Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners petitioned to be appointed permanent guardians of their elderly uncle, Thomas Lankford. The district court dismissed the guardianship petition after finding Petitioners were not qualified to serve as guardians because their potential to inherit from Lankford created a disqualifying conflict of interest. Petitioners appealed, asserting (1) the district court erred in finding a conflict of interest, and (2) in the alternative, the guardianship conflict waiver statute, which allows a court of waive conflicts but limits that authority to conflicts of a spouse, adult child, parent, or sibling of a ward, violated their due process and equal protection rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in finding a conflict of interest; and (2) Petitioners' constitutional claims were not properly before the Court. View "Utley v. Lankford" on Justia Law

Decedent died intestate as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Petitioner, the former spouse of Decedent, sought a share in the settlement proceeds from a wrongful death action based on her monthly receipt of payments from Decedent for a child support arrearage. The circuit court ruled that Petitioner was not entitled to a portion of the subject settlement funds because Petitioner could not demonstrate she was financially dependent on Decedent at the time of trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to a share of the wrongful death settlement proceeds, as Petitioner's receipt of monthly arrearage payments was not sufficient to demonstrate the statutory requirement of financial dependence. View "Ellis v. Swisher" on Justia Law

In 2000, Lauren unsuccessfully petitioned for guardianship of her father, Glenn. Appellants, including Lauren, subsequently removed Glenn from his house and refused to disclose his location. On June 26, 2003, the probate court awarded temporary limited co-guardianship to Glenn's business partner, David, and to Glenn's son, Dan. Because Appellant's refused to disclose Glenn's whereabouts, the court later ordered Appellants to retrieve Glenn and bring him before the court. In 2005, the probate court adjudged Appellants to be in contempt of the court's July 26, 2003 order. The court then appointed David as permanent guardian for Glenn. Glenn died in 2007. In 2010, the probate court assessed compensatory and contempt sanctions against Appellants totaling $447,000 in the aggregate. In 2011, the trial justice dismissed Appellants' appeals for failure to timely provide the probate record. Later that year, the superior court issued an execution on the probate court order awarding sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Appellants' appeals, as the Court could not conduct any meaningful review due to the lack of a record before it. View "Griggs v. Heal" on Justia Law

Theresa was married to Myron when he retired from the federal government in 1989. Myron elected to receive a reduced annuity and named Theresa to receive a survivor annuity. In 1998, they divorced. Myron married Roksoliana. Myron received annual notices from the Office of Personnel Management explaining that if he wanted to provide survivor benefits to a spouse that he married after retirement, he had to send a signed request within two years after the date of marriage. In 2002 Myron sent a letter requesting survivor annuity benefits for Roksoliana. OPM denied Myron’s request as not submitted within two years of his marriage and instructed Myron to send his divorce decree to change or eliminate the survivor election previously made. In 2006 Myron sent the divorce decree and the certificate documenting his marriage to Roksoliana. OPM sent notification that his election to transfer full survivor benefits to his new spouse was effective immediately. Myron died in 2009. OPM granted Roksoliana benefits and denied Theresa’s application. An ALJ reversed; the Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding OPM’s annual notice insufficient to inform Myron of his rights and obligations and that the Board’s award to Theresa was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Dachniwskyj v.Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

The circuit court found Frieda, Cordelia's elderly mother, to be a protected person. After determining that Cordelia was exploiting Frieda, neglecting her needs, and mishandling her finances, the court directed Cordelia to turn over to Frieda's conservator a full accounting of what she had done with Frieda's assets. Cordelia failed to comply with the order. The mental hygiene commissioner subsequently found Cordelia to be in contempt for failing to account for the disposition of assets belonging to her mother. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's finding that Cordelia was in contempt; (2) affirmed that portion of the $50 per diem contempt sanction that applied prospectively from the actual date of the entry of the order of contempt; but (3) reversed that portion of the sanction that was retroactive, and reversed the sanction insofar as it purported to be for "compensation or damages." View "In re Frieda Q." on Justia Law

Donald died in 2007 at age 84. His will, dated December, 2006, was admitted to probate. The woman he had married one year before execution of that will, Blanca, was named as executor. James, who had been held out by Donald as Donald’s biological son throughout his life, sued Blanca in her individual capacity and as executor, contesting the will. In 2000 James had learned from Donald that James’s mother, who died in 2001, married Donald, after James’ biological father abandoned them. Donald stated that a “secret” adoption had taken place. There is no legal documentation of an adoption. The disputed will states, “I am married to Blanca DeHart. I have no children.” James cited this as evidence of unsound mind and alleged that, during the brief marriage, Blanca became joint tenant on real estate, bank accounts and brokerage accounts worth millions of dollars, and obtained a power of attorney to act on her then-husband’s behalf, exercising control over his real estate dealings and sale of the family farm. The circuit court dismissed with prejudice. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to state causes of action as to lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, contract for adoption and equitable adoption. The court erroneously denied a motion to compel deposition of the attorney who drafted the disputed will. View "DeHart v. DeHart" on Justia Law

Decedent's last will and testament and her correspondence with family members included specific directions to bury her in a plot she had already purchased at a cemetery in Montana. Decedent's surviving husband, Appellant, sought to bury her in Iowa and claimed the sole right to decide because Decedent had never executed a declaration under the Final Disposition Act designating anyone else to make that decision. The probate court granted a motion by the executor of Decedent's estate compelling burial in Montana. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the operative statutory language requires enforcement of the surviving spouse's decision; and (2) therefore, the probate court erred in concluding that Decedent's wishes trumped her surviving husband's right to control disposition of her remains under the Final Disposition Act. View "In re Estate of Whalen" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married for thirty years. Following the onset of serious health problems (for both), they separated. A family court judge was tasked with identifying and dividing the marital estate upon dissolution of the marriage. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether trust distributions could be considered marital property. The Court ruled that they can in limited circumstances. Further, the Court affirmed the family court's division of the marital estate, but reversed the inclusion of one tract of timber. The Court also reversed the reservation of alimony to the wife and modified that portion of the order that required the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees and costs. View "Wilburn v. Wilburn" on Justia Law

Brent Anderson purchased life insurance from Insurer and named three beneficiaries under the policy: (1) his then-wife, Lucia, (2) his parents, and (3) his sister. Brent and Lucia subsequently divorced. Later that year, Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-814 became effective. The statute provides that a divorce revokes "any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a governing instrument." Brent died several years later without having changed his designation of Lucia as primary beneficiary under the life insurance policy. Insurer filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful beneficiary under Brent's policy. The district court ruled in favor of Lucia based in part on the fact that section 72-2-814 became effective after Brent and Lucia's divorce. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the U.S. court of appeals and answered that section 72-2-814 applies to a divorce that pre-dates the statute's enactment. View "Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans v. Andronescu" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her siblings based on diversity jurisdiction, alleging that the siblings, co-trustees of the Brunsting Family Living Trust, had breached their fiduciary duties to her, a beneficiary of the trust. At issue was the scope of the probate exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Marshall. The court found no evidence that the trust was subject to the ongoing probate proceedings and concluded that the case fell outside the scope of the probate exception. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Curtis v. Brunsting, et al" on Justia Law