Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this divorce matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding the orders of the district court regarding child support and parent-time, holding that the court of appeals properly found that it had limited appellate jurisdiction over this matter and did not err in upholding the district court's orders regarding child support and parent-time.Mother filed for a divorce in 2010. The case dragged on for the better part of a decade. Before the Supreme Court, Father argued that the court of appeals (1) erred by construing his notice of appeal to limit the scope of the court of appeals' appellate jurisdiction, (2) erred in affirming the district court's order regarding his child support obligations, and (3) erred in affirming the district court's order denying his petition to modify the amended decree. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) Father's notice of appeal limited the scope of appellate jurisdiction; (2) the court of appeals correctly upheld the district court's order regarding child support; and (3) the court of appeals correctly rejected Father's arguments regarding his petition to modify. View "Pulham v. Kirsling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition to vacate or reduce the alimony award to his former spouse under Utah Code 30-3-5(8)(i)(i), holding that the court of appeals properly determined that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of establishing that the change of circumstances he alleged was foreseeable at the time of his divorce.In denying Petitioner’s petition, the district court applied a standard set forth in Bolliger v. Bolliger, 997 P.2d 903 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) and other cases. The court of appeals affirmed but under a different standard. The Supreme Court affirmed while clarifying the standard that applies under section 30-3-5(8)(i)(i), holding (1) the question is whether an alleged substantial change was “foreseeable” at the time of the divorce, not whether it was “contemplated” in the divorce decree, which is the standard set forth in Bolliger and other cases; and (2) Petitioner failed to carry his burden of establishing, on the basis of the record before the court that entered the divorce decree, that the change he alleged was not foreseeable. View "MacDonald v. MacDonald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court revoked certification in this case certified to it by a bankruptcy court to answer a question of state law because the issues were not adequately briefed and because of the potential impact of the automatic stay on the property settlement at issue in this case.The bankruptcy court certified two questions of Utah law concerning the overlap of family and bankruptcy law. The Court noted that the parties failed to provide the briefing needed to answer the questions here and that the martial property division at issue in this case may have violated the automatic stay that accompanies a bankruptcy petition’s filing. Accordingly, because of the insufficient briefing and the problematic procedural posture, the Supreme Court declined to answer the questions and revoked certification. View "In re Deborah Michelle Kiley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s order terminating J.M.B.’s guardianship and custody of J.B. and denied the guardian ad litem’s (GAL) motion to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.After J.M.B. separated from J.B.’s biological mother, J.M.B. became J.B.’s legal guardian and was also given custody of the child. J.M.B.’s guardianship and custody were subsequently terminated, and the juvenile court determined, after a trial, that J.M.B.’s guardianship rights should be terminated. J.M.B. filed this appeal. During oral arguments, the GAL renewed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that this appeal was moot because J.B.’s adoption had been finalized for more than one year. The Supreme Court held (1) the case was not moot because J.M.B.’s action and appeal satisfied the time constraints set forth in Utah Code 78B-6-133(7)(d); (2) the juvenile court had jurisdiction to vacate the district court’s orders yielding guardianship rights to J.M.B.; (3) J.M.B. waived her statutory right to counsel; and (4) J.M.B. failed to preserve her remaining arguments in the juvenile court proceedings below. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of Patricia and Robert Porenta’s marital home to Patricia in this case involving a fraudulent transfer of the home to Robert’s mother (Mother).During the divorce proceedings of Patricia and Robert, Robert transferred his interest in the couple’s marital home to Mother with the intent to avoid Patricia’s claim to the home. Robert subsequently died, and the divorce case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, Patricia filed this action against Mother alleging that the transfer was fraudulent under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act. The district court granted the marital home to Patricia. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act requires an ongoing debtor-creditor relationship when a claim under the Act is filed, and the debtor-creditor relationship was in this case was not extinguished when Robert died because an ongoing debtor-creditor relationship existed between Patricia and Robert’s estate; and (2) the trial court did not err in granting Patricia the entire marital home rather than money damages, but the matter is remanded for a determination of the current status of title. View "Porenta v. Porenta" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court did not reach the merits in this matter where Father appealed the district court order awarding Mother attorney fees and costs for the underlying juvenile court proceedings for lack of jurisdiction and awarded Mother reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. The juvenile court denied Father’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and granted Mother custody of the parties’ minor children. The court also ordered Father to pay all fees and costs incurred by Mother. When jurisdiction over the case had been transferred to the district court, the court granted Mother’s motion for attorney fees. Father filed a motion to alter or amend under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 challenging the award. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court lacked the authority to rule on the merits of the Rule 59 motion because it was not timely filed, and therefore, the earlier order of the district court was the final judgment on the underlying matter of attorney fees and costs; (2) the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of this case; and (3) Mother is awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the court of appeals affirming the district court’s conclusion that Jillian Scott cohabited with J.O, her ex-boyfriend, and, therefore, her alimony payments terminated under Utah Code 30-3-5(1). The statutory language governing termination of alimony provides that alimony “terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabiting with another person.” See Utah Code 30-3-5(10). On appeal, Jillian argued that the district court’s interpretation of the statute was incorrect because it failed to account for the present tense of the verb “is.” The court of appeals disagreed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of section 30-3-5(1) requires the paying spouse to establish that the former spouse is cohabiting at the time the payment spouse files the motion to terminate alimony; and (2) the court of appeals erred when it found that Jillian and J.O. cohabited. View "Scott v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Birth Father’s motion to intervene in this contested adoption. Both Birth Father and Birth Mother were members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and their Child was an Indian child. Birth Mother executed a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights and consent to adoption and represented that her brother-in-law was the Child’s biological father. No Indian tribe received notice of the proceedings. The district court terminated Birth Mother’s parental rights and determined that the biological father was not a “parent” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Birth Father later filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings in order to establish paternity. The court denied Birth Father’s motion to intervene on the basis that he was not a parent under either the ICWA or Utah’s adoption statutes. A majority of the court held that Birth Father was a “parent” under the ICWA and, as such, was entitled to participate in the proceedings below on remand. View "In re Adoption of B.B." on Justia Law

The juvenile court erred in using a per se rule that “[h]itting a child with a belt or strap or another object is abuse” because the rule is overbroad and alters the statutory meaning of “abuse” within the meaning of the Utah Code.This case involved four children. Mother was the mother of all four children, and Father was the biological father of the younger two. The State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate the children as abused and neglected under Utah Code 78A-6-105. The parties stipulated to a number of findings of fact. The juvenile court determined that Parents abused the children under section 78A-6-105. Parents appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred when it concluded that spanking a child with a belt, without any additional proof of harm, constitutes abuse within the meaning of Utah law. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the stipulated facts did not support an abuse determination. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law

Ten years after the parents of B.W.D. and her younger sisters divorced, B.W.D. filed an amended petition alleging that Father had abused and neglected her younger sisters. B.W.D. petitioned the juvenile court to transfer custody solely to her. The juvenile court sua sponte dismissed the petition without giving B.W.D. an opportunity to be heard, basing much of its decision on Utah Code 78B-13-802, which provides that a court must decline jurisdiction if it would have jurisdiction only “because a person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred in applying an “unjustifiable conduct” test, and its inconvenient-forum determination was deficient, leading it to erroneously deny B.W.D.'s petition. View "In re S.W." on Justia Law