Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction seeking the return of three children from New York to Thailand. The court held that the Convention does not enter into force until a ratifying state accepts an acceding state's accession and that Article 35 limits the Convention's application to removals and retentions taking place after the Convention has entered into force between the two states involved. Therefore, because the Convention did not enter into force between the United States and Thailand until April 1, 2016, after the allegedly wrongful retention of the children in New York on October 7, 2015, the Convention does not apply to petitioner's claim and the district court did not err in dismissing his petition. View "Marks v. Hochhauser" on Justia Law

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New York's intestacy law, as it existed in 2013 at the time of the agency's final determination, did not permit children conceived posthumously to inherit via intestacy. In this case, plaintiff had conceived twins via in vitro fertilization eleven years after her husband, the donor spouse, died. Plaintiff filed applications for child's survivors' benefits, based on her husband's earnings history, with the Social Security Administration. The Second Circuit held that, under the applicable provisions of New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) in effect at and prior to the time of the agency's final decision, the twins were not entitled to inherit from the decedent in intestacy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of benefits. View "MacNeil v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

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The notice of termination itself constitutes an adverse employment action, even when the employer later rescinds the termination. The Second Circuit held that plaintiff's notice of termination in this case was itself an adverse employment action, despite its later revocation; likewise, the court saw no reason to construe plaintiff's Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claim differently from her Title VII claim with respect to whether the rescission of a notice of termination given to a pregnant employee establishes as a matter of law that the notice may not constitute an adverse employment action; the facts alleged were insufficient to establish constructive discharge nor a hostile work environment; plaintiff's retaliation claim was properly dismissed; and because plaintiff did state a plausible claim of discriminatory termination, and interference with her FMLA rights, the district court should reconsider on remand its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state and city law claims. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Shultz v. Shearith" on Justia Law

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The notice of termination itself constitutes an adverse employment action, even when the employer later rescinds the termination. The Second Circuit held that plaintiff's notice of termination in this case was itself an adverse employment action, despite its later revocation; likewise, the court saw no reason to construe plaintiff's Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claim differently from her Title VII claim with respect to whether the rescission of a notice of termination given to a pregnant employee establishes as a matter of law that the notice may not constitute an adverse employment action; the facts alleged were insufficient to establish constructive discharge nor a hostile work environment; plaintiff's retaliation claim was properly dismissed; and because plaintiff did state a plausible claim of discriminatory termination, and interference with her FMLA rights, the district court should reconsider on remand its decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state and city law claims. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Shultz v. Shearith" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in favor of defendants, agreeing with plaintiff that the district court wrongly instructed the jury that "but for" causation applied to Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claims. The court held that FMLA retaliation claims of the sort plaintiff brought here were grounded in 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) and a "motivating factor" causation standard applied to those claims. The court also held that the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in admitting and permitting the adverse inferences to be drawn in this case. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against the Hospital under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., alleging that the Hospital terminated her illegally for taking medical leave to which she was entitled under the terms of the Act. The DC Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to the hospital, holding that the district court erred in determining that plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, establish a "serious health condition" under 14 C.F.R. 825.115(e)(2), but correctly concluded that the Hospital was not estopped from challenging whether plaintiff established the elements of her FMLA interference claim. Because the Hospital failed to show entitlement to summary judgment on plaintiff's right to leave under section 825.115(e)(2), the Hospital's entitlement to summary judgment turns on the adequacy of plaintiff's notice. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to make this determination. View "Pollard v. The New York Methodist Hospital" on Justia Law