Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Judith Mortner, temporary administrator of the estate of respondent Theodore Mortner (Husband), appealed, and petitioner, Lynn Mortner (Wife), cross-appealed a circuit court order abating the Wife’s divorce action and vacating its prior final divorce decree. Husband and Wife were married in July 1987. In October 2013, Wife filed a petition for divorce when she was 70 years old and still working and Husband was approximately 90 years old and still working. In July 2014, Husband, Wife, and their counsel signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU) purporting to settle the divorce action. The MOU was filed with the court in September with a cover letter reminding the court that the divorce decree was not to issue until counsel notified the court that it could issue. On October 29, Husband’s counsel hand-delivered to the court a letter advising that the decree could now issue. On October 30, the court signed an order that decreed the parties divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences, approved the MOU, and incorporated it as part of the divorce decree. Unbeknownst to the court, Husband died on either one or two days prior to its order. Also unbeknownst to the court, the parties on October 29, through their counsel, entered into an amendment to their proposed final decree of divorce and their MOU. Wife subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the issuance of the divorce decree, requesting the court to vacate the decree on the ground that, before the court had signed its October 30 order, Husband had died. In its appeal, the Estate argued that the trial court erred by abating the divorce action. In her cross-appeal, Wife argued that the Estate lacked standing to contest the abatement and that its appeal should therefore be dismissed. She also argued that the trial court erred when it allowed Husband’s counsel to appear at the hearing on her motion to abate the divorce. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. View "In the Matter of Lynn Mortner and Theodore Mortner" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on the validity of a 1995 Florida divorce decree. Sarath Sapukotana (Sarath) and Palihawadanage Ramya Chandralatha Fernando (Fernando) were married in Sri Lanka in 1992. Sarath moved to the United States a year later. In 1995, a Florida court entered an uncontested divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Sarath and Fernando. In 2004, Sarath then married Martha Gay Weaver Sapukotana (Martha) in Mississippi. Sarath died intestate in 2008 from injuries which led to a wrongful death suit. The trial court granted Martha’s petition to be named the administratrix of the estate, over the objection of Fernando, Sarath’s first wife. This allowed Martha to file, and later to settle, the wrongful death claim. Fernando claims that the 1995 Florida divorce decree was fraudulent and void for lack of service of process, and that she instead was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate and to the proceeds of the wrongful death action. Fernando filed a motion to vacate the chancery court’s decision to appoint Martha as administratrix of Sarath’s estate. The chancery court dismissed Fernando’s motion and held that Martha was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate. Fernando appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court, finding that the chancery court lacked authority to vacate the 1995 Florida divorce decree. View "In Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Sarath Sapukotana" on Justia Law

During the course of their marriage, Caroline, a citizen of Canada, made more than $75,000 in loans to Kimberly, of Ohio, which were never repaid. A federal district court dismissed Caroline’s contract and tort lawsuit. While appeal was pending, Kimberly died and Caroline substituted the Estate as the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal, finding that neither the domestic relations exception nor the probate exception to federal diversity under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) applied. Because a court in Canada had dismissed divorce proceedings upon notice of Caroline’s death, there was no risk of a decision incompatible with a divorce decree, and, at the time Caroline filed the federal complaint, the property that she sought was not “in the custody of a state probate court.” View "Chevalier v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

The estate of husband, William E. Simendinger, appealed an injunction order by the Superior Court that encumbered all real property held by the estate. Husband's estate also challenged the family court's award of attorney's fees. Wife Connie Simendinger and husband were married in 1987. They divorced in 2014. The final order and decree of divorce incorporated a stipulation between the parties, which provided in pertinent part that in lieu of alimony, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of $2,250,000 ($50,000 within 30 days and the balance of $2,200,000 in one year). This amount was secured by real estate, and had been owned solely by the husband, free and clear of all mortgages. Wife received the $50,000, but husband did not subsequently pay the $2.2 million balance or secure the unpaid amount in real estate. After the thirty-day deadline passed, wife filed a motion for contempt and enforcement, as well as a motion for attorney's fees. The family court set a hearing date for August 2014 to determine how best to proceed. The decree nisi became absolute on May 3, 2014. Then husband died unexpectedly on July 14. His estate was substituted as party. The family court denied the contempt motion, and enjoined the estate from disposing or otherwise encumbering any real estate that might be subject to the divorce decree stipulation. On appeal, husband's estate argued that the family court abused its discretion by: (1) issuing an injunction against husband's estate absent a hearing to show that husband had violated a court order; (2) including certain "business properties" within the scope of the injunction; and (3) awarding attorney's fees to wife without first clearly establishing a factual basis to support an award of attorney's fees. Upon review of the family court record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Simendinger v. Simendinger" on Justia Law

In 2010, the divorce court entered a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage of Charles Dahl and Kim Dahl. Kim appealed, challenging several of the district court’s rulings in the divorce case. Kim also appealed the dismissal of her claims in a separate, but related, lawsuit involving marital assets contained in the Dahl Family Irrevocable Trust. The district court consolidated, sua sponte, these cases for the purposes of appeal and remanded the consolidated case to the divorce court, holding that the Trust should have been joined as a party to the divorce action. View "Dahl v. Dahl" on Justia Law

B.K.J. appealed a district court order appointing J.W. and Guardian and Protective Services, Inc. ("G.A.P.S"), as her co-guardians. B.K.J.'s niece, J.W., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and a conservator on grounds B.K.J. suffered mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease and dementia and had shown decline in her ability to care for herself and her finances. Particularly, J.W. asserted B.K.J. had over $600,000 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties and had allegedly been taken advantage of monetarily by certain friends and family members. After a hearing for emergency guardianship, the district court appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as emergency co-guardians to B.K.J. pending further hearing. The district court appointed a physician and a visitor to examine B.K.J., and an attorney to represent B.K.J. as guardian ad litem. A hearing was held on the petition. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that a guardianship was necessary for B.K.J., and that she did not oppose the appointment of First International Bank as her conservator. The court-appointed physician, the court-appointed visitor, B.K.J.'s guardian ad litem, and others testified regarding the extent of B.K.J.'s incapacity, the necessity of a guardian, and who should be appointed as B.K.J.'s guardian. B.K.J. testified that she did not want J.W. appointed as her guardian and nominated two of her friends, F.C. and T.C., to be appointed as her co-guardians. The district court appointed First International Bank as B.K.J.'s conservator and appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians, concluding the evidence established they were the proper and best qualified persons to serve as her guardians and represent the best interests of B.K.J. B.K.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of B.K.J." on Justia Law

Mary is the child of the marriage of Marion and Herbert Sanders. Marion executed a will in California, placing her separate property assets in the Trust and providing that Mary would receive the Trust income during her lifetime. Upon Mary’s death, the remainder of the Trust was to be distributed “for the benefit of the then living issue” of Mary. The will defined ‘’issue" as lawful lineal descendants of all degrees, including legally adopted children. If Mary had “no living issue” surviving, Jody was to become the income beneficiary of the Trust. In 2013, Mary adopted Andrew, the adult son of a close friend, and sought a declaration of Andrew's rights. The probate court concluded that Andrew did not fall within this definition of “issue” because he had been adopted as an adult under Texas adoption statutes. The probate court believed that a Texas parent-child relationship did not encompass the same rights and duties as a California parent-child relationship. The court of appeal reversed. California cannot devalue a parent-child relationship simply because it was created, whether by biology or adoption, in a sister state that imposes different rights and duties. Those policy choices do not alter the status of the relationship. View "Sanders v. Yanez" on Justia Law

Prior to his death and after consulting a lawyer about divorcing Wife, Husband changed the beneficiary on his term life insurance policy from Wife to Respondents, his parents and sister. Less than four months before Husband’s death, Wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage to Husband. Following Husband’s death, the district court dismissed the dissolution proceeding. Wife subsequently filed suit against Respondents, alleging that Husband’s transfer violated Minn. Stat. 518.58(1)(a), which prohibits the transfer of “marital assets” by a party who contemplates commencing a marriage dissolution. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 518.58(1)(a) did not apply to Wife’s claim because her dissolution proceeding abated upon Husband’s death and the statute applies only in current dissolution proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the language of section 518.58(1)(a) limits the statute’s application to pending dissolution proceedings, the statute did not provide Wife, who was no longer a party to a marital dissolution proceeding, a remedy in this case. View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Lillian and Jimmie Lee Johnson were married for 37 years, and together, raised her grandniece, Jessica Rogers. In 2005, Ms. Johnson made a will that included a number of bequests to Rogers. Ms. Johnson died in 2011, and Mr. Johnson then sought to probate her will. Rogers filed a caveat, asserting that she had been adopted by Ms. Johnson after the will was made, which would entitle her to an intestate share of the estate Although Rogers was unable to point to any statutory adoption by Ms. Johnson, she claimed nonetheless that she had been adopted pursuant to the equitable doctrine of “virtual adoption.” The probate court agreed that Rogers was “virtually adopted” by Ms. Johnson after she made her will, and so, the probate court admitted the will to probate, but subject to Rogers taking an intestate share of the estate. Mr. Johnson appealed, arguing the doctrine of virtual adoption had no application in a case in which the decedent disposed of her entire estate by will. The Supreme Court agreed, and for that reason, affirmed the admission of the will to probate, but reversed that part of the judgment holding Rogers was entitled to an intestate share. View "Johnson v. Rogers" on Justia Law

In 2010, Nancy Powell-Ferri (Nancy) filed an action, which was still pending at the time of the present action, for dissolution of her marriage to Paul John Ferri (Paul). After Plaintiffs, the trustees of a 1983 trust created by Paul’s father for the sole benefit of Paul, transferred a substantial portion of the assets in the 1983 trust to a 2011 trust created by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs instituted this declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that they had validly exercised their authority in transferring the assets and that Nancy had no interest in the trust assets. Nancy filed a cross complaint alleging that Paul had breached his duty to preserve marital assets during the pendency of the marital dissolution action by failing to take affirmative steps to contest the decanting of certain assets from the trust. The trial court granted summary judgment for Paul, concluding that Nancy failed to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State does not require a party to a dissolution action to take affirmative steps to recover marital assets taken by a third party without a finding of dissipation. View "Ferri v. Powell-Ferri" on Justia Law