marital assets. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Wife was entitled to fees and costs incurred related to appointing a receiver and hiring expert forensic accountants; (2) the district court abused its discretion in awarding Wife attorney fees and out-of-pocket costs in excess of the amount Husband caused her to incur and in basing its award upon its findings that Husband had breached an oral contract with Wife regarding a business they started; (3) the court exceeded its discretion in awarding Wife the full amount of dissipated assets without first estimating the maximum amount of assets Husband may have dissipated; (4) the court erred in declining to consider whether Husband was entitled to a credit or setoff for the separate property he contributed to the purchase and development of the marital residential property; and (5) the court properly declined to award Husband a setoff or credit for his managerial contributions to his business. View "Goggin v. Goggin" on Justia Law

After Mother was diagnosed with terminal lung cancer, she prepared a testamentary appointment of guardianship and conservatorship of Child in favor of Grandparents. After Mother's death and upon a petition by Grandparents, the district court confirmed Grandparents' appointment of guardianship. Child's alleged father (Father) subsequently filed a motion to vacate the guardianship appointment, arguing that he had not received notice of Grandparents' guardianship petition as required under the Court Appointment Statute. The district court denied Father's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father had standing to bring this appeal even though he did not formally intervene in this case, but (2) none of the issues raised in Father's appeals were preserved for appeal or warranted reversal under plain error review. View "In re A.T.I.G." on Justia Law

Appellant, the biological father of Baby Girl T., challenged the district court's determination of his rights as a birth father and its grant of a motion in limine preventing his presentation of evidence. The court concluded that Appellant did not comply with the provisions of the Utah Adoption Act and therefore waived the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of Baby Girl T., as well as the right to refuse to consent to her adoption. It also barred Appellant from presenting evidence that the reason he failed to comply with requirements of the Act was because state employees negligently failed to register his notice of paternity proceedings prior to the birth mother's execution of a consent to adoption. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Act was constitutionally defective as applied to Appellant and deprived him of a meaningful chance to preserve his opportunity to develop a relationship with his child. View "In re Baby Girl T" on Justia Law

Here the Supreme Court answered a question of Utah law certified to it by the U.S. district court. The question was, "Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent in a record' to being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the donor's death under Utah intestacy law?" In this case, after she gave birth, the wife of the donor applied for social security benefits based on the donor's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied the benefits, finding that the wife had not shown the child was the donor's "child" as defined by the Social Security Act. The wife subsequently filed a petition for adjudication of paternity, and the district court adjudicated the donor to be the father of the child. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the state law question to the Supreme Court. The Court held that an agreement leaving preserved frozen semen to the deceased donor's wife does not, without more, confer on the donor the status of a parent for purposes of social security benefits. View "Burns v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Robert Manzanares, a Colorado resident, challenged the district court's order terminating his parental rights in his biological daughter, "Baby B." The district court held that Manzanares's conset to the adoption of Baby B. was not required under Utah law, basing this conclusion on a finding that Manzanares either knew or through "reasonable diligence" could have known of at least one of several "qualifying circumstances" defined by Utah law. Specifically, the court found that Manzanares had knowledge of his girlfriend's plan to flee to Utah to give birth and place their baby for adoption. The Supreme Court reversed after clarifying the standards that govern under the Adoption Act and prior Supreme Court cases, holding (1) the district court's conclusions ran counter to a proper understanding of the statute and were unsupported by the evidence, as there is a difference between a belief and actual knowledge in establishing that a father had notice that a birth and adoption would take place in Utah; and (2) Manzanares could not have known, and did not know, that the birth and adoption would take place in Utah. Remanded. View "In re Baby B." on Justia Law

Upon adjudication of parental neglect, the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) took custody of L.O., a child and an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation, and placed L.O. with a foster family. After L.O.'s natural parents relinquished parental rights, L.O.'s foster family filed a petition for adoption. The Nation filed an objection to the adoption because DCFS failed to abide by the placement preferences contained in the Indian Child Welfare Act and moved the juvenile court to transfer jurisdiction to the Nation. The juvenile court denied the transfer motion. The Nation appealed, and the court of appeals dismissed the case. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two procedural questions raised by the Nation, the juvenile court granted the foster family's petition to adopt L.O. Filed with the adoption order was a document titled "Navajo Nation's Consent to Adoption." The Supreme Court declined to address the issues raised on certiorari and dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that the Nation's consent to L.O.'s adoption placement rendered the procedural questions moot.

Steve Richards sued his former domestic partner, Diana Brown, seeking to have the relationship declared to be an unsolemnized marriage. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Brown, holding that Richards' petition was untimely. The remaining equitable claims went to trial, and ultimately, the trial court found that Brown had been unjustly enriched by Richards' contributions to home improvement and awarded Richards a money judgment. After Brown paid the judgment, Richards appealed the court's dismissal of his unsolemnized marriage claim. The court of appeals (1) held that Richards did not waive his right to appeal, and (2) reversed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment against Richards on his unsolemnized marriage claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Richards did not waive his right to appeal even though he accepted payment on the unjust enrichment judgment, as a claim of unjust enrichment is separate and district from a claim of unsolemnized marriage; and (2) the court of appeals correctly interpreted the Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 in determining that an end to cohabitation does not necessarily terminate a relationship.

At issue in this case was a support order that required Petitioner Steven Hansen to pay child support to his ex-wife. Petitioner subsequently sought to redirect his support payments to a homeless shelter where the child resided for a period of time. The district court declined to order redirection of child support to the shelter, concluding that the support statute did not allow for payments to be redirected. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the homeless shelter was not a party to the proceedings and was legally ineligible to become the child's physical custodian in any event, the district court properly denied Petitioner's motion to redirect child support.