Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Two parents, both with ties to France and the United States, became embroiled in a contentious custody dispute over their twin children, who hold dual citizenship. After the parents’ relationship ended, the mother relocated with the children from France to Oregon. Both parents then initiated custody proceedings in their respective countries. The Oregon state court issued a restraining order preventing the father from removing the children from Oregon, but after a French court granted him joint custody and restricted the children’s departure from France, the father took the children back to France. The Oregon court subsequently granted the mother sole custody, held the father in contempt, and issued a warrant for his arrest. The mother later returned to France, took the children back to Oregon without the father’s consent, and French authorities began investigating her actions.The father filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the return of the children to France. The mother moved to dismiss the petition, invoking the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine due to the father’s failure to resolve the Oregon arrest warrant and his absence from the state. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the petition, reasoning that the father’s conduct justified the harsh sanction of disentitlement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine must be narrowly applied in civil cases, and that the traditional justifications for the doctrine—enforceability, efficiency, dignity of the courts, deterrence, and abandonment—did not necessitate dismissal in this context. The court emphasized the importance of parental rights and the unique purposes of the Hague Convention. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for adjudication on the merits. View "PARIS V. BROWN" on Justia Law

County officials in Trinity County, California, obtained warrants to take Patricia and Stanley Miroth's children into protective custody, leading to the termination of their parental rights by a state court. The Miroths alleged that the officials failed to provide required social services and committed fraud in the state child custody proceedings, which led to the termination of their parental rights. After unsuccessful appeals in state court, the Miroths filed a federal lawsuit seeking money damages for these alleged wrongs.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the federal claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The district court found that the Miroths were essentially seeking relief from the state court judgments and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the Miroths' claims did not seek relief from or reversal of the state court's order. Instead, they sought money damages for alleged legal wrongs by adverse parties that preceded the state court's order. The court emphasized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to cases where the federal plaintiff asserts injury caused by a state court judgment and seeks relief from that judgment. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MIROTH V. COUNTY OF TRINITY" on Justia Law

Larry and Kari Miller, both Arizona domiciliaries, owned a cooperative apartment held in each of their names, as husband and wife. First Community Bank, a judgment creditor of Larry Miller, obtained a lien against the couple's co-op. Under Arizona law, the co-op would be treated as community property. Under California law, the co-op would not constitute community property because it was not acquired by the couple while they were domiciled in California. The court held that while the co-op owned by the couple did not come within the definition of community property in California, as that term is defined in Section 760 of the California Family Code, it does come within the definition of a tenancy-in-common. The court explained that the interests of a co-tenant in such tenancies, which are presumed to be held in equal shares, are subject to the enforcement of a judgment lien. In this case, applying California's choice-of-law rules, the court held that California law governs, and that the co-op would be treated as a tenancy-in-common, as defined in Section 685 of the California Civil Code, making Larry Miller's interest in the co-op subject to enforcement of the judgment lien. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy court's summary judgment for the creditor, remanding for further proceedings. View "In re Miller" on Justia Law