Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose from the death of a minor child, 23-month-old Brooklyn Coons (BIC) at the hands of her father's girlfriend. Plaintiffs-Appellants, Larry and Mary Crosetto and the Estate of BIC, filed an action alleging that a social worker, Defendant-Appellee Linda Gillen, created the danger that resulted in the death of their granddaughter and denied them their rights to familial association. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. Gillen, and declined to hear a supplemental state law claim. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that qualified immunity was unwarranted on their state danger-creation and familial association claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that qualified immunity was not appropriate on the state danger-creation claim given genuine issues of material fact. Thus the Court reversed in part. The Court affirmed summary judgement on the familial association claims. View "The Estate of B.I.C., et al v. Gillen" on Justia Law

At issue in this interlocutory appeal was the scope of the special relationship doctrine and whether it would apply to the facts alleged to expose two human services employees to potential individual liability for the death of a seven-year-old child in foster care. After their son Chandler died while in the care of Jon Phillips and Sarah Berry, Chandler's biological parents, Christina Grafner and Joshua Norris, and Melissa R. Schwartz, personal representative and administrator of Chandler’s estate, filed suit against two county human services departments and two employees alleging, among other things, a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for violation of Chandler's substantive due process rights. The two employees, Defendants-Appellants Margaret Booker and Mary Peagler, appealed denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts, when taken as true, showed Booker and Peagler plausibly violated Chandler's substantive due process right to be reasonably safe while in foster care, which right was clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "Schwartz, et al v. Booker, et al" on Justia Law

While Mark and Elizabeth Dowell were still married, Mark created an irrevocable life insurance trust (ILIT) naming Elizabeth as is primary beneficiary and their two children as contingent beneficiaries. After the couple divorced, Mark filed a petition to modify the trust, contending that he did not need Elizabeth's consent to modify because she had relinquished her beneficial interest in the property settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mark. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the parties' divorce degree did not divest Elizabeth of her status as the primary beneficiary of the ILIT as a matter of law. Remanded with instructions to grant Elizabeth's motion for summary judgment. View "Dowell v. Dowell" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute between three daughters regarding the administration of their deceased mother’s estate. The dispute centered around three documents: (1) a will executed in 1987; (2) a revised will the decedent allegedly executed in 2007 or 2008, which contained a clause revoking all prior wills; and (3) an exhibit that was allegedly an accurate (but unsigned) draft of the revised will. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that: (1) the decedent executed a valid will in 1987; (2) the decedent subsequently executed a revised will, but that will was lost; and (3) the revised will had revoked the 1987 will. Because an executed version of the revised will was never located, the superior court concluded it had been destroyed by the decedent, leaving her estate to be administered under Alaska’s statutory scheme for intestate succession. On appeal, one daughter challenged the superior court’s conclusion that the 1987 will was properly revoked. The Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to determine whether its finding that the revised will was properly executed is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Court also remanded for the superior court to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to overcome the presumption that the decedent destroyed her will. View "Dan v. Dan" on Justia Law

Kathy and Curtis Rice were married approximately four months before separating and filing for divorce. While they were separated but still married, Curtis died in a work-related accident. Jackie Griffin, Curtis's mother and the administratrix of his estate, claimed Kathy was barred by Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.090(2) from receiving an interest in Curtis's estate. The statute provides that a spouse who voluntarily leaves the other and "lives in adultery" forfeits his or her right to and interest in the other's estate and property. Based on Griffin's proof at trial that Kathy had sexual intercourse with another man the night prior to Curtis's death, the trial court held that Kathy forfeited her interest in Curtis's estate pursuant to section 392.090(2). The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutory language "lives in adultery" requires more than a single instance of adultery. View "Griffin v. Rice" on Justia Law

Here the Supreme Court answered a question of Utah law certified to it by the U.S. district court. The question was, "Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent in a record' to being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the donor's death under Utah intestacy law?" In this case, after she gave birth, the wife of the donor applied for social security benefits based on the donor's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied the benefits, finding that the wife had not shown the child was the donor's "child" as defined by the Social Security Act. The wife subsequently filed a petition for adjudication of paternity, and the district court adjudicated the donor to be the father of the child. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the state law question to the Supreme Court. The Court held that an agreement leaving preserved frozen semen to the deceased donor's wife does not, without more, confer on the donor the status of a parent for purposes of social security benefits. View "Burns v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Maude Williams passed away in May 2000, leaving behind both a substantial fortune and incomplete estate-planning documents. Originally believing this omission precluded transfer of the relevant estate property to a limited partnership, her Estate paid over $147 million in federal taxes. The Estate later discovered Texas state authorities supporting that Williams sufficiently capitalized the limited partnership before her death, entitling the Estate to a substantial refund. In this refund suit, the Estate claimed a further substantial deduction for interest on the initial payment, which it retroactively characterized as a loan from the limited partnership to the Estate for payment of estate taxes. The district court upheld both the Estate's contentions. The court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Williams' intent on forming the partnership was sufficient under Texas law to transfer ownership of the Community Property bonds to the partnership. The district court also correctly concluded that the post hoc restructuring of the transfer as a loan from the partnership back to the Estate for tax purposes was a necessarily incurred administrative expense; the Estate retained substantial illiquid land and mineral assets that justified the loan, and the loan did not constitute an "indirect use" of the Community Property bonds. View "Keller, et al v. United States" on Justia Law

This case arose from a separation agreement made thirty-seven years ago between a now-deceased husband and plaintiff, his first wife. Plaintiff contended that her ex-husband promised to devise to her certain assets upon his death, and she brought various claims for equitable relief against defendant, her ex-husband's second wife, who survived him. The superior court concluded that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, plaintiff argued that this conclusion was erroneous because, under the governing Massachusetts law, claims based on a contract to make a will do not accrue until the promisor's death. Although the Supreme Court accepted plaintiff's legal premise, it do not accept that it governed this case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "Mueller v. Mueller and Joseph F. Mueller Trust" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Walbridge appealed a superior court order that denied her petition to establish her homestead right exempt from the mortgage held by Respondents the Estate of Raymond Beaudoin, Jr. and its co-administrators Steven Beaudoin and Raymond Beaudoin, III. Petitioner owned property in Rochester that she purchased with her then-husband. At that time, it was undeveloped land. Petitioner executed a mortgage on the property and released her homestead rights to that property. Allegedly unbeknownst to Petitioner, her husband executed a mortgage deed and promissory note on the property in favor of the decedent Raymond Beaudoin once a home was built there. The mortgage on the property did not list it as part of the homestead of the mortgagor. Petitioner and her husband divorced, and pursuant to the divorce decree, she was awarded all right, title and interest in the property. The property was foreclosed upon. Petitioner filed a petition to establish that her homestead right to the property was exempt from Respondents' mortgage. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that her homestead right in the property was not established until she actually, physically occupied it. She contended that her "obvious intention of present and immediate occupancy of the home . . . followed by [her] actual occupancy within a reasonable time, was equivalent to actual occupancy." The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Walbridge v. The Estate of Raymond A. Beaudoin, Jr." on Justia Law

Husband died intestate in 2008. A woman, claiming to be his wife, was appointed as administrator of the estate. Petitioner, who resides in the Peoples’ Republic of China, alleged that she was the surviving spouse and sought an elective share. The petition was dismissed. According to petitioner, the first stipulation of dismissal was based upon counsel’s belief that the parties had reached a settlement, and the second stipulation of dismissal was to allow parallel litigation in Pennsylvania. Unable to resolve that litigation, petitioner filed the instant action in May 2011. In her belated response to a motion to dismiss, petitioner alleged that she was not informed of husband’s death for several weeks, and was not timely notified of appointment of the administrator. The court declined to set aside the dismissal. No petition for an extension of time for election was filed during the sixth-month period. The first petition was filed more than five months after the limitations period had expired, and the current petition was filed nearly two years after the limitations period had expired. View "in Re: Ren Xiong Estate" on Justia Law