Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
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The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded a decision from the bankruptcy court in a case involving unpaid child support. The debtor, Justin Gary LaMonda, petitioned for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. He was married to Natalia LaMonda, and after they divorced, he was ordered to pay child support. The case has been converted multiple times, from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, and then back to Chapter 7 again. Natalia LaMonda filed an unsecured priority claim for unpaid child support, which the Chapter 7 Trustee objected to. The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee's objection, leading to this appeal.The Appellate Panel found that Natalia LaMonda's claim for unpaid child support arose after the order for relief and before the case was converted under section 1307 of the Bankruptcy Code. According to the Panel, her claim should therefore be treated as if it arose before the petition date, making it eligible for treatment as a priority unsecured claim. Thus, the Panel held that the bankruptcy court erred by disallowing Natalia LaMonda's claim based on the Trustee's objection. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "LaMonda v. Harder" on Justia Law

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In this case heard by the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the appellant, Tiano N. Trice, was appealing against a decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern. The dispute arose after Trice was arrested while on supervised release, leading to the revocation of his supervised release for domestic assault and child endangerment. Trice was sentenced to a 24-month imprisonment period, followed by 12 months of supervised release.In his appeal, Trice did not challenge the domestic assault violation but contested the child endangerment finding and the district court's factfinding and credibility determinations. The incident involved Trice and the mother of his children, Clareshanda Chamberlain, getting into a heated argument in the presence of their children, during which Trice lifted the bed Chamberlain was in and dropped it to the ground. The children, scared by the altercation, fled from the house or hid.The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the district court's factual findings and credibility determinations were not erroneous. The court also rejected Trice's argument that hearing the assault, as opposed to actually seeing it, is insufficient to trigger child endangerment, stating that Iowa law does not make this distinction. The court concluded that Trice was aware his children were present during the assault on their mother, which constitutes child endangerment under Iowa law. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that Trice committed child endangerment and did not abuse its discretion in revoking Trice's supervised release. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. View "United States v. Trice" on Justia Law

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In October 2021, Defendant flew from Japan to Missouri with her and Plaintiff’s child, L.T. In March 2022, Plaintiff filed a petition for the return of their child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”) to have L.T. returned to Japan. The district court found L.T. was “at home” in Japan before Defendant removed the child to the United States. The district court granted Plaintiff’s petition to have L.T. returned to Japan. Defendant appealed arguing Japan cannot be L.T.’s habitual residence because Sarah was coerced into living in Japan and therefore did not intend to make Japan L.T.’s home.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there is no evidence of physical abuse, violence, or threats of violence in this case. Additionally, having considered the testimony and having reviewed the text message exchanges between the parties, the court did not find evidence of the type of verbal abuse or controlling behavior that would suggest that Defendant was coerced or forced into staying in Japan. Therefore, Defendant’s coercion argument on appeal is inconsistent with the district court’s factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous. View "Naoteru Tsuruta v. Sarah Tsuruta" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued a Missouri judge for putting his kids in jail twice, once after a custody hearing and again after ordering law enforcement to pick them up in Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Defendant’s action of placing Plaintiff’s children in jail and then later in a juvenile-detention facility violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant argued that he should receive absolute immunity, but the district court disagreed and ruled that the case could proceed. At issue on appeal is whether judicial immunity shields these acts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Defendant’s decision to personally escort the kids to jail took what would otherwise be a judicial act too far. Judges have the authority to order an officer or a bailiff to escort an unruly litigant to jail. The court wrote that Defendant crossed the line; however, when he personally escorted the kids to jail, stood there while they removed their clothes and belongings, and personally came back an hour later to release them. Further, the court explained that here, even if Defendant had no “express authority” to issue the pick-up order, he is immune because he had jurisdiction to issue one. He cannot be sued, in other words, no matter how erroneous his interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act may be. View "D. Bart Rockett v. The Honorable Eric Eighmy" on Justia Law

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Defendant violated her joint custody agreement with Petitioner by traveling from Switzerland to the United States with their then-12- year-old daughter, M.D., in July 2020. Petitioner filed a petition seeking M.D.’s return to Switzerland, pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague Convention). After an evidentiary hearing on the merits, the district court denied the petition based on the mature child defense, finding that M.D. was of sufficient age and maturity such that the court should take account of her views and that she objected to returning to Switzerland. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with directions to grant the petition for the return of M.D. under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that M.D. is an “innocent party” in this acrimonious dispute. But because M.D. did not express a particularized objection to returning to Switzerland, instead describing a preference—for a variety of understandable reasons—to remain in the United States, the district court’s finding that M.D.’s statements constituted an objection within the meaning of the mature child defense was clearly erroneous. View "Vladyslav Dubikovskyy v. Elena Goun" on Justia Law

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Appellant made deferred cash payments to his ex-wife, Appellee, pursuant to a marriage termination agreement (MTA) that Appellee “waives any right to . . . permanent spousal maintenance.” At issue is whether those payments were nonetheless “spousal maintenance” payments under Minn. Stat. Section 518.552.The Eighth Circuit concluded that the answer is clearly no and therefore affirm the decision of the United States Tax Court denying Appellant deductions under now-repealed alimony provisions of the Internal Revenue Code for $51M in cash payments he made to Appellee during his 2012 and 2013 federal income tax years.The court concluded that that Minnesota law unambiguously establishes that the MTA was not a spousal maintenance agreement. Rather, it was a contractual division of marital property. Contractual obligations under a divorce agreement fall under the general rule that causes of action survive their personal representatives. Minn. Stat. Section 573.01. That being so, Minnesota law unambiguously provides that the payments in question were not deductible because Appellant’s liability to make the payments would survive Appellee’s death. This is consistent with the stated purpose of Section 71(b)(1)(D). View "Andrew Redleaf v. CIR" on Justia Law

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Defendant and her then-husband bought a condo for $525,000 with the intention of making it their primary residence. To finance the purchase, the couple took out a mortgage with the Plaintiff bank. Defendant did not sign the note but consented to her husband doing so. The mortgage contained a "future advances" clause, which granted Plaintiff a security interest in the Mortgage covering future funds Defendant's husband might borrow.Four years later, Defendant's husband borrowed additional funds from Plaintiff to keep his business afloat. Defendant did not sign the note. A few months later, Defendant's husband filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and the condo was sold for $650,000, approximately $250,000 of which was deposited in escrow. The couple divorced and Defendant moved out of the state.In Defendant's husband's bankruptcy case, the court held a portion of the escrowed sale proceeds must pay down his business notes pursuant to the mortgage’s future advances clause and that he could not claim a homestead exemption. Plaintiff was granted summary judgment on its claims that Defendant's proceeds were also subject to the future advances clause and that Plaintiff could apply those proceeds to Defendant's husband's business note.Defendant appealed on several grounds, including unconscionability, contract formation, and public policy, all of which the court rejected, affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment to Plaintiff. View "Sanborn Savings Bank v. Connie Freed" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tyson on plaintiff's interference claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court concluded that Tyson's request for recertification was reasonable as a matter of law under 29 U.S.C. 2613(e) and did not interfere with defendant's FMLA rights. The court explained that it was reasonable as a matter of law to require recertification based on a significant change in the circumstances of plaintiff's absences. View "Whittington v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, his three children, and Stop Child Protection Services from Legally Kidnapping filed suit against the county, DCSS, nine county officials, and three officials. Plaintiffs' constitutional, federal, and state law claims stemmed from a Child in Need of Protection of Services (CHIPS) proceeding by DCSS.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of three Minnesota child welfare statutes; plaintiff was not entitled to monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, because he failed to establish a due process violation, an equal protection claim, and municipal liability and conspiracy; and the children are also not entitled to damages under section 1983. The court also held that, even if the complaint was sufficiently pled and established a constitutional violation, defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore, the court held that no conduct by the individual defendants, as alleged in the amended complaint, rose to the level of maliciousness required to deny official immunity under Minnesota law. Finally, plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief. View "Mitchell v. Dakota County Social Services" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on plaintiff's claim of interference with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and retaliation against her for asserting those rights. Plaintiff's claims arose when she was put on administrative leave following an investigation into her involvement in her husband's sexual abuse of their children. The court held that plaintiff failed to show any prejudice from the County's delay in acting on her FMLA request or its failure to give her notice of her FMLA rights. The court rejected the FMLA interference claim, holding that plaintiff was neither asked to nor required to complete work-related tasks while on leave. Rather, the activities plaintiff was asked to do related to the underlying child-protection investigation, her FMLA request, and her employment status.The court also held that the County was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim where the undisputed sequence of events does not demonstrate a causal link between her FMLA request and the Board's decision to proceed with a meeting regarding whether to terminate her employment. In this case, the Board's actions were based on the maltreatment determination. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to the County. View "Thompson v. Kanabec County" on Justia Law