Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The respondent, Justin Nadeau (husband), appealed the final decree of divorce from the petitioner, Michelle Nadeau (wife), issued by the Circuit Court. The husband argued that the trial court erred in dividing the marital estate and denying his request for alimony. Additionally, the husband and his parents, James and Gail Nadeau, contended that the trial court erred in adding the parents to the action for discovery purposes only.The Circuit Court found that the parties had a wedding ceremony in June 2009, but the officiant's license had lapsed, leading to a second civil ceremony in July 2009. Before the June ceremony, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement. The husband owned properties in Rye and Portsmouth, which were transferred to a trust managed by his father before the second ceremony. The wife discovered these transfers in 2012 during an investigation by the Attorney General’s Office. The Rye property was sold in 2013 or 2014, and the State Street property was sold during the divorce proceedings. The wife filed for divorce in May 2020, and the trial court joined the husband’s parents for discovery purposes due to the husband's non-compliance with discovery orders.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that the trial court did not err in treating the State Street and Rye properties as part of the marital estate, as the transfers were likely fraudulent and diminished the marital estate's value. The court also found that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in awarding the wife the proceeds from her personal injury settlement. Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court's decision to join the husband’s parents for discovery purposes did not affect the outcome of the case, as the adverse inferences were drawn from the husband's own actions. View "In the Matter of Nadeau & Nadeau" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether the proceeds of an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) should be included in the estate of a deceased individual, Thomas Reich, for the purpose of calculating the share of his surviving spouse, Pamela Reich, as an "omitted spouse" under California law. Thomas had created a revocable trust in 2003, which was amended in 2016, to distribute his assets upon his death. He designated his daughter and granddaughter as beneficiaries of the IRA, which had a balance of approximately $1.5 million at the time of his death. Thomas married Pamela in 2020 but did not update his trust to provide for her before his death in 2021.Pamela initially filed a petition seeking an omitted spouse's share of Thomas's estate, including the IRA proceeds. The Los Angeles County Superior Court overruled a demurrer by the trust's beneficiaries, suggesting that the IRA proceeds might be included in the estate. However, a partial settlement was reached, excluding the IRA proceeds from Pamela's share. Pamela then filed two new petitions regarding her entitlement to the IRA proceeds, which were assigned to a different judge.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the probate court's orders dismissing Pamela's petitions. The court held that the IRA proceeds are nonprobate assets and do not pass through the decedent's testamentary trust to the separate trusts created for the beneficiaries. Therefore, the IRA proceeds are not part of Thomas's "estate" for the purpose of calculating Pamela's omitted spouse's share. The court also noted that the prior demurrer ruling was not controlling in this context. View "Reich v. Reich" on Justia Law

J.F.R., an 80-year-old individual diagnosed with cognitive impairments and dementia, lives with her daughter Stephanie in Montana. A dispute arose between Stephanie and J.F.R.'s other daughter, Jana, regarding J.F.R.'s care and financial management. Jana filed a petition for the appointment of both daughters as co-guardians and co-conservators, while J.F.R. supported Stephanie's appointment as sole guardian and conservator. The District Court initially appointed both daughters as temporary co-guardians and co-conservators but later vacated this order, directing the parties to proceed with discovery.The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Granite County, held a hearing and found substantial evidence of financial mismanagement and communication issues between the daughters. The court noted that J.F.R.'s assets were being depleted rapidly and that her current advisors were insufficient to protect her financial interests. Consequently, the court appointed the Western Montana Chapter for Prevention of Elder Abuse (Western) as J.F.R.'s temporary conservator and Western, Stephanie, and Jana as temporary co-guardians.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the District Court did not err in determining that J.F.R.'s welfare required immediate action, justifying the appointment of a temporary guardian and conservator. The court also found no abuse of discretion in appointing Western, despite the statutory order of priority, as the circumstances warranted a neutral third party. Additionally, the court ruled that Western's dual role as co-guardian and conservator did not violate statutory provisions, and the appointment of a neuropsychologist for evaluation was appropriate under the circumstances. View "In re J.F.R." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie. The plaintiff, Marcia Sallum Glassie, was married to Donelson C. Glassie, and they divorced in 1993. According to their property-settlement agreement, the testator was to execute a will that would treat his obligations under the agreement as a claim against his estate and bequest to the plaintiff an amount equal to said obligations. A dispute arose over what the agreement required of the testator’s will. In 1997, a Family Court justice determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a bequest of a sum equal to the testator’s obligations. The testator died in 2011, and the plaintiff filed a claim for $2,000,000 against the testator’s estate a year later, which the defendant disallowed.The case was previously reviewed by the Superior Court, which awarded the plaintiff $2,000,000, less the proceeds of a life insurance policy that she received upon the testator’s death and attorneys’ fees. However, this judgment was vacated by the Supreme Court on multiple grounds, including that the disputed provision in the will was ambiguous and required factfinding and conclusions of law with respect to the testator’s intent.In the current review by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice made numerous prejudicial evidentiary rulings that prevented her from presenting her case. After reviewing the record and considering the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found no error in the trial justice’s decisions to prevent the plaintiff from presenting evidence regarding a trust, to allow the defendant to withdraw certain admissions, to admit evidence of a life insurance policy, and to allow evidence of the defendant’s post-death conduct. The court also found that the plaintiff had not preserved her argument regarding the trial justice’s decision to prevent her from examining the defendant about his counterclaim. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Peter Galbraith, II, the ward, and Belinda Galbraith were married in 2015. Between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and later deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. In 2022, she asked Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother to take care of him, and he was moved out of the marital home. In 2023, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship over him and filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The trial court initially held that the guardian did not have the authority to file a divorce petition on behalf of the ward. After obtaining authorization from the guardianship court, the guardian refiled the petition. However, the trial court again dismissed the petition, stating that Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The guardian appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the guardianship court from authorizing a guardian to file a divorce petition on behalf of a ward. The court found that the guardian was acting to protect the ward's rights and manage his financial resources, which aligns with the purpose of the Act. The court also held that the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The court concluded that the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between a decedent's wife and the co-personal representatives of the decedent's estate over the ownership of $100,000 and a camper under the terms of a premarital agreement. The decedent's wife, Yvonne M. White, argued that she was entitled to these assets based on the premarital agreement she had with her late husband, Leonard P. White. The co-personal representatives of Leonard's estate, his sons Jamison Patrick White and Ryan Howard White, contested this claim.The District Court for Washington County, Nebraska, ruled in favor of Yvonne, awarding her the $100,000 and the camper. The co-personal representatives appealed this decision to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling. They then sought further review from the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court found that Yvonne's suit for the $100,000 and the camper did not constitute a "claim" against the estate, but rather, she was a beneficiary of the estate entitled to the assets she sought under a breach of contract theory according to the terms of the premarital agreement. Therefore, her suit was not subject to the nonclaim statute's requirements for the timely filing of a claim. The court also found that the camper was a joint asset under the premarital agreement, rejecting the co-personal representatives' argument that it was the decedent's separate property. View "White v. White" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed a district court decision denying Chad Hanson's petition to be recognized as the heir of the late Arlen Lindberg. Lindberg died intestate, and Hanson filed a petition alleging that he was Lindberg's biological son, substantiating his claim with an affidavit from his mother and DNA testing results showing a 99.7% chance of relation to Lindberg's biological brother. The Lindberg family opposed the petition, arguing that Lindberg's parental rights were terminated when Hanson was adopted by his stepfather. The district court ruled in favor of the Lindberg family, interpreting North Dakota's Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Parentage Act to require that a paternity action commence within two years of birth, which was not the case for Hanson. However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the district court had applied the law incorrectly. The Supreme Court ruled that the Uniform Probate Code allows for establishing a "genetic father" through genetic testing or the Uniform Parentage Act, and that the act of adoption does not equate to an adjudication of paternity. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Estate of Lindberg" on Justia Law

In this California appellate case, the key issue was whether non-monetary benefits, specifically room and board, constituted "remuneration" within the meaning of Probate Code section 21362, a provision relating to the presumption of fraud or undue influence for donative transfers to caregivers of dependent adults. The case arose when the defendant, Elvira Gutierrez, who provided care services to the decedent in exchange for room and board, was named as the sole beneficiary in the decedent’s testamentary instruments. The plaintiffs, relatives of the decedent, argued that Gutierrez was a "care custodian" under the Probate Code, and that her receipt of the decedent’s estate should be presumed to be the product of fraud or undue influence. The trial court initially ruled that Gutierrez was not a care custodian because room and board did not constitute remuneration for her services. However, the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that "remuneration" as used in section 21362 does include room and board. The Court found that such an interpretation was consistent with the term's ordinary usage, the legislative intent to protect vulnerable adults from financial exploitation, and its interpretation in other legal contexts. The Court therefore concluded that Gutierrez was a care custodian under the statute, and the decedent’s donative gifts to her were subject to the presumption of fraud or undue influence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the distribution decisions of the district court in the underlying divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust and affirmed its decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the revocable inter vivos family trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action and that the district court had the authority to distribute the trust's assets; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the trust's assets between the parties as community property. View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Daniel Barefoot, as a personal representative and legatee of the estate of Danny Bryant Barefoot, appealed a probate court order that determined the estate of Donna Viola Barefoot was entitled to a share of Danny's estate on the basis that Donna was an omitted spouse under § 43-8-90, Ala. Code 1975. Danny executed a will in August 2012, while married to Merita Hall Barefoot. In the will, other than a specific bequest to his and Merita's son, Daniel, Danny devised his residuary estate to Merita. Danny specified that, if Merita predeceased him, his estate would be shared jointly in equal shares by Daniel and Marcie Jenkins, whom he identified in the will as his stepdaughter. Danny also named Daniel and Marcie as corepresentatives of his estate. Merita died on September 6, 2014. On January 21, 2018, Danny married Donna. Danny and Donna did not execute a prenuptial agreement, and Danny did not execute a new will or a codicil to his previous will to include any testamentary dispositions to Donna. Danny died on September 5, 2021. Twelve days later, on September 17, 2021, Donna died. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the appeal was from a nonfinal order and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Barefoot v. Cole" on Justia Law