Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
by
In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was tasked with determining whether multiple periods of separation prior to filing a paternity action were enough to preclude the application of the presumption of paternity. The presumption of paternity is a legal doctrine which presumes that a child conceived or born during a marriage is a child of that marriage. The court held that a marital couple's separation prior to the filing of the paternity action does not, per se, preclude the application of the presumption of paternity.In this case, a woman (Mother) and her husband (Husband) were married and separated multiple times. During one of their separations, the woman had unprotected sexual intercourse with another man (B.C.). After the woman became pregnant and gave birth to a child, B.C. filed a paternity action. The woman and her husband, who had since reconciled, argued that the presumption of paternity should apply because they were married at the time of the child's conception and remained married at the time of the paternity action.The lower courts held that the presumption did not apply due to the couple's multiple separations. However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed this decision, finding that although temporary separations are a factor to consider in determining whether a marriage is intact, they are not dispositive. The court concluded that the couple's marriage was intact at the time of the paternity action and the presumption of paternity applied, effectively dismissing B.C.’s paternity action. View "B.C. v. C.P. & D.B." on Justia Law

by
At issue in this appeal was whether an order determining that grandparents had standing under Section 5325(3) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa. C.S. § 5325(3), to file and pursue an action for partial physical custody of their grandchildren was a collateral order appealable as of right under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313, Pa.R.A.P. 313 (Rule 313). In August 2017, A.L.R. (Father) and T.A.D-R. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) began residing with J.C.D., III, and A.M.D. (collectively, Grandparents), Mother’s parents, at their home in York County, Pennsylvania. While Parents resided at Grandparents’ home, the Children were born to Parents: E.J.R. and A.L.R. Parents and the Children resided with Grandparents until May 2022, when, following a disagreement, Parents moved out of Grandparents’ home with the Children. Thereafter, Grandparents filed a complaint seeking shared legal and partial physical custody of the Children. Parents filed preliminary objections, alleging, inter alia, that Grandparents lacked standing to pursue an action for custody of the Children. The trial court found: (1) Parents and Children lived in the same home as Grandparents for approximately five years; (2) during that time, Grandparents were not raising the Children and did not stand in loco parentis to the Children and helped Parents with the Children as grandparents and as people sharing living quarters typically do; and (3) Grandparents filed their custody complaint within six months of when Parents removed the Children from Grandparents’ home. Based on these findings, the trial court entered an order concluding that Grandparents did not have standing to file and pursue an action for shared legal and partial physical custody of the Children. After reconsideration, the trial court entered a second order determining the Grandparents did have standing to file and pursue their action for partial custody of the Children. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that such an order was not a collateral order, and, therefore, it affirmed the Superior Court’s order quashing this appeal. View "A.M.D., et al. v. A.L.R, et al." on Justia Law

by
In an appeal by allowance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether a proposed adoption by a mother’s long-term partner, in conjunction with the termination of the biological father’s parental rights, constituted “cause” to excuse the relinquishment requirement of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2903 with respect to the mother under Section 2901. The Court found that, in order to seek termination of Father’s parental rights and the proposed adoption by Partner under Section 2901, Mother had to demonstrate cause as to why she could not satisfy the statutory requirement, i.e., why she and Partner cannot marry, and then establish why the relinquishment requirement under Section 2711(d) was satisfied under the facts of her case. As the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights without first evaluating whether Mother established cause under Section 2901, and given that Mother did not provide evidence pertaining to this “cause” analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order remanding to the orphans’ court for consideration of whether Mother could establish cause, as defined in this opinion, to excuse the relinquishment requirement under the facts of this case. View "In Re Adopt. of: M.E.L." on Justia Law

by
Child K.T. was born June 2016. Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) first became involved with her when she tested positive for cocaine at birth; CYF had been involved with Mother since 2009 regarding an older child. Prompted by continued housing instability, a report of intimate partner violence between Mother and Child’s biological father, and Mother’s failure to follow through with service referrals, CYF sought a finding of dependency in early 2017. For more than two years, while Child remained in a foster home, and prior to CYF filing for termination, Mother was inconsistent with participation in CYF’s recommended services. The orphan court ultimately concluded “terminating the parental rights of Mother does not serve the needs and welfare of the child.” A majority of the Court of Appeals determined the record supported the trial court’s “evaluation of the bond that clearly exists between Mother and Child, and its determination that this bond was worth preserving[,]” and the court was thus within its discretion to deny termination. In this discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the court that denied CYF’s petition for involuntary termination of a mother’s parental rights gave “primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” as required by 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b). More specifically, the Court considered whether the court evaluating the parent-child bond must determine whether the bond was necessary and beneficial to the child, and severing the bond would cause the child to experience extreme emotional consequences, rather than a mere “adverse” impact. Upon review, the Supreme Court found error and thus (1) vacated the appellate court's orders and (2) remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In the Int. of: K.T." on Justia Law

by
At issue in this case was whether a superior court erred in it affirmed a Court of Common Please Criminal Division's decision overturning a Montgomery County District Attorney (DA) decision. The DA had disapproved the private criminal complaint of Luay Ajaj (Father) against Saja Ibrahim Abdulkareem Al Rabeeah (Mother) for violations of 18 Pa. C.S. § 2904(a) (interference with custody of children), and 18 Pa. C.S. § 2909(a) (concealment of whereabouts of a child). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the proper standard of review courts should apply when reviewing a disapproval decision under Rule of Criminal Procedure 506(B)(2) was: if the private complainant demonstrated that the disapproval decision amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional. Applying that standard of review here, the Court concluded Father failed to demonstrate that the DA’s decision to disapprove the Complaint amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional, and, consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order. View "In Re: Private Comp. Filed by L. Ajaj" on Justia Law

by
Child K.N.L. (born 2010) was adjudicated dependent and committed to the custody of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) in 2015. The parental rights of the child’s biological parents were terminated involuntarily in 2017. The juvenile court vacated the custodial and visitation rights of the child’s former caregiver, R.B.P., who had been the legal guardian at the time she entered foster care. In 2018, with the support and consent of DHS, the child’s foster parent filed a report of intention to adopt and petition to adopt the child. Prior to the finalization, the child’s biological maternal aunt, D.M., moved to intervene in the adoption matter as well as her own petition to adopt the child. Appellant T.B., the adult child of the former guardian R.P.B., also sought to intervene and to adopt the child. The child was removed from the pre-adoptive foster home and the foster parent requested to withdraw her pending adoption petition. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted review of this matter to determine whether the juvenile court erred when it denied appellant standing — based on in loco parentis status — to intervene in the adoption of the child, and concluded the juvenile court did err. The court interpreted and applied relevant Adoption Act provisions strictly, as principles of limitation on standing in an adoption action, in contravention of 23 Pa.C.S. §2312 and the applicable case law, rather than assessing whether appellant demonstrated a genuine and substantial interest in having a formal, permanent parental role in the child’s life as a result of the in loco parentis status he pleaded. " The Supreme Court remanded this case to the adoption court to consider appellant's standing anew in light of the proper standards. View "In the Int. of: K.N.L." on Justia Law

by
In this discretionary appeal, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether certain life insurance and individual retirement account (IRA) proceeds that Johanna Goodwin (Wife) acquired as sole beneficiary prior to the dissolution of her marriage to Scott Goodwin (Husband) fell within the purview of Section 3501(a)(3) of Pennsylvania's Divorce Code. The Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances presented here, such proceeds constituted “gifts” as the term was used in Section 3501(a)(3), and, thus, they were excluded from the marital estate for equitable distribution purposes. Because the Superior Court reached the same conclusion, the judgment of that court was affirmed. View "Goodwin v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

by
Mother J.B., lived with her two young children (“Y.W.-B” and “N.W.-B”) and the children’s father (“Father”) in Philadelphia. In 2019, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) allegedly received a general protective services report (“GPS report”) from an unidentified source alleging possible neglect by Mother. Although DHS referenced this GPS report several times at the evidentiary hearing and used it to refresh its sole witness’s recollection, it inexplicably never introduced it into evidence. The proceedings revealed the allegation suggested Mother was homeless and failed to feed one of her children during a single eight-hour period. DHS used this allegation as grounds to enter and inspect the family residence. The issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether DHS established sufficient probable cause for the trial court to issue the order permitting entry into the home without consent. To this, the Court concluded DHS did not establish probable cause, and thus reversed the order of the Superior Court holding to the contrary. View "In the Interest of: N.W.-B." on Justia Law

by
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in quashing the notice of appeal filed by the Family Court of the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District (the Family Court) on the basis that the trial court’s order was not an appealable collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313. Because the Court concluded the trial court’s order denying summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds was a collateral order, appealable as of right under Rule 313, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and remanded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "Brooks v. Cole, et al." on Justia Law

by
The trial court in this case denied a county agency’s petitions to terminate involuntarily the parental rights of a mother. The agency appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court’s order and effectively terminated the mother’s parental rights to two of her children. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the mother’s petitions for allowance of appeal to consider two issues: (1) whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicted with the Supreme Court's decision in In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010); and (2) whether the Superior Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court exceeded its standard of review. "Rather than examining the record to determine whether it supports the trial court’s conclusion that the various conditions that led to the Children’s removal from Mother’s custody no longer continue to exist, the intermediate court focused exclusively on one condition that led to the Children’s removal, i.e., Mother’s mental health issues, and searched the record to support its view that Mother has failed to address this condition adequately. Because the Superior Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the trial court, we vacate the Superior Court’s judgment and reinstate the trial court’s order." View "In the Interest of: S.K.L.R." on Justia Law