Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The issue in this cause is whether Plaintiff-appellant Rhonda Brown was estopped from asserting her status as the surviving spouse of the Decedent, Bobby Joe Brown, Jr. Plaintiff and Bobby Joe Brown, Jr. were married in 1995, and three children were born of the marriage. Rhonda testified that after a few years of marriage, she told Bobby she could no longer stay with him if he did not cease his extra-marital affairs. He did not comply with this condition, and Rhonda moved out of the marital home. They were never divorced through a court proceeding. She moved frequently and, at different times, lived in several Oklahoma cities, as well as in Kansas. After Bobby and Rhonda separated, he began living with Ami Alley in 2004. Two children were born to the couple. Ami testified she and Bobby held themselves out as husband and wife to everyone and established a home together in Perry, Oklahoma. Rhonda testified she was aware of the relationship between Ami and Bobby and that he was living with her and their two children. Rhonda testified that Bobby referred to Ami as his girlfriend. In 2013, Bobby died in a motorcycle accident. Ami was named Personal Representative of his estate upon the court's finding she was Bobby's surviving spouse in a common law marriage. Rhonda was not sent notice of the proceeding, and Ami did not advise the court of Rhonda's relationship with Bobby. Ami explained that the court asked if there was anybody to object, and no one appeared to do so. She said the court did not ask about Rhonda, and she did not raise the issue. She also testified Rhonda knew about the proceeding but would not give Ami her address. In the judgment denying Rhonda's Petition and Motion to Revoke Letters of Administration, the trial court found Bobby and Ami's relationship met the requirements of a common law marriage; and that Rhonda re-married in a ceremonial, traditional marriage in 2012. The court based its decision to deny Rhonda's motion to revoke the letters of administration on the issue of estoppel, rather than the legal classification of her marriage to Bobby. Finding that the trial court properly held that Rhonda was estopped from asserting she should have been appointed Personal Representative of Bobby's estate (instead of Ami), the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brown v. Alley" on Justia Law

Judgment creditor Far West Industries filed suit against Michael Mona, who, together with Rhonda Mona, was a co-trustee of a family trust. A California court found that Michael committed fraud and awarded Far West a $17.8 million judgment against Michael. Far West domesticated the California judgment in Nevada against Michael and the family trust. The Nevada district court requested to examine Rhonda and ordered the Monas to produce some of Rhonda’s personal financial documents. When the Monas did not produce the documents the district court sanctioned them pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 and concluded that the funds on Rhonda’s three bank accounts were subject to execution by Far West pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.320 to partially satisfy the judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the post-judgment sanctions order, holding that the district court erred in (1) ordering Rhonda to produce documents and appear for an examination regarding her personal finances without Far West proceeding against Rhonda in her individual capacity or without the court clerk issuing a subpoena and Far West serving the subpoena on Rhonda; and (2) ordering Rhonda’s personal bank accounts to be executed upon pursuant to rule 37 and section 21.320 and to be applied to partially satisfy the judgment. View "Mona v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

David Pratt obtained court orders requiring his ex-wife, Cynthia Vedder, to pay child support and expenses. Vedder was the beneficiary of a trust established by her grandparents. Pratt filed a petition to compel Robert Ferguson, the trustee of the Borgert Vedder and Nellie A. Vedder Revocable Trust, to satisfy the orders from Vedder's share of the trust estate. The trial court denied the petition based on a clause in the trust that prohibited the Trustee from making certain distributions if they would become subject to Vedder's creditors' claims (the shutdown clause). After review, the Court of Appeal held that, notwithstanding the shutdown clause, Probate Code section 15305 gave the trial court discretion to order a trustee to make distributions of income and principal to satisfy the final child support orders. Pratt's petition also sought the imposition of a judgment lien on Vedder's interest in the trust estate to satisfy a community property judgment that he held against her. The trial court relied on the shutdown clause to deny the petition for a lien. Because Pratt was entitled to a judgment lien on the trust to satisfy the community property judgment, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Probate Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeal reversed that portion of the trial court's order too. View "Pratt v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

K.P. appealed an order appointing a conservator and co-guardians for his adult uncle, R.G. In September 2014, R.G. lived in one of several mobile homes on land in rural McKenzie County owned by him and members of his family. R.G.'s brother helped care for him until that brother died in May 2014. According to R.G., his niece, S.P., became his caregiver after his brother's death, and she lived near Billings and usually saw him once or twice a month. In September 2014, law enforcement officers raided the property where R.G.'s mobile home was located as part of an investigation of others. According to a McKenzie County Deputy Sheriff, R.G.'s mobile home had dog feces throughout and did not have running water, a sewer or septic system, a furnace, a working refrigerator, or an adequate food supply. After the law enforcement raid, C.G., a niece of R.G.'s, petitioned for appointment of an emergency conservator and guardian for her uncle, alleging he was between 86 and 87 years old and was being unduly influenced by S.P., who was nominated as his attorney-in-fact under a July 2014 durable power of attorney. C.G.'s petition sought to have R.G. declared an incapacitated person and to establish protective proceedings for his residential, medical, and financial affairs. C.G. thereafter petitioned for appointment of a conservator and a guardian for R.G. At the hearing, K.P. testified his sister, S.P., was willing to waive her appointment as her uncle's designated attorney-in-fact and healthcare agent under the July 2014 power of attorney and K.P. sought to be appointed as his uncle's conservator and guardian as the named alternate under that document. The court appointed GAPS, K.N., and S.S., a granddaughter of R.G.'s brother, as co-guardians and appointed American State Bank & Trust as conservator for R.G. K.P. appealed that decision. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding good cause not to appoint K.P. as guardian and conservator for R.G. and did not abuse its discretion in appointing other individuals and entities as conservator and co-guardians for R.G. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of R.G." on Justia Law

In this case the competent spouse, Lynn Bower unquestionably paid for the support and maintenance of her conservatee husband David. In fact she devoted about 72 percent of the couple’s $200,000 marital estate income to making the $12,000 a month payments to a home specializing in Alzheimer’s care for David. What she didn’t do was comply with the letter of an order of the probate court to pay lump sum large professional fee claims directly to David’s conservator and several other creditors. Instead she either paid those claims directly herself, or those claims were paid indirectly from escrows based on liens asserted by the relevant professionals. Based on the literal noncompliance with the terms of the order, the probate judge ordered the community estate of the Bowers divided, with the conservator receiving David’s share. Because the probate court erroneously proceeded on the premise that article 3 of part 6, division 4 of the Probate Code, section 3089, was triggered by noncompliance with orders to pay professional fees directly to the conservator in a lump sum, rather than refusal to comply with an order to support the conservatee spouse, the Court of Appeal reversed an order dividing the estate and remanded the matter to the trial level for application of the proper standard to the facts of this case. View "Conservatorship of Bower" on Justia Law

Roy Volk and Pamela Dee Volk had a son, RBV, in the fall of 2000. In 2011, the marriage was dissolved. At the time of the divorce, Roy owned two term life insurance policies. While a statutorily-mandated temporary restraining order was still in effect, Roy changed the beneficiary designations on both policies and designated his sister, Valerie Goeser, as the new beneficiary. Just over four months after the divorce was final, Roy died. Valerie received the life insurance proceeds from both policies. Pamela subsequently filed this action on behalf of RBV against Valerie and Roy’s estate seeking a constructive trust over the insurance policy payouts for the benefit of RBV. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valerie, concluding that Valerie was not unjustly enriched when she received Roy’s life insurance proceeds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Valerie was unjustly enriched because Roy’s errors in changing the beneficiary of his life insurance under the statutorily-mandated restraining order invalidated his designations on the insurance policies, and a constructive trust was created on RBV's behalf as a result of these errors. Remanded. View "Volk v. Goeser" on Justia Law

After Eric Zornes won a lottery, Eric and his wife, Julia, commenced a gifting plan to Andy Wolfe, Jason Wolfe, and Jason Reed. These gifts were structured as loans, and each borrower made a promissory note for his loan, payable to Julia’s and Eric’s revocable trusts jointly. Andy’s note was secured by a deed of trust for real property. Julia and Eric later divorced pursuant to a settlement agreement. When Eric found that Andy’s house had been sold and that Julia had retained the proceeds of the sale, Eric filed this complaint alleging that Julia had converted the proceeds of Andy’s note. Julia counterclaimed for partition of the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Julia, concluding that even if Julia had converted the proceeds, the settlement agreement operated as an accord and satisfaction. The court also ordered partition of the promissory notes for Jason Wolfe’s and Jason Reed’s loans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Eric was not entitled to summary judgment on his conversion claim; (2) the settlement agreement did not constitute an accord and satisfaction; and (3) the lower court erred in the method by which it partitioned the Jason Wolfe and Jason Reed notes. View "Zornes v. Zornes" on Justia Law

Judith Mortner, temporary administrator of the estate of respondent Theodore Mortner (Husband), appealed, and petitioner, Lynn Mortner (Wife), cross-appealed a circuit court order abating the Wife’s divorce action and vacating its prior final divorce decree. Husband and Wife were married in July 1987. In October 2013, Wife filed a petition for divorce when she was 70 years old and still working and Husband was approximately 90 years old and still working. In July 2014, Husband, Wife, and their counsel signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) purporting to settle the divorce action. The MOU was filed with the court in September with a cover letter reminding the court that the divorce decree was not to issue until counsel notified the court that it could issue. On October 29, Husband’s counsel hand-delivered to the court a letter advising that the decree could now issue. On October 30, the court signed an order that decreed the parties divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences, approved the MOU, and incorporated it as part of the divorce decree. Unbeknownst to the court, Husband died on either one or two days prior to its order. Also unbeknownst to the court, the parties on October 29, through their counsel, entered into an amendment to their proposed final decree of divorce and their MOU. Wife subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the issuance of the divorce decree, requesting the court to vacate the decree on the ground that, before the court had signed its October 30 order, Husband had died. In its appeal, the Estate argued that the trial court erred by abating the divorce action. In her cross-appeal, Wife argued that the Estate lacked standing to contest the abatement and that its appeal should therefore be dismissed. She also argued that the trial court erred when it allowed Husband’s counsel to appear at the hearing on her motion to abate the divorce. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "In the Matter of Lynn Mortner and Theodore Mortner" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on the validity of a 1995 Florida divorce decree. Sarath Sapukotana (Sarath) and Palihawadanage Ramya Chandralatha Fernando (Fernando) were married in Sri Lanka in 1992. Sarath moved to the United States a year later. In 1995, a Florida court entered an uncontested divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Sarath and Fernando. In 2004, Sarath then married Martha Gay Weaver Sapukotana (Martha) in Mississippi. Sarath died intestate in 2008 from injuries which led to a wrongful death suit. The trial court granted Martha’s petition to be named the administratrix of the estate, over the objection of Fernando, Sarath’s first wife. This allowed Martha to file, and later to settle, the wrongful death claim. Fernando claims that the 1995 Florida divorce decree was fraudulent and void for lack of service of process, and that she instead was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate and to the proceeds of the wrongful death action. Fernando filed a motion to vacate the chancery court’s decision to appoint Martha as administratrix of Sarath’s estate. The chancery court dismissed Fernando’s motion and held that Martha was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate. Fernando appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court, finding that the chancery court lacked authority to vacate the 1995 Florida divorce decree. View "In Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Sarath Sapukotana" on Justia Law

During the course of their marriage, Caroline, a citizen of Canada, made more than $75,000 in loans to Kimberly, of Ohio, which were never repaid. A federal district court dismissed Caroline’s contract and tort lawsuit. While appeal was pending, Kimberly died and Caroline substituted the Estate as the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal, finding that neither the domestic relations exception nor the probate exception to federal diversity under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) applied. Because a court in Canada had dismissed divorce proceedings upon notice of Caroline’s death, there was no risk of a decision incompatible with a divorce decree, and, at the time Caroline filed the federal complaint, the property that she sought was not “in the custody of a state probate court.” View "Chevalier v. Barnhart" on Justia Law