Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between two former spouses involving child custody and related issues in Ohio state court. After their 2019 divorce, they shared parenting responsibilities for their two children. In 2023, the ex-husband, a police officer, allegedly enlisted a county employee to access confidential information about his ex-wife’s fiancé, and this information was subsequently shared. Complaints about this conduct were filed with municipal and county authorities. Amid these events, the ex-wife and her fiancé filed a federal lawsuit alleging violations of federal civil rights statutes and state law, and sought relief against municipal and county entities.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, the plaintiffs amended their complaint and the City of Cincinnati moved to dismiss the claims against it. The district court dismissed these claims under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The plaintiffs sought reconsideration or, alternatively, certification to appeal the dismissal, but the district court declined to certify the order as final. Separately, the ex-wife moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of an Ohio state court’s contempt order, which sanctioned her for disclosing the ex-husband’s address in federal filings. The district court denied injunctive relief, citing Younger v. Harris abstention, to avoid interference with ongoing state court proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed two issues: the district court’s abstention from granting injunctive relief and the dismissal of the Monell claim. The Sixth Circuit held that Younger abstention was appropriate because the contempt proceeding was an ongoing state judicial process implicating important state interests, and the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in state court. The court also determined it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the Monell dismissal, as the district court’s order was not final and had not been certified for interlocutory appeal. The court affirmed the abstention and dismissed the Monell appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Taylor v. Hooven" on Justia Law

A mother removed her eight-year-old son, B.B., from Finland, where he had lived his entire life, to the United States, in violation of a Finnish joint custody agreement with the child’s father. The parents had previously separated amid the mother’s allegations of abuse, though those allegations were disputed and did not involve direct harm to B.B. After the mother settled in Ohio, the father filed a petition in federal court pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the child’s return to Finland.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio conducted a two-day hearing, including an in-camera interview with the child. The district court found that the father established a wrongful removal under the Convention. The court then examined the mother’s defenses under Article 12 and Article 13, rejecting claims of consent and grave risk of harm. Ultimately, the district court found that the age and maturity exception applied: B.B., though only eight, was found sufficiently mature for his views to be considered, and he clearly objected to returning to Finland for several particularized reasons. The court also found no clear evidence of undue influence by the mother over the child’s testimony.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in finding B.B. sufficiently mature or in crediting his particularized objections to return. The court further found no clear error in the district court’s assessment of the absence of undue influence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition for return. View "Boa-Bonsu v. Owusu" on Justia Law

A Canadian citizen married an American citizen in 2017. The couple lived in Canada until 2020, then moved to Hawaii, where the American spouse began working as a physician. The Canadian spouse entered the United States on a tourist visa and soon applied for lawful permanent residency. To support this application, the American spouse signed a federal Affidavit of Support, committing to maintain the non-citizen’s income above 125% of the federal poverty line. The Canadian spouse obtained permanent residency in 2021. Around that time, the marriage ended, and the American spouse moved to Michigan and filed for divorce. In 2022, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and consented divorce judgment in Michigan, in which they resolved all issues—including spousal support—and released any claims against each other.The Canadian spouse later filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that his former spouse had failed to provide the financial support required by the Affidavit of Support. The former spouse moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that the divorce judgment precluded the claim. The district court rejected the jurisdictional argument but agreed that claim preclusion under Michigan law barred the lawsuit, and dismissed the action.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that federal courts must give state court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have under state law, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Act. The court ruled that Michigan claim preclusion law applied, and that the prior divorce judgment barred the new lawsuit because the claim could have been raised in the divorce proceedings. The court also rejected arguments that federal law or preemption required a different result. View "Ramgoolam v. Gupta" on Justia Law

During a contentious divorce and custody dispute, Amanda Hovanec, who had returned to Ohio from South Africa with her children, conspired with Anthony Theodorou, her romantic partner, to kill her husband, T.H. After failed attempts to hire hitmen in South Africa, Theodorou, at Hovanec’s direction, obtained and shipped etorphine, a dangerous animal tranquilizer, to the United States. Hovanec ultimately used the drug to fatally inject T.H. at her mother Anita Green’s home. Green assisted after the murder by helping to select a burial site, driving the others to dig a grave, and later transporting them and the body for burial. The group also undertook efforts to conceal the crime, including disposing of T.H.’s belongings and misleading authorities. All three were arrested after an investigation revealed dashcam footage of the crime.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Hovanec pleaded guilty to multiple controlled-substance offenses resulting in death, and Green pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact. Hovanec received a 480-month sentence; Green received 121 months and was ordered to pay restitution for psychological care for T.H.’s and Hovanec’s children. Both defendants appealed their sentences and, in Green’s case, the restitution order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentences for both Hovanec and Green. The appellate court upheld the denial of a sentencing reduction for Green based on her lack of candor regarding knowledge of the murder plan. The court also affirmed the sentencing enhancements for Hovanec’s leadership role and obstruction of justice. However, the court reversed the restitution order against Green, holding that under federal law, restitution for psychological care requires evidence of bodily injury, defined as physical harm or physical manifestations of psychological harm, and remanded for further factual findings on this issue. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Kentucky’s Health and Family Services commenced a Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse proceeding. The mother stipulated to neglecting her children. Kentucky placed both boys in foster care. R.O., the mother’s aunt, sought custody of the children. The state conducted a standard home evaluation and criminal background check on R.O. and eventually both children were placed in her home by court order. The family court closed the action and granted joint custody to the mother and R.O., though the boys remained living with R.O., who sought foster care maintenance payments. The family court declined to rule on the issue, “indicating that permanency had been achieved.” R.O. then sued the state, arguing that the federal Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. 672(a), required the state to provide maintenance payments, and that the failure to make payments violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The state removed the case to federal court. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the Child Welfare Act provides no privately enforceable rights, that the family lacked a property interest in the payments, and that Kentucky’s scheme rationally distinguished between relative and non-relative foster care providers. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the Act creates a private right of action. View "D.O. v. Glisson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Henry married in 1987 and divorced in 1993. The Divorce Judgment granted Plaintiff one-half of the pension benefits Henry had accrued during the marriage, with full rights of survivorship. Henry was forbidden from choosing a payment option that would deprive Plaintiff of these benefits. Henry worked for Chrysler from 1965 to 1992, and began receiving retirement benefits in 1994, under a “Lifetime Annuity Without Surviving Spouse” option, in violation of the Judgment. Plaintiff’s attorney submitted the Judgment to the Plan administrator, who stated that the Judgment lacked information required by 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(C) to qualify as a “qualified domestic relations order,” so it could not override ERISA’s anti-alienation provision. Plaintiff did not contact the Plan again until after Henry had died in 2007. The Plan denied her benefits request, noting “the participant does not have a remaining benefit to be assigned.” For six years, Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to have the Plan qualify the Judgment. The Plan noted that changing the type of benefit was impermissible under plan the rules. In 2014, plaintiff obtained a nunc pro tunc order, correcting the Judgment. The Plan again denied benefits. Plaintiff filed suit under ERISA. The district court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, reasoning that, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim was based on the 2014, denial of benefits based on the Nunc Pro Tunc Order, it was timely and that the Order relates back to 1993. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the claim untimely. View "Patterson v. Chrysler Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Hayes, a U.S. citizen, married Pliego, a Spanish diplomat. Their child was born in 2011. In 2012, the family moved to Turkey, where Pliego served in the Spanish embassy. In 2014, Hayes took the child to Kentucky, stating she would not return. Pliego sought the child’s return under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. 9001–9011 (ICARA), which implements the Hague Abduction Convention. The district court determined the child’s country of habitual residence was Turkey and that removal of the child violated Pliego’s joint custody rights under Turkish law. Convention Article 13(b) creates a defense to a child’s return if “there is a grave risk” of “physical or psychological harm” or “an intolerable situation.” Hayes alleged, and Pliego denied, that Pliego had abused her and the child. The court concluded that the evidence of “physical or psychological harm” was not “clear and convincing.” Pliego and the child returned to Turkey. Hayes followed and obtained temporary custody from a Turkish court. That court subsequently dismissed the temporary custody order based on Pliego’s diplomatic status, but Hayes and the child had fled to the United States. Pliego filed his second ICARA petition; the court granted Pliego temporary custody while Pliego waived diplomatic immunity to seek permanent custody in Turkey. During visitation, Hayes photographed bruises on the child; she alleged that Turkish courts could not protect the child due to Pliego’s diplomatic status. The court found credible Pliego’s and his mother’s testimony that the “bruises” were actually mosquito bites, held that custody litigation could proceed in Turkey, held that Hayes had failed to make out a defense under Article 13(b), and awarded Pliego $100,471.18 in fees and costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Spanish government’s waiver of Pliego’s diplomatic immunity sufficiently permits the Turkish courts to adjudicate custody. View "Pliego v. Hayes" on Justia Law

Eaton sought custody of his infant son, claiming that the child’s mother would endanger the child’s safety. The mother responded that Eaton had substance abuse issues. The court ordered both to undergo testing at Lexington's Community Alternative Program. The mother’s results were clean. Eaton tested positive for cocaine and opiates. The court ordered additional testing. Eaton took around 120 urine tests through the program. He tested positive for drugs at least 10 times and for alcohol at least 20 times. He unsuccessfully moved to strike the results as inaccurate. Several times, Eaton gave a sample at both the community program and an alternative site on the same day. He tested positive in four drug tests and one alcohol test. Apparently, the two sites' results never conflicted. The court granted sole custody to the mother. Eaton filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging that tests at the community program violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the program “fail[ed] to use adequate procedures to allow for reasonable reliability of the test results.” The district court dismissed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because they interfered with ongoing state litigation and stayed the damages claims, but later granted Lexington summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Eaton did not offer sufficient evidence to support his claim. View "Eaton v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty." on Justia Law

A family member reported to Michigan Children’s Protective Services (CPS) that Barber was neglecting J.B. Miller, a CPS social worker, interviewed J.B. at his public elementary school without a court order or Barber’s consent. Miller interviewed Barber, who defended his marijuana and prescription-drug use as medically authorized. Days later, Miller again interviewed J.B. at school without a court order or parental consent and spoke with J.B.’s paternal grandmother. Miller obtained a court order, placing J.B. in protective custody pending a hearing, Mich. Comp. Laws 722.638, and picked J.B. up from school. After a hearing, the judge found probable cause to support the petition, but returned J.B. to Barber’s custody conditioned on: Barber’s abstaining from marijuana, submitting to drug screening, and ensuring that J.B. has constant adult supervision. Barber sued Miller under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his substantive due process rights by interviewing J.B. without a court order or parental consent; falsehoods in the petition; and removing J.B. from school, and challenged the statute as facially unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity and found that Barber lacked standing for his constitutional challenge to the statute. View "Barber v. Miller" on Justia Law

Alexander filed a suit, claiming that nine individuals—all of whom had some connection to child support proceedings related to Alexander’s son—conspired against him and violated his civil rights by imposing child support obligations that he did not owe; providing false information about those obligations to the IRS; and extorting money from him through “bribery” and “terror tactics.” Among other relief requested, Alexander asked that his child support payments “be abated.” The district court dismissed claims against the federal and the state court judges on grounds of absolute judicial immunity and remaining federal claims after finding that they fell within the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on grounds of failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, noting that the Supreme Court has indicated that the domestic relations exception is narrow and finding that this case did not fall within the exception. View "Alexander v. Rosen" on Justia Law