Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Comcast claiming that the company interfered with his ability to request an excused absence under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-54, and that his termination from employment was based on the interference, as well as retaliation of his prior FMLA absences. Plaintiff lost his employment with Comcast when he failed to show up for work on three consecutive shifts and failed to notify his department of his absences or to request leave under the FMLA. Plaintiff's unilateral determination that he was fired did not excuse him from his responsibility to return Comcast's phonecalls or otherwise confirm his employment status before he stopped showing up to work or calling in to request additional FMLA leave. Plaintiff had many opportunities to correct his misperception that he had been terminated before missing three consecutive work shifts. Therefore, the court held that the record did not support plaintiff's claim of interference against Comcast and the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued his employer, alleging that his termination was the result of interference with and retaliation for his exercise of his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer and plaintiff appealed. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the employer's actions were a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff's testimony that the racially hostile environment had abated since his first lawsuit was settled in his numerous uses of FMLA leave without negative consequences supported the employer's non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory justification for plaintiff's termination.

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of her petition seeking half the proceeds of the sale of stock that was ordered forfeited in her ex-husband's conviction for mail fraud and money laundering in connection with the Thomas Petters Ponzi scheme. The court concluded that petitioner did not allege a legal interest in the stock proceeds sufficient to confer standing, and that, even if she did, her petition failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued her former employer for retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(2). The district court granted the employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Because the employer did not offer a non-discriminatory reason for its alleged act, the proper inquiry for the district court was whether plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Because plaintiff failed to provide any other evidence linking her termination to her use of FMLA leave, a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for her on that issue. Therefore, the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Chapter 7 Trustee appealed from the Bankruptcy Court's judgment in favor of debtor's parents on a fraudulent transfer action, holding that debtor could not fraudulently transfer property that would have been exempt. Because the court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court erred in applying Minnesota fraudulent transfer law to the count seeking relief under section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court reversed and remanded for further findings.

This case arose out of a dispute between plaintiff and her ex-husband over the education and custody of their three minor children. Plaintiff sued City Defendants, alleging that they unlawfully impeded her access to the children. Plaintiff sued the School District Defendants, asserting that they unlawfully denied her access to the children and their education records. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the City Defendants for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment for the School District Defendants. The court held that the fact that plaintiff lived in a different state did not suffice to convert the loss of a single three-hour visit into a deprivation of a fundamental right for purposes of substantive due process and, even if plaintiff could show a deprivation, the City Defendants' alleged conduct would not shock the conscience. The court also held that plaintiff failed to state a procedural due process claim against the City Defendants, given the relatively minimal deprivation alleged in this case, where the post-deprivation procedures were adequate to protect her rights to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The court further held that plaintiff had no fundamental liberty interest in contacting her children at their schools and the court agreed with the district court that an attendance clerk's one-time refusal to tell plaintiff why one of the children had been absent from school, a coach's referral of plaintiff to her ex-husband for information about the children's swimming activities, and the school's refusal to send plaintiff all of the school's projects she requested did not amount to a deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest. Given the limited nature of any infringement of plaintiff's protected liberty interest, the procedures at issue were sufficient to protect plaintiff's right to procedural due process. The court finally held that plaintiff's right, as a non-custodial parent, under state law and her role in the children's lives vary significantly from the rights and role afforded to the ex-husband or to a typical married parent. Therefore, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendants with respect to her equal protection claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Planned Parenthood brought this equitable action against the Governor and Attorney General of South Dakota in their official capacities, seeking to enjoin enforcement of revisions enacted in 2005 to the South Dakota law on informed consent to abortion. The court held that because Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds upheld the human being advisory against a facial challenge, the district court did not err in doing the same in this case. The court also held that the district court erred in holding the relationship advisories unconstitutional where they could be constitutionally applied to a "large fraction" of the women to whom they were relevant. The court further held that the district court did not err in granting Planned Parenthood summary judgment as to the suicide advisory where it violated due process and doctors' First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech that was untruthful, misleading, or irrelevant. The court finally held that the district court did not err in upholding the risk advisory where Planned Parenthood had not shown that the risk advisory would cause confusion in any case, let alone the quantum of cases required to sustain a facial challenge.

Appellee sued the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA), seeking review of the SSA's denial of benefits to her daughter. At issue was whether a child conceived through artificial insemination more than a year after her father's death qualified for benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 402, 416. The Commissioner interpreted the Act to provide that a natural child of the decedent was not entitled to benefits unless she had inheritance rights under state law or could satisfy certain additional statutory requirements. The court held that the Commissioner's interpretation was, at a minimum, reasonable and entitled to deference, and that the relevant state law did not entitle the applicant in this case to benefits. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgments.

The Minch Family sued the Estate of the Norbys in diversity, seeking injunctive relief and damages for flooding of the Minch Family's property, allegedly caused by a field dike built on the Norbys' land. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the Minch Family's claims were time-barred and whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion by denying the Minch Family's motion to amend its complaint to allege a claim for punitive damages and the Minch Family's motion to amend the scheduling order. The court held that the Minch Family had failed to meet its burden of showing that the applicable two year-statute of limitations should be tolled and its claims were untimely. The court held that because it had affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Minch Family's claims as time-barred, the issue of punitive damages was moot. The court further held that because the Minch Family's motion only related to its claim for punitive damages, the court need not address the issue of whether the magistrate judge abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend the court's scheduling order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellee filed a petition to return his 22-month-old daughter to Mexico pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction (Convention), implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. 11601 et seq. Appellant, the estranged wife of appellee and mother of the child, opposed the petition. The district court subsequently entered an order granting the petition and appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying her motion for a continuance and in excluding the testimony of two witnesses. The court held that, given the underlying circumstances and the professed goal of expediency in Convention proceedings, the court agreed that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of the witnesses where the testimony would have been cumulative or not relevant.