Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was the wife of Kenneth Otto, who was convicted of the murder of Shamaia Smith. Before his conviction, Otto transferred title to certain property to Defendant. Otto and Defendant subsequently received a judgment of dissolution, which included a division of the marital property. During a hearing in the wrongful death action filed by the estate of Smith against Otto, the trial court found that Smith's estate was a creditor of Otto and that the transfer of Otto's assets to Defendant was fraudulent. Plaintiff, administratrix of Smith's estate, filed an action against Defendant pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, along with an application for a prejudgment remedy. The trial court concluded that there was probable cause to show that the assets transferred from Otto to Defendant through the dissolution action were fraudulent transfers and awarded Plaintiff a prejudgment remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim under the Act; (2) the trial court's determination that the dissolution action was undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Smith's estate was proper; and (3) the trial court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because it could grant practical relief under the Act.

Petitioners Todd and Trent Bemis appealed a probate court order that dismissed their petition for guardianship over the person and estate of their step-father Dr. Raymond B. More than seven months after Dr. B left an assisted-living facility in Florida, Petitioners filed their petition for guardianship when Dr. B engaged in behavior the Supreme Court "assume[d] was evidence of his legal incapacity at that time." The petition contained no allegations about the doctor’s behavior, and Petitioners had no contact with him after he left Florida. Dr. B objected to a request for a psychological evaluation, and moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that it was "per se defective" because the guardianship statute requires that all evidence of a proposed ward's inability to care for himself "must have occurred within 6 months prior to the filing of the petition and at least one incidence of such behavior must have occurred within 20 days of the filing of the petition." After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition and denied the petitioners' motion for a psychiatric evaluation. The petitioners appealed both decisions. Finding that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the doctor’s interest in freedom from an unwanted psychological examination outweighed the petitioners' interests in procuring evidence of his alleged incapacity, the Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's decision.

Lee Paulson's mother and siblings appealed a district court's orders that interpreted his will in favor of his fiancee, Robyn Risovi, denied a motion for reconsideration, and order distribution of his estate. Lee Paulson and Risovi were engaged to be married, with a wedding set for July 18, 2009. On June 26, 2009, Lee Paulson and Risovi executed an antenuptial agreement. The antenuptial agreement contained several terms: an agreement by Lee Paulson to name Risovi as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, an agreement by Lee Paulson that his will would transfer specific real property to Risovi, and an agreement by Lee Paulson to establish a testamentary trust for the benefit of Risovi's daughter. On the same date, Lee Paulson executed a will. The will established the trust for Risovi's daughter, devised real property to "my wife, Robyn," bequeathed all of his tangible personal property to "my spouse, Robyn," if she survived him, and devised his residuary estate to "my spouse, if my spouse survives me[.]" Article Six of the will outlined the definitions governing the will, and provided, "My spouse's name is Robyn Risovi and all references in this Will to 'my spouse' are to her only." A footnote followed this statement: "This Will has been prepared in anticipation of the upcoming marriage of . . . Lee Paulson and Robyn Risovi set for July 18, 2009." Lee Paulson died on July 15, 2009. The district court declined to read the antenuptial agreement together with the will to determine Lee Paulson's testamentary intent, as encouraged by the Paulson family, because the antenuptial agreement was not incorporated into the will by reference. The Paulson family appealed, and the appeal was remanded to determine if the estate was supervised. After further review, the Supreme Court found no error in the district court's interpretation of the will in favor or Risovi.

Lorraine Flaws died testate but was predeceased by her named beneficiaries. Because Flaws' will did not designate contingent beneficiaries, the administration of her estate was governed by the laws of intestate succession. Prior to a hearing to determine heirs, a motion for partial summary judgment was filed claiming that Lorraine's niece, who was born to Lorraine's brother out of wedlock, did not have standing under the pertinent statutes to assert that she was an heir of the estate. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the niece did not comply with S.D. Codified Laws 29A-2-114, which sets forth the methods and time limits an individual born out of wedlock must comply with in order to establish parentage for purposes of intestate succession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a question remained as to whether Yvette failed to comply with any of the methods and time limits in the statute for establishing paternity. Remanded.

Appellant Anthony Hayes appealed a superior court order that denied his petition to enjoin a sheriff's sale and found a prejudgment attachment by Appellee Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC or Hospital) valid and executable. In 2006, Appellant's wife Karen was admitted to the SNMHC for medical treatment stemming from alcoholism. SNHMC filed suit in superior court against Appellant for his wife's unpaid medical bills. At the same time, the hospital petitioned to attach a portion of the couple's real estate owned as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. During the pendancy of the attachment proceedings, the Hayses divorced. Under the terms of their separation agreement, each was responsible for their own medical expenses not covered by insurance. Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the real estate. Shortly thereafter, she died. SNHMC obtained a limited probate administration in order to proceed with the sheriff's sale of the properties. The trial court found that Mrs. Hayes' interests in the subject properties remained valid and that SNHMC was entitled to execute its judgment against them. On appeal, Appellant contended that, because Mrs. Hayes quitclaimed her interest in the property prior to entry of final judgment against her, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to find that her death terminated SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that SNHMC’s prejudgment attachment was obtained and recorded during Mrs. Hayes' lifetime and while she held the property jointly with her husband. As such the hospital's judgment remained valid. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the hospital.

Caveators Celia Beth Simmons (Beth) and Lisa Kay Norton (Lisa) appealed from the grant of summary judgment to the propounder of the will of their father, Charles Powell Norton (Charles). Beth and Lisa contended that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment on their claim that the will was the product of undue influence on the part of their brother, Samuel. The court held that there was simply no evidence that Samuel exerted any influence over Charles in the making of the will and it was therefore not error to grant summary judgment.

As part of the distribution of property following the dissolution of Kenneth Treiger and J’Amy Lyn Owens’ marriage, a home belonging to them (the Maplewood property) was sold, and, pursuant to a trust agreement, the proceeds were deposited in a trust account. Bank of America NA (the Bank), which had obtained a writ of attachment on the Maplewood property, filed a declaratory judgment action to determine each party’s rights to the proceeds. This presented two issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) to determine whether the “Supplemental Decree of Dissolution” (Supplemental Decree) established a lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger; and (2) to determine whether various documents were valid judgments. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Supplemental Decree established an equitable lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger in the amount of one-half of the proceeds of the court-ordered sale of the property. Furthermore, Documents "1375" and "13761" were valid judgments entitling Treiger to further awards but that Document "1370" was properly not given separate effect. Accordingly, the Court affirm in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In May 2008, seven-year-old Jordan Alexander Robertson was placed in foster care at the home of Verlin Spurgeon and Carol Spurgeon. In June 2008, Jordan drowned in the Spurgeons' swimming pool. James Brakefield, as administrator of Jordan's estate, sued the Spurgeons, among others, in circuit court alleging that they had negligently and/or wantonly caused Jordan's death. The Spurgeons moved the circuit court for a summary judgment, alleging, among other things, that the claims were barred by the doctrines of parental, State, and State-agent immunity. The circuit court denied the motion. The Spurgeons petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted their petition in part and issued the writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss the negligence claims against the Spurgeons. In all other respects, the Court denied the petition.

Plaintiff Natalie Billings appealed a family court's final judgment order in favor of her husband Jireh Billings, Sr.  Plaintiff argued on appeal: (1) the family court abused its discretion by granting husband's motion in limine excluding evidence of any revocable trusts or wills under which he may be a beneficiary; (2) the family court abused its discretion when it refused to include as marital property suitable for distribution two irrevocable trusts of which husband is a beneficiary; and (3) the family court abused its discretion by nullifying husband's maintenance arrearage of $8,312.74.  Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the family court's decision with regard to the distribution of property and the maintenance award. The Court affirmed the family court on all other issues. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Justine Critzer died intestate with, apparently, no spouse, siblings, children or parents to survive her. Nancy Donak, the administratrix of Critzer's estate, subsequently discovered that the Mary Kummer ("Mrs. Kummer"), the deceased mother of Richard and Charles Kummer and Jane Kummer Stolte ("Kummer children"), was the biological sister of Critzer. Consequently, the Kummer children were Critzer's closest surviving heirs. After the Kummer children began to administer the estate, Donak filed a motion for rule to show cause against distribution based upon the fact that Mrs. Kummer had been adopted at the age of fifty-three by her aunt by marriage. At a hearing to determine the effect of Mrs. Kummer's adoption, the court held (1) the Kummer children were not Critzer's heirs at law because Mrs. Kummer's adoption severed their legal ties to Critzer and her estate, and (2) Virginia's statutory scheme does not distinguish between the adoption of an adult and the adoption of a minor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the Kummer children were not heirs-at-law of the Critzer estate because their mother's adult adoption severed their inheritance rights.