Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a separation agreement made thirty-seven years ago between a now-deceased husband and plaintiff, his first wife. Plaintiff contended that her ex-husband promised to devise to her certain assets upon his death, and she brought various claims for equitable relief against defendant, her ex-husband's second wife, who survived him. The superior court concluded that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, plaintiff argued that this conclusion was erroneous because, under the governing Massachusetts law, claims based on a contract to make a will do not accrue until the promisor's death. Although the Supreme Court accepted plaintiff's legal premise, it do not accept that it governed this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "Mueller v. Mueller and Joseph F. Mueller Trust" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Walbridge appealed a superior court order that denied her petition to establish her homestead right exempt from the mortgage held by Respondents the Estate of Raymond Beaudoin, Jr. and its co-administrators Steven Beaudoin and Raymond Beaudoin, III. Petitioner owned property in Rochester that she purchased with her then-husband. At that time, it was undeveloped land. Petitioner executed a mortgage on the property and released her homestead rights to that property. Allegedly unbeknownst to Petitioner, her husband executed a mortgage deed and promissory note on the property in favor of the decedent Raymond Beaudoin once a home was built there. The mortgage on the property did not list it as part of the homestead of the mortgagor. Petitioner and her husband divorced, and pursuant to the divorce decree, she was awarded all right, title and interest in the property. The property was foreclosed upon. Petitioner filed a petition to establish that her homestead right to the property was exempt from Respondents' mortgage. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that her homestead right in the property was not established until she actually, physically occupied it. She contended that her "obvious intention of present and immediate occupancy of the home . . . followed by [her] actual occupancy within a reasonable time, was equivalent to actual occupancy." The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Walbridge v. The Estate of Raymond A. Beaudoin, Jr." on Justia Law

Husband died intestate in 2008. A woman, claiming to be his wife, was appointed as administrator of the estate. Petitioner, who resides in the Peoples’ Republic of China, alleged that she was the surviving spouse and sought an elective share. The petition was dismissed. According to petitioner, the first stipulation of dismissal was based upon counsel’s belief that the parties had reached a settlement, and the second stipulation of dismissal was to allow parallel litigation in Pennsylvania. Unable to resolve that litigation, petitioner filed the instant action in May 2011. In her belated response to a motion to dismiss, petitioner alleged that she was not informed of husband’s death for several weeks, and was not timely notified of appointment of the administrator. The court declined to set aside the dismissal. No petition for an extension of time for election was filed during the sixth-month period. The first petition was filed more than five months after the limitations period had expired, and the current petition was filed nearly two years after the limitations period had expired. View "in Re: Ren Xiong Estate" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edeltraud Elter-Nodvin appealed a superior court order that dismissed her claims against Respondents (her daughters) Leah and Madeline Nodvin. The claims sought to impose a constructive trust on insurance and retirement account proceeds that would otherwise pass to her daughters. Petitioner was married to Stephen Nodvin in 1986, and had Respondents. In 2009, Stephen filed for divorce, the couple separated, and Petitioner moved abroad. In October of that year, the family division issued an anti-hypothecation order instructing the parties to refrain from, among other things, disposing of marital property while proceedings were pending. Sometime thereafter, Stephen changed the beneficiaries of certain life insurance policies and retirement accounts from Petitioner to the couple’s daughters. After changing the beneficiaries, Stephen died. In 2011, Petitioner sued her daughters for the insurance and retirement account proceeds. She argued that the circumstances under which her husband changed his beneficiaries justified the imposition of a constructive trust. The daughters, one of whom was still a minor and represented by guardians, moved to dismiss the petition. They argued that Stephen’s change of beneficiaries did not violate the anti-hypothecation order, and, therefore, their status as the named beneficiaries entitled them to the proceeds of their father’s insurance policies and retirement accounts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Stephen's action did not violate the plain language of the anti-hypothecation order. Further, the Court held that the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's breach of contract and constructive trust claim because she failed to allege facts to establish a contract or a confidential relationship at the time Stephen changed beneficiaries: "while the divorce action was pending, Petitioner could not rely upon Stephen to provide for her based on a spousal obligation. Rather, if she wished to remain beneficiary of the insurance policies, she should have asked the court to order Stephen not to alter them." View "Elter-Nodvin v. Nodvin" on Justia Law

A woman died intestate survived by her husband and three adult children from a previous marriage. The husband had acquired a boat for a fishing charter business during his marriage to the decedent, but the boat and charter business were titled in his name alone. Relying on principles of equitable distribution for divorce cases, the estate's personal representative asked the court to include half the value of the boat and a skiff in the estate's property because marital funds had been used to purchase them. The court denied this request, and the estate's assets were distributed according to statute. The children appealed, contending their mother's estate held an undivided interest in the boats and business. Because the superior court correctly decided that the equitable distribution framework for divorce proceedings did not apply in probate proceedings, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Pestrikoff v. Hoff" on Justia Law

Richard Villars and Kathleen Villars were married in 1984, divorced in 2002. Richard served in the military for most of the marriage, first in the United States Air Force and later in the Alaska Air National Guard. Prior to filing their dissolution, the parties drafted a settlement agreement dividing their property such that each person was to receive half of the marital estate. The value of Richard’s military retirement benefits was not known at the time of dissolution because he had not yet qualified for benefits. However, Richard and Kathleen agreed to split the marital portion of Richard’s military retirement benefits 50/50 should Richard receive them. Richard began collecting his military retirement benefits in 2009 at the age of 48, twelve years earlier than he and Kathleen had expected at the time of dissolution. Kathleen asserted she was entitled to collect her marital portion of Richard’s military retirement benefits when Richard began collecting them. Richard disagreed, arguing that the parties intended Kathleen to collect only when Richard turned 60 years old. The superior court determined that the settlement agreement was unambiguous and the parties intended to divide equally the marital portion of Richard’s military retirement benefits when he began receiving them, not when he turned 60. The superior court ordered Richard to repay Kathleen 50% of the marital portion of the retirement benefits he had received to date. Richard appealed, arguing that the superior court’s finding on the parties’ intent was erroneous and that the retirement benefits were his separate property until he reached the age of 60. Richard further argued that the superior court impermissibly modified the settlement agreement. Because the findings of the superior court were not clearly erroneous and the superior court did not make an impermissible modification to the settlement agreement, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Villars v. Villars" on Justia Law

In 1976 Cecilia Kincaid Bates, grantor, and co-trustees George Kincaid and Richard Peterson entered into a trust agreement establishing the Cecilia Kincaid Gift Trust for George. George was Cecilia's son and died in 2009. In 2010 the co-trustees filed a final account, petition for settlement, distribution, and termination of the trust. When distributing the proceeds of the trust, the district court determined that Jennifer, George's child who was born and given up for adoption after the trust was established, should be included in the trust distribution. The trustees appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the plain language of the trust, Jennifer was not a descendant of George because she was adopted and was therefore regarded as the lawful blood descendant of the adopting parent or parents. Remanded. View "In re Kincaid Gift Trust" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lynne DiGaetano, Michael John DiGaetano, Christopher D. DiGaetano, Scott M. DiGaetano, and Shauna Arsenault, appealed a superior court order that granted the motion in limine of Defendant, John M. DiGaetano, to exclude parol evidence. Defendant cross-appealed a prior order of the same court that denied his motion to strike Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal. The matter arose from the distribution of trust proceeds from the death of the parties' parents-grandparents. Paragraph eleven of this trust provided that the trust “may be revoked in its entirety or amended from time to time by an instrument in writing executed by the said Donors jointly or by a surviving Donor.” The patriarch died in 2002, and the matriarch amended the trust in 2003 to establish Defendant as the sole trustee and beneficiary. Following his mother's death in 2006, Defendant sold the trust assets and collected the proceeds. Seeking to establish his right to the proceeds, Defendant petitioned the probate court who concluded that the 2003 amended trust was enforceable, and ruled in Defendant's favor. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they were entitled to a jury trial on the issues of whether the original trust was a contractual "common plan" and whether the matriarch breached that contract when she amended it. Defendant moved to strike Plaintiffs' notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's order denying Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs' notice of appeal: The Court was not persuaded by Plaintiffs' contention that the original trust was a contract, the existence of which would be evidence to reform the family trust and to impose a constructive trust in their favor. Plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion and remanded the case to dismiss Plaintiffs' appeal.

On May 29, 2009, Plaintiff Rose McCann filed a petition for divorce against Defendant Walter McCann in the Family Court. A judgment granting the divorce was later signed in early, 2010, leaving the identification, valuation, management, and partition of the community property as the remaining issues in the case. Plaintiff filed a petition for partition of community property, moving the court to appoint various experts to assist in the partition. The Family Court appointed real estate and financial experts to inventory and value the real estate, and determine the value of the remaining property. Thereafter, a “Notice of Filing of Succession” was filed, stating that Defendant's succession had been opened in the District Court under Probate. Plaintiff filed a motion to substitute the succession executrix the decedent's daughter, as the party defendant in the partition proceeding. The succession executrix filed a “Declinatory Exception of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Motion to Transfer,” seeking to have the partition action transferred to the District Court. The Family Court overruled the exception, denied the motion to transfer, and signed a judgment substituting the executrix into the partition action as the defendant, in place of the deceased Defendant. The executrix unsuccessfully appealed the Family Court's decision. The Supreme Court granted Defendant executrix’s writ application and remanded the matter to the appellate court for briefing, argument and full opinion. On remand, the appellate court by a majority decision again denied the executrix' writ application. The issue now before the Supreme Court was the correctness of the lower courts’ rulings. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Family Court no longer had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the partition of community property when one of the former spouses died. Thus, the Family Court erred in overruling the Defendant executrix’s exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Janice and Steven Dunwoody were divorced pursuant to a divorce judgment entered in the district court. Steven filed a motion to clarify the divorce judgment, seeking to establish a life insurance trust as provided in the agreement. The district court issued an order clarifying the original divorce judgment by ordering that the trust be established and ordering the cash surrender value of Steven's life insurance policy to be evenly split between Steven and Janice after their youngest child reached the age of twenty-three. Steven appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the court improperly disposed of omitted property - the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy - within the purview of a motion to clarify. Remanded.