Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
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The case involves Rachel Goldstein and James Sabatino, who had a two-year relationship in Massachusetts that ended in 2017. In March 2020, Sabatino began contacting Goldstein, informing her that he had found sexually explicit photos and conversations on a cell phone she had loaned him during their relationship. Despite Goldstein's request for Sabatino to return the phone, he refused. Goldstein became concerned that Sabatino would use these texts and images to control her and ruin her career. In May 2020, a Massachusetts court granted Goldstein a protective order against Sabatino, which he violated, leading to his arrest. In June, the Massachusetts court extended the protective order for another six months. The same month, Goldstein moved to Harris County, Texas. While the Massachusetts protective order was still in effect, Sabatino began filing small-claims lawsuits in Massachusetts against Goldstein. In October 2020, Goldstein filed an application for a protective order against Sabatino in Harris County.The district court in Harris County issued a protective order against Sabatino, a Massachusetts resident, based on conduct that occurred entirely within Massachusetts. Sabatino appealed, challenging the district court's personal jurisdiction over him and its subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. The Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas vacated the order and dismissed the case, holding that the district court lacked territorial jurisdiction—a purportedly nonwaivable, third jurisdictional requirement. The court of appeals did not address personal jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals’ territorial jurisdiction analysis, but agreed with Sabatino that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court held that territorial jurisdiction is not an independent jurisdictional requirement in Chapter 7B protective-order proceedings. The court also held that Sabatino did not enter a general appearance, and thus did not waive his challenge to the district court's personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment vacating the protective order and dismissing the case. View "GOLDSTEIN v. SABATINO" on Justia Law

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This case arises from a parental rights termination appeal in Texas. The father had been the primary caregiver for his three children, including one-year-old twins and a three-year-old daughter. However, the father tested positive for methamphetamine and the children were removed by the Department of Family and Protective Services due to the father's drug use and homelessness. Although the father initially complied with a service plan, which included drug testing and treatment, he eventually refused further treatment and missed subsequent drug tests. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, but the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the Department had failed to prove harm to the children as a direct result of their father's drug use.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of "endanger" in the context of illegal drug use. It held that a parent's endangering conduct does not need to be directed at the child or result in actual injury to the child. Instead, endangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that exposes a child to loss or injury, or jeopardizes the child's physical or emotional well-being. The court argued that the father's pattern of drug use, coupled with his homelessness, employment instability, and almost complete abandonment of his children for the six months preceding the trial, posed a substantial risk to the children's emotional well-being. Therefore, legally sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that the father's conduct endangered the children. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for a best-interest determination. View "In re R.R.A." on Justia Law

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In this divorce proceeding, the Supreme Court of Texas was asked to consider whether a judgment was rendered through an email sent only to the parties' legal counsel. The case involved Eve Lynn Baker and Terry Lee Bizzle, who after nearly 20 years of marriage, filed cross-petitions for divorce. The trial court informed the parties that a same-day ruling would not be possible and that the court would "e-mail the parties with the decision" at the end of the following week.Subsequently, the trial court sent an email to the parties' attorneys outlining the allocation of assets. The court did not copy the court clerk on this email or otherwise submit it to the clerk for filing or entry in the record. The trial court later signed a modified version of Wife's proposed final decree, declaring the parties divorced on insupportability grounds and dividing the marital estate.However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, ruling that the postmortem divorce decree was void for want of subject-matter jurisdiction because the trial court had not rendered judgment completely resolving the divorce action before the wife passed away.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' decision, finding that the trial court did not render judgment in the privately communicated October 4th email, and the wife's subsequent death divested the trial court of jurisdiction to render judgment in the postmortem final divorce decree. The court held that public pronouncement of the trial court's decision is not a mere formalism but an official judicial action affording the decision legal significance. View "BAKER v. BIZZLE" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Texas handled a case in which a nurse claimed her employer, Scott & White Memorial Hospital, wrongfully terminated her employment in retaliation for reporting potential child abuse or neglect to the Texas Child Protective Services (CPS), which is considered a protected conduct under Section 261.110(b) of the Texas Family Code.The nurse, Dawn Thompson, had previously received two written reprimands for violating the hospital's personal-conduct policy. On the third occasion, she disclosed a child patient's protected health information to a school nurse without the parents' authorization. This was considered by the hospital as a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and a breach of the patient's rights. Consequently, Thompson was terminated.Thompson filed a lawsuit against the hospital, asserting that her termination was in violation of Family Code Section 261.110(b), which protects professionals who report child abuse or neglect in good faith from adverse employment actions.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that Section 261.110 imposes a "but-for causation" requirement, which means that the protected conduct must be such that without it, the adverse employment action would not have occurred when it did. In this case, the court found that Thompson would have been terminated when she was due to her HIPAA violation, regardless of her report to CPS. Therefore, the court rejected Thompson's retaliation claim and reinstated the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the hospital. View "SCOTT & WHITE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL v. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of Texas examined the requirements for terminating parental rights based on a parent's noncompliance with a service plan ordered by the court. The mother had been ordered to follow a service plan after her children were removed from her care due to allegations of neglectful supervision. The plan required her to attend counseling sessions, parenting classes, and substance abuse classes. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services later sought to terminate the mother's parental rights based on her alleged failure to comply fully with the service plan.The lower courts held that the mother's failure to strictly comply with the plan's requirements necessitated termination of her parental rights. However, the Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with this interpretation. The court stated that the requirement for termination of parental rights based on noncompliance with a service plan is not strict compliance with every detail of the plan. The court emphasized that the noncompliance must involve a requirement that is specifically established in the plan and is material to the plan's overall purpose. In light of this, the court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the termination of the mother's parental rights based on her noncompliance with the service plan.The court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower courts in part and rendered judgment vacating those portions of the trial court’s order terminating the mother's parental rights. The remainder of the trial court’s termination order was affirmed. View "IN THE INTEREST OF R.J.G., R.J.G., D.G.M." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Father's appeal of the termination of his parental rights, holding that Father properly invoked the court's jurisdiction, and therefore the court erred in dismissing Father's appeal on jurisdictional grounds.After a joint bench trial and in a single order the trial court ordered termination of both Father's and Mother's rights. Father noticed his appeal to one of two courts of appeals with jurisdiction to entertain his appeal, and Mother noticed her appeal to the other court. Although Father amended his notice to consolidate his appeal into the court of appeals in which Mother's appeal was pending, the court of appeals determined that the amended notice did not vest it with jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the merits were properly before the court of appeals at issue, and therefore, the court erred in dismissing Father's appeal for want of jurisdiction. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that a parent whose parental rights have been terminated cannot complain for the first time on appeal that the trial court failed to make the "extraordinary circumstances" and "best interest" findings under Tex. Fam. Code 263.401(b).The statute at issue provides that a court may retain a parental rights termination suit if it finds that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services and that continuing that conservatorship is in the child's best interest. The court in this case made only one of the required findings when it extended the dismissal deadline. Mother appealed a subsequent judgment terminating her parental rights. The court of appeals vacated that judgment and dismissed the termination suit, concluding that the trial court lost jurisdiction by failing to make the additional required finding by the dismissal deadline. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the findings requirement is not jurisdictional, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the action. View "In re Interest of J.S." on Justia Law

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In this divorce proceeding, the Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court granting Father the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of the couple's four children, holding that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an interview of the parties' thirteen-year-old daughter, M.N., and the error was harmful.Under Tex. Fam. Code 153.009(a) parents in a divorce or custody proceeding may request either an interview of the children by the judge or a jury trial but not both. Mother demanded a jury trial but later withdrew her demand to take advance of section 153.009(a)'s mandate that the trial court interview M.N. The court, however, declined to conduct the interview on the ground that Mother had not filed a written motion. In the final divorce decree the parties were appointed joint managing conservators of the children and Father was granted the right to determined the children's primary residence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred by declining to undertake its mandatory obligation to interview M.N.; and (2) the error was not harmless because it resulted in the loss of a jury trial on disputed fact questions. View "In re J.N." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court finding that Mother failed to comply with her service plan and that termination of Mother's rights was in her children's best interest, holding that the trial court's findings were supported by legally sufficient evidence.Mother's parental rights were terminated pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code 161.001(b)(1)(O), under which termination may be ordered if the parent as failed to comply with a court-ordered service plan "as a result of the child's removal from the parent...for the abuse or neglect of the child." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's findings that Mother's acts and omissions, which rendered her an unfit parent, were within the statutory definition of "abuse or neglect." View "In re A.A." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court granting the City of Austin's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing this case brought by Plaintiff alleging that the City provided taxpayer money to abortion-assistance organizations in violation of Texas law, holding that the case must be remanded.The trial court granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction without explaining its reasons and dismissed with prejudice Petitioner's claim that the City's budget violated Texas law and dismissed with prejudice Petitioner's claim that the City's 2019 budget violated the Gift Clause. The court of appeals affirmed, relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Roe to conclude that Petitioner's claim could not proceed. Petitioner petitioned for review. After briefing was complete, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for review without regard to the merits and vacated the judgments below, holding that, because Dobbs overruled Roe, remand was required for consideration of the effect this change in the law and any intervening factual developments on Petitioner's claims. View "Zimmerman v. City of Austin" on Justia Law