Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

When Respondent was born, her birth certificate identified Decedent as her father. Decedent later married Respondent’s mother but never formally established or challenged his status as Respondent’s father. When Decedent died, Appellants, Decedent’s sister and nephew, filed an ex parte petition for appointment as special administrators of Decedent’s estate. The petition identified Decedent’s siblings and their issue as his heirs, and Respondent was identified as Decedent’s stepdaughter. The district court made Appellants co-administrators of the estate. Respondent then filed a petition for revocation of the letters of special administration and for appointment as the special administrator, arguing that, as Decedent’s child, she had priority in appointment. The probate commissioner suggested that the district court find Respondent was Decedent’s child and entitled to appointment as administrator. The district court ordered that the report and recommendation be fully accepted and adopted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) paternity contests in intestacy proceedings are governed by the Nevada Parentage Act; and (2) Appellants were time-barred by, and lacked standing under, the Nevada Parentage Act to challenge Respondent’s presumptive paternity. View "In re Estate of Murray" on Justia Law

Reverend Flesher participated in benefits plans administered by the Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Board (MMBB), a New York not‐for‐profit corporation. Flesher entered into the plans while married to Snow. Snow, also a reverend and MMBB policyholder, was listed as the primary beneficiary on both of Flesher’s plans. Snow’s father was the contingent beneficiary. When Flesher and Snow divorced in 2008 they signed a Marital Settlement Agreement; each agreed to relinquish rights to inherit from the other and was allowed to change the beneficiaries on their respective MMBB plans. Flesher, then domiciled in Colorado, died in 2011 without changing his beneficiaries. MMBB , unable to determine how to distribute the funds, and filed an interpleader suit. The district court discharged MMBB from liability, applied New York law, and held that Flesher’s estate was entitled to the funds. The Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question: whether a governing‐law provision that states that the contract will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of New York, in a contract not consummated pursuant to New York General Obligations Law 5‐1401, requires the application of New York Estates, Powers & Trusts Law 3‐5.1(b)(2), which may, in turn, require application of the law of another state. View "Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow" on Justia Law

Charles William White (“Bill”) and his son Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”), were partners in a business that owned and operated convenience stores. In 2000, during the course of the partnership, Bill married Anita White. In 2005, Tommy bought his father’s share of the partnership for $42,600, but in dissolving the partnership, Bill and Tommy neglected to execute and file deeds transferring the partnership’s real property. In early 2009, Bill’s health declined rapidly, and Anita and Tommy began to clash over Bill’s healthcare. During this time, Tommy realized that he and his father had failed to execute deeds transferring the partnership’s real-property assets. Tommy used a durable power of attorney his father had given him years before to execute quit-claim deeds transferring the partnership property to himself. Bill and Anita continued to clash over who had authority to make healthcare decisions for Bill, so Tommy filed a petition for a conservatorship for his father’s benefit and sought appointment as his father’s conservator. Anita filed a counterclaim to challenge Tommy’s fitness to serve as his father’s conservator and sought to have Tommy return all assets he had transferred to himself using his father’s power of attorney. The chancellor agreed that a conservatorship was appropriate, but he appointed a third party as Bill’s conservator. Bill died in 2009, and at that time, the conservator filed a motion asking to be discharged from his duties and to be allowed to distribute the assets of the conservatorship to Bill’s estate. The parties agreed to an order discharging the conservator and to a distribution of funds held by the conservator to Bill’s estate. The chancellor’s order made no mention of Anita’s action to set aside the deed transfers. In 2010, Anita filed suit to set aside the quit-claim deeds and to redeem the real property Tommy had acquired using his father’s power of attorney. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The chancellor held that Anita’s action was barred by res judicata, granted Tommy’s motion, and denied Anita’s cross-motion. The Supreme Court found that the judgment dismissing the conservatorship was not a final judgment on the merits, and reversed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Charles William White" on Justia Law

After Kenneth Vanderwerff’s death, Janetta Gardiner, Vanderwerff’s romantic partner for the three years before his death, filed a petition for a “judicial declaration of common law marriage.” The district court granted the declaration of marriage, and Gardiner was appointed as personal representative of the estate. Four of Vanderwerff’s cousins (Cousins) moved to set aside the marriage determination under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and to intervene in the marriage action. The court granted intervention to the Cousins and set aside the declaration of marriage. Approximately two years after Gardiner’s petition was granted, the court dismissed the marriage case of its own accord for untimely service under Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b)(i). The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the declaration of marriage, holding that the district court improperly set aside the declaration of marriage, granted intervention, and sua sponte dismissed the case for failure of service. View "Gardiner v. Vanderwerff" on Justia Law

Boyce Elmore died on November 5, 2000. More than ten years later, Cedric Williams (claiming to be Boyce’s son) filed a paternity action in an effort to recover under Boyce’s estate. After the chancellor held that Cedric’s action was timely, Boyce’s estate appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the chancellor’s decision should have been reversed.View "In the Matter of the Estate of Boyce Elmore, Deceased" on Justia Law

Jones was murdered, leaving no will. He owned a life insurance policy through his employer. He did not designate a beneficiary. The policy provided that the proceeds ($307,000) would go first to a surviving spouse (Jones never married), second to surviving children, third to surviving parents, and fourth to his estate. Quincy claimed to be Jones’s son; Moore, claimed to be his daughter. The insurance company filed an interpleader action. After paying $24,000 for funeral expenses and $137,000 to Quincy, the company deposited the remainder with the court. Jones’s biological sister also claimed the proceeds, arguing that Jones was homosexual and had not fathered children. Jones’s income tax returns showed that he had claimed various children as dependents, sometimes omitting Quincy. A DNA test established that Moore was not his daughter. The district judge declined to order a test for Quincy because Jones had held Quincy out as his biological son and had signed an order in 1996 acknowledging Quincy (then six years old) as his son. The judge awarded Quincy the deposited funds.. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 35 would have allowed, but did not require, the judge to order a DNA test, given the presumption of paternity under Illinois law.View "MN Life Ins. Co. v. Jones" on Justia Law

From Lilyanna Knudson’s birth until Ronald Scherer’s (Decedent) death, Knudson believed and considered the Decedent to be her father. After learning that he was not, Knudson filed a petition seeking a determination that she was the Decedent’s heir. Specifically, Knudson argued that, pursuant to the judicially-created doctrine of equitable adoption, she was the daughter and heir of the Decedent. The district court dismissed Knudson’s petition, concluding that Wyoming law does not recognize equitable adoption and that equitable adoption would be contrary to Wyoming’s probate code. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, based on the Court’s interpretation of Wyoming’s probate code, Wyoming does not recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption, and therefore, Knudson was not an heir.View "In re Estate of Scherer" on Justia Law

The estate of Etsuko Futagi Toland appealed a Court of Appeals decision upholding summary judgment that denied registration of a Japanese divorce decree awarding Etsuko Toland a monetary award against her former husband, Peter Paul Toland. The question to the Washington Supreme Court was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying recognition of the divorce decree under comity principles because Paul was not given notice of a Japanese guardianship proceeding involving the couple's daughter. The Washington Court reversed: the 2008 guardianship had no effect on Paul's legal obligations under the 2006 divorce decree. The divorce decree was valid, and whether it should have been recognized as a matter of comity did not depend on whether Paul had notice of the guardianship proceeding. The Washington Court held that the trial court abused its discretion, and remanded this case back to the trial court for registration of the divorce decree. View "In re Estate of Toland" on Justia Law

Seventy-six-year-old William suffered from a lifelong mental disability. William’s brother Robert and sister Jeanne were the sole trustees of a trust established by William’s mother to support William. Because Williams had fallen prey to financial scammers, Robert and Jeanne took steps to prevent William from trust money. Thereafter, Robert petitioned for appointment as William’s guardian, and Jeanne cross-petitioned seeking to be appointed as William’s guardian and conservator. The district court dismissed Robert’s petition as a sanction for his failure to appear at a pretrial conference and temporarily appointed Jeanne as William’s guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed Robert’s guardianship petition; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in disposing of Robert’s motions to submit the case to mediation and to quash the proposed order dismissing Robert’s petition; and (3) the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Robert’s petition to disqualify the presiding judge. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bratton" on Justia Law

A daughter was appointed special guardian for her parents. Two lawyers entered an appearance on behalf of the parents and alleged that the parents had selected them as nominated counsel. The daughter sought to be named guardian and then a nephew and niece of the parents sought to be named guardians. Upon agreement of the parties an independent guardian was named. Hearings were held and an order issued that: (1) rejected the two lawyers as nominated counsel for the parents; and (2) denied a motion to reconsider a previous denial of a motion for unsupervised visitation by the nephew and niece and change of guardian to the nephew and niece. The allegedly nominated attorneys commenced an appeal which the Supreme Court retained. The trial court also denied a motion for emergency relief to change supervised visitation. A request for extraordinary relief from supervised visitations was filed during the appeal and the request was consolidated with the appeal. Subpoenas duces tecum were quashed relating to the wards' trusts. An additional request for extraordinary relief was filed during the pendency of the appeal based upon the order quashing the subpoenas, and we treat that proceeding as a companion case. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision that nominated counsel had a conflict of interest and were not independent, and that Petitioners failed to show that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or acted in excess of its authority when it denied an emergency motion to modify the supervised visitation, and that while the trial court incorrectly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to issue subpoenas duces tecum to a trustee of a ward's trust, it must hold a hearing on the objections to the discovery request and adjudicate which parties are entitled to participate in the discovery and determine whether a sustainable objection to discovery exists pursuant to the Discovery Code. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Berry" on Justia Law