Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This was an action for approval of accounting and termination of a testamentary trust. Jean I. Willey, the testator, had four sons: Todd, Mark, Scott, and Dale. Todd, filed a motion seeking approval of the trust accounting and the termination of Mark's supplemental needs trust, the corpus of which, according to Todd, was reduced to around $5,000 and should be turned over to Mark (via his guardians). The petition to approve the accounting and terminate the trust was opposed by Mark and Scott, together with Scott's wife (collectively, the "Objectors"). The Objectors made three objections to the Petition to Terminate the Estate: the gift of money from Jean to Todd during her lifetime worked an ademption on the bequest to Todd of a portion of the residue of Jean's estate; Jean's real property, which passed to the four brothers as co-tenants, and which was informally managed as a rental property for several years by Dale, generated more income than had been distributed to the brothers; and the language in the will which they construed as creating in Jean's real property a life estate for Mark. The court denied all of the Objector's objections and granted the Trustee's Petition to Approve the Accounting and the Dissolution of the Trust. The court also held that the trustee should submit a form of order consistent with the opinion within thirty calendar days.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the distribution formula of an irrevocable trust that Wilbert L. and Genevieve W. Gore set up for the benefit of their grandchildren (Pokeberry Trust). The court held that the October Instrument governed the Pokeberry Trust; the Pokeberry Formula would be applied to determine how the corpus of the trust would be distributed among the Gores' nineteen natural-born children; and Jan C. was neither a grandchild of the Gores for purposes of the Pokeberry Trust nor entitled to any relief other than what he was granted by the September Opinion. Counsel was requested to confer and to submit an implementing order.

This case stemmed from an adverse possession property dispute in Sussex County, Delaware. The court found that petitioners were, by at least 1980, aware of (and, therefore, on notice of) the claims of William Wiggins to the exclusive, fee simple ownership, as a surviving husband of Anna Wiggins, to attractive real property. The court also held that William's possession was known to plaintiffs at least by then to be exclusive as to them. Therefore, with these findings of fact, the rights of William and, thus, those claiming under him, including Parker Enterprises, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (Parker), now the only record owner of the property, to title by adverse possession, were hereby confirmed in light of passage of more than twenty years between 1980 and 2006, the date when this action was commenced. Accordingly, Parker had demonstrated that it was the fee simple owner of the property and that the remaining plaintiffs have no right to the property.

This case stemmed from the long-running dispute between Vickie Lynn Marshall and E. Pierce Marshall over the fortune of J. Howard Marshall II, a man believed to have been one of the richest people in Texas. Vickie married J. Howard, Pierce's father, approximately a year before his death. Shortly before J. Howard died, Vickie filed a suit against Pierce in Texas state court asserting that J. Howard meant to provide for Vickie through a trust, and Pierce tortiously interfered with that gift. The litigation worked its way through state and federal courts in Louisiana, Texas, and California, and two of those courts, a Texas state probate court and the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, reached contrary decisions on its merits. The Court of Appeals subsequently held that the Texas state decision controlled after concluding that the Bankruptcy Court lacked the authority to enter final judgment on a counterclaim that Vickie brought against Pierce in her bankruptcy proceeding. At issue was whether the Bankruptcy Court Judge, who did not enjoy tenure and salary protections pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, had the statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. 157(b) to issue a final judgment on Vickie's counterclaims and, if so, whether conferring that authority on the Bankruptcy Court was constitutional. The Court held that the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on Vickie's counterclaim as a core proceeding under section 157(b)(2)(C). The Court held, however, that the Bankruptcy Court lacked the constitutional authority under Article III to enter final judgment on a state law counterclaim that was not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's proof claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

Virginia McClung appealed a circuit court judgment that reformed a deed that conveyed an interest in land to her and her brother. In 1979 Ms. McClungâs parents divorced. Their separation agreement conveyed two parcels of property to their adult children, Ms. McClung and Charles Green, as "tenants in common, reserving unto [the parents] a life estate therein." At that time, none of the parties recognized a discrepancy between the separation agreement and the actual deed, which conveyed the property to the siblings as "joint tenants with the right of survivorship." The deed was recorded, the parents divorced, and the divorce decree "ratified and confirmed" the separation agreement. In 1992, Charles Green died. His sole heir was his 21-year-old daughter, Bridget Williams. Loretta Green, Ms. McClungâs mother died in 2007 leaving Ms. McClung as her sole heir. Subsequently, a dispute arose between Senior Green and his daughter over who was entitled to the rental income Loretta had previously received from the property. The father sued his daughter seeking all rents received from the property. In his suit, Mr. Green argued that he and his ex-wife intended that his children take the property as tenants-in-common after his and Lorettaâs life estates expired. But owing to a mutual mistake, the deed had erroneously conveyed the property as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Mr. Greenâs granddaughter joined in the lawsuit because she inherited her fatherâs interest in the property if the court reformed the deed. A month after he commenced his suit, Mr. Green died. The trial court ruled in his (and his granddaughterâs) favor, and Ms. McClung appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the trial record, the court found that before the 1979 deed could be reformed, there must be evidence to indicate that Loretta Green did not intend to convey the property to her children as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Neither the separation agreement nor the recorded deed accurately reflected Lorettaâs intent at the time either document was executed. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial courtâs reformation of the 1979 deed was inappropriate. The Court reversed the lower courtâs decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, the father of decedent, commenced an action seeking to recover from defendants, decedent's grandparents, for decedent's wrongful death and for her conscious pain and suffering where she accidentally drowned in defendants' pool. At issue was an exclusion in defendants' homeowner's insurance policy excluding coverage for bodily injury to an insured where an insured would receive "any benefit" under the policy. The court held that judgment should have been granted in plaintiff's favor where the exclusion did not operate to bar coverage for the noninsured plaintiff's wrongful death claim for the death of the insured decedent. Accordingly, the court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Lucien Cabrel died in December 1963 and Cabrel's wife and four minor children were the recipients of a joint award of year's support in 1964. In 2000, Cabrel's two daughters filed a petition to partition real property in Henry and Spalding counties in which property the daughters claimed an interest by virtue of the 1964 joint award of year's support. The daughters also sought an accounting and to recover from their mother income generated by the property between 1964-1997. In Case No. S11A0212, the mother appealed the denial of summary judgment on the partitioning issue and in Case No. S11A0214, the daughters took issue with the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment, its failure to conduct a hearing on their motion for attorney fees, and its determinations that they were barred from having an accounting and were not entitled to prejudgment interest. The court held that since the motion to set aside was filed more than three years after the entry of judgment of partition and that judgment was made by a court with jurisdiction, the trial court did not err when it denied the mother's motion to set aside the judgment of partition. The court held also that the partitioning judgment was not appealed and the daughters cannot now complain that they had a greater interest in the property than that which was awarded in 2004; that the trial court did not err in concluding that the daughters were not entitled to income from the property where they did not meet certain contingencies; and that the trial court did not err when it did not award attorney fees since the daughters were not awarded any damages.

Husband and wife executed a will in 1980, which was expressly identified as being "joint and mutual," bequeathing all of their property to each other as the survivor in fee simple and at the death of the survivor, the residue of the estate was to be divided equally among husband's two children, David and Darrell, and wife's two children, Deana and Diane. After husband died in 2005, wife probated the 1980 will, became the executor, and conveyed husband's estate to herself. In November 2005, wife executed another will which could, at her death, leave 20% of the estate to appellant, Deana, and the residue to the children of Deana and Diane. Deana then obtained wife's power of attorney and conveyed all of her mother's real estate to her two children and to appellee, Diane's child. When wife died in 2008, Deana offered the 2005 will for probate and Diane filed a caveat and also sought to petition the 1980 will as the last will and testament. The court held that the trial court did not err when it applied the law in place before the 1998 probate code was adopted to determine whether husband and wife had a contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it concluded that the 1980 will was joint and mutual and that husband and wife had an enforceable contract not to revoke the 1980 will; when it did not in fact find that the fee simple conveyance to wife was a marital trust; when it made no rulings as to whether wife's 2005 will was a contract, and as such, that issue could not be raised on appeal; and when the 1980 will specifically provided that the residue of the survivor's estate was to be divided equally among the four children. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order that the 1980 will would be specifically enforced by equity.

Appellant, owner of sixty-seven shares of corporate stock of Burnett Livestock Company, appealed the district court's summary judgment that imposed a constructive trust upon those sixty-seven shares for the benefit of several of her relatives including appellees, her aunt and uncle, in accordance with the provisions of a document entitled Agreement for Disposition of Rental and/or Royalty Income, signed on February 20, 1989 by appellant's mother and appellant's grandmother. At issue was whether the evidence submitted supported the parties' respective motions for summary judgment. The court reversed the order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees and remanded for further proceedings holding that there was insufficient evidence on the record to prove the elements of a constructive trust.

Plaintiffs, Eva D. and Lee J. Kelly, appealed the district court's finding that they exercised undue influence over Robert Lee McNeel and invalidated the trust and will in which Mr. McNeel had named Ms. Kelly as one of two beneficiaries in place of his son. Plaintiffs also appealed the district court's grant, in a separate proceeding, to remove Ms. Kelly as Mr. McNeel's guardian and conservator and appointment of the son to replace her. At issue was whether the district court's finding of undue influence and removal of plaintiff as guardian and conservator of Mr. McNeel's trust was clearly erroneous. The court held that, in light of the circumstances, the district court did not err in its order invalidating the 2005 trust amendment and will and that the district court had the authority to remove plaintiff as guardian conservator upon determining that she was not acting in the best interest of Mr. McNeel.