Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Husband and wife executed a will in 1980, which was expressly identified as being "joint and mutual," bequeathing all of their property to each other as the survivor in fee simple and at the death of the survivor, the residue of the estate was to be divided equally among husband's two children, David and Darrell, and wife's two children, Deana and Diane. After husband died in 2005, wife probated the 1980 will, became the executor, and conveyed husband's estate to herself. In November 2005, wife executed another will which could, at her death, leave 20% of the estate to appellant, Deana, and the residue to the children of Deana and Diane. Deana then obtained wife's power of attorney and conveyed all of her mother's real estate to her two children and to appellee, Diane's child. When wife died in 2008, Deana offered the 2005 will for probate and Diane filed a caveat and also sought to petition the 1980 will as the last will and testament. The court held that the trial court did not err when it applied the law in place before the 1998 probate code was adopted to determine whether husband and wife had a contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it concluded that the 1980 will was joint and mutual and that husband and wife had an enforceable contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it did not in fact find that the fee simple conveyance to wife was a marital trust; when it made no rulings as to whether wife's 2005 will was a contract, and as such, that issue could not be raised on appeal; and when the 1980 will specifically provided that the residue of the survivor's estate was to be divided equally among the four children. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order that the 1980 will would be specifically enforced by equity.

Appellant, owner of sixty-seven shares of corporate stock of Burnett Livestock Company, appealed the district court's summary judgment that imposed a constructive trust upon those sixty-seven shares for the benefit of several of her relatives including appellees, her aunt and uncle, in accordance with the provisions of a document entitled Agreement for Disposition of Rental and/or Royalty Income, signed on February 20, 1989 by appellant's mother and appellant's grandmother. At issue was whether the evidence submitted supported the parties' respective motions for summary judgment. The court reversed the order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees and remanded for further proceedings holding that there was insufficient evidence on the record to prove the elements of a constructive trust.

Plaintiffs, Eva D. and Lee J. Kelly, appealed the district court's finding that they exercised undue influence over Robert Lee McNeel and invalidated the trust and will in which Mr. McNeel had named Ms. Kelly as one of two beneficiaries in place of his son. Plaintiffs also appealed the district court's grant, in a separate proceeding, to remove Ms. Kelly as Mr. McNeel's guardian and conservator and appointment of the son to replace her. At issue was whether the district court's finding of undue influence and removal of plaintiff as guardian and conservator of Mr. McNeel's trust was clearly erroneous. The court held that, in light of the circumstances, the district court did not err in its order invalidating the 2005 trust amendment and will and that the district court had the authority to remove plaintiff as guardian conservator upon determining that she was not acting in the best interest of Mr. McNeel.

Fifteen-month-old Trayvon Scroggins died in June, 2006 after being hit by a taxicab. Trayvon was survived by his mother, Appellee Evon Medlock, his father, Appellant Tremayne Scoggins, and one sister. Appellant was serving time at a federal penitentiary at the time of Trayvonâs birth and death. Appellee was Trayvonâs sole caregiver, and was named special administratrix of his estate. On opening Trayvonâs estate, Appellee asserted that Appellant was Trayvonâs biological father, but because he was in prison, no claim as a beneficiary would be asserted on his behalf unless it was determined that he was entitled to any benefits under state law. Subsequent to her appointment as administratrix, Appellee filed a wrongful-death and survival action against the cab company. The suit ended in settlement. But at the hearing, the circuit court appointed counsel to represent Appellantâs interests. In 2009, Appellant filed a motion to establish paternity of Trayvon. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the paternity suit, arguing that state law has a mechanism for establishing paternity when one of the parents is dead, but not when the child is dead. Appellee argued that the circuit court could not exercise jurisdiction over a deceased child. The circuit court dismissed the paternity suit, holding it was outside its statutory powers to hear the case. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that court dismissed the appeal as moot. The Supreme Court was âmindfulâ of Appellantâs assertion that he had a right to participate in Trayvonâs wrongful-death action. Beneficiaries of a wrongful-death action include the surviving parents and siblings. However, the Court held it âwill not read words into a statutory provision that are not there.â The Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellantâs petition.