Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court holding that the juvenile and domestic relations district court (JDR court) had no jurisdiction to modify an award of child support, holding that the JDR court had jurisdiction to enter the order.After Spear and Nawara Omary were divorced by an order of the circuit court. Later, thee Department of Social Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement filed a motion in the JDR court to modify the child support order. The JDR granted the motion. Omary appealed, arguing that the JDR court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order. The circuit court agreed and vacated the order. Spear appealed, arguing that the JDR court did have jurisdiction because he had previously withdrawn an appeal from the JDR court to the circuit court, and therefore, remand happened automatically by operation of law. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Va. Code 16.1-106.1(F), by operation of law, effects an automatic remand whenever a circuit court enters an order noting the appellant's withdrawal of an appeal from the JDR court; and (2) therefore, the circuit court, not the JDR court, had jurisdiction to modify the child support order. View "Spear v. Omary" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court sustaining the a plea of res judicata and dismissing this breach of contract action.In his plea of res judicata, Defendant argued that Plaintiff was barred from bringing the contract action because she had sought identical relief in a show cause petition in a divorce action, which was still pending, and the circuit court had dismissed that petition in the show cause order, which Defendant argued was a final order. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s plea and dismissed the contract action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no final order regarding the claim that Defendant was attempting to preclude by his assertion of res judicata, and therefore, res judicata did not bar Plaintiff’s contract action. View "Kellogg v. Green" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court sustaining the a plea of res judicata and dismissing this breach of contract action.In his plea of res judicata, Defendant argued that Plaintiff was barred from bringing the contract action because she had sought identical relief in a show cause petition in a divorce action, which was still pending, and the circuit court had dismissed that petition in the show cause order, which Defendant argued was a final order. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s plea and dismissed the contract action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no final order regarding the claim that Defendant was attempting to preclude by his assertion of res judicata, and therefore, res judicata did not bar Plaintiff’s contract action. View "Kellogg v. Green" on Justia Law

Contrary to the conclusions of the lower courts in this divorce case, Richard Levick’s marriage to Deborah MacDougall was not voidable or void ab initio, and therefore, the circuit court had authority to distribute the marital assets consistent with the marital agreement and to continue its adjudication of the divorce proceeding.During a divorce proceeding ten years after the marriage of the parties, Levick asserted for the first time that his marriage to MacDougall was void ab initio, and therefore, he could repudiate a marital agreement requiring him to pay spousal support and to distribute the marital assets. The circuit court agreed and ruled that the marriage was void ab initio. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the marriage was merely voidable, not void ab initio. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Levick failed to rebut the strong presumption favoring the validity of his marriage. View "Levick v. MacDougall" on Justia Law

Samantha Cucco filed for divorce from Michael Luttrell. The circuit court entered a final decree of divorce that incorporated a Property, Custody, and Support Settlement Agreement (the PSA) executed by the parties. Pursuant to the PSA, the divorce decree provided that Luttrell’s monthly spousal support payments to Cucco would terminate “as a result of action by the Court taken pursuant to [Va. Code 20-109]…relative to cohabitation.” Luttrell later filed a motion for adjustment of spousal support, alleging that Cucco had been cohabiting continuously with her fiancee for at least one year. In response, Cucco argued that because her relationship was with another woman, she was not “cohabiting” within the meaning of section 20-109(A). The circuit court concluded that only opposite-sex couples could cohabit for purposes of section 20-109(A), denied Luttrell’s motion, and awarded Cucco attorney’s fees pursuant to the cost-shifting provision in the PSA. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacated the award of attorney’s fees, holding that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that same-sex couples cannot “cohabit” for purposes of section 20-109(A). Remanded. View "Luttrell v. Cucco" on Justia Law