Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, the named beneficiary of an accident benefits plan that her husband obtained through his employer, brought suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging that the plan administrator, Metropolitan Life Insurance (Metlife), abused its discretion in determining that her husband was intoxicated at the time of the accident and denying coverage. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Metlife because Metlife's interpretation of the relevant policies was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that Metlife did not abuse its discretion as plan administrator when it denied benefits based on the general exclusion for intoxication that appeared in the certificate of insurance. The court also held that the toxicology report, which concluded that the husband's blood alcohol level was above the state limit, constituted evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and therefore, satisfied the substantial evidence standard. The court also held that because it agreed with the district court's conclusion that the denial of benefits was justified in light of the intoxication conclusion, it need not address Metlife's assertion that the husband's death was not accidental because it was reasonably foreseeable or, alternatively, the result of intentional self-inflicted injury. Accordingly, summary judgment was affirmed.

Debtor reopened his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings and thereafter, moved the bankruptcy court to hold in contempt his former spouse and her subrogee, West Virginia's Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau of Child Support Enforcement (BCSE), for violating the terms of debtor's confirmed Chapter 13 repayment plan by seeking income-withholding orders against him for child and spousal support arrears. The bankruptcy court refused to hold the former spouse or BCSE in contempt but did reduce the income withholding. On appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) reversed and reinstated the income withholdings. Debtor timely appealed. The court held that 11 U.S.C. 1327(a) did not apply to this case because the bankruptcy court confirmed debtor's plan and the plan explicitly limited the former spouse's privilege to return to family court for the sole purpose of litigating child support interest. Although the Bankruptcy Code provided that, to be confirmed, a plan must provide for the full payment of accrued interest on child support and spousal support, 11 U.S.C. 101(14A), a confirmed plan was given res judicata effect even when it violated the Code. As for debtor's claim for post-petition child and spousal support, and interests thereon, the BAP correctly ruled that these claims were beyond the purview of the plan and the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the BCSE income-withholding order could exceed the monthly payment schedule provided in debtor's plan. The court further held that the former spouse's recovery of post-petition spousal and child support was permitted because they were post-petition domestic support obligations for which the Bankruptcy Code allowed no proof of claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought this suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, and the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, against the state, the Iowa Department of Administrative Services (DAS), and two officials of the DAS. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred plaintiff's FMLA claims against all of the defendants. The court held that the state's waiver of its state court immunity in FMLA cases had no bearing on the state's immunity from suit in federal court. Therefore, the state had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and summary judgment was affirmed.

Appellant pled guilty to wire fraud and was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment. Appellant argued that his son, who suffered from muscular dystrophy, required around-the-clock care that his wife could not provide by herself. At issue was whether the district court, in consideration of appellant's caretaker duties, erred in denying his request for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5H1.6, failed to properly consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and imposed an unreasonable sentence by declining to vary below the Guidelines range. The court held that the district court correctly explained at sentencing that family circumstances were not a factor ordinarily considered when sentencing a defendant under the Guidelines. The court also held that the district court clearly considered appellant's son's medical condition and appellant's role as a caretaker as relevant factors under section 3553(a). The court further held that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court thoroughly considered appellant's role in caring for his son and therefore, affirmed the sentence.

Appellant petitioned for his son's transfer to Israel for custody adjudication alleging that his son had been wrongfully detained in Iowa by the child's mother. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that the parties' intention was to make Iowa the habitual residence where the district court emphasized the son's perspective that the settled purpose of his relocation to Iowa was to reside there habitually. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the parties' intent at the time of the move was to make Iowa the son's habitual residence whether the district court emphasized the son's perspective or the parents' perspectives; that the parties maintained no home in Israel after coming to Iowa and appellant spent two months closing down his business before rejoining his family in the United States; that it appeared that the family did intend to "abandon" Israel; and any agreement of the pair to return to Israel would have involved staying in the United States for the indefinite amount of time it would take the mother to finish her doctorate.