Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Ohio
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In this case from the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court considered whether a derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could proceed even when the primary medical negligence claim, on which it was based, was barred by the statute of repose. The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. McCarthy, had filed a medical negligence claim against Dr. Lee and associated medical practices, alleging negligent care in the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The claim was dismissed due to the statute of repose. Subsequently, the McCarthys filed a separate claim on behalf of their three minor children for loss of consortium due to the treatment of Mrs. McCarthy's condition. The medical providers moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it could not stand alone as it was a derivative claim of the previously dismissed medical claim. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium could not exist when the principal claim on which it was based was extinguished by the statute of repose. The court explained that the statute of repose operates as a substantive bar to a claim, extinguishing both the remedy and the right. Therefore, when a principal claim is extinguished, no other claim derived from it can exist. The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the children's derivative claim for loss of parental consortium. View "McCarthy v. Lee" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Ohio examined the appropriate standard of review for cases involving a juvenile court’s decision to award permanent custody of a child and to terminate parental rights. The case stemmed from a dispute surrounding the custody of a minor child, Z.C., with the Ashtabula County Children Services Board (ACCSB) granted permanent custody. The father, D.C., appealed this decision, resulting in a conflict between the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and other appellate districts regarding the correct standard of review. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to its review, while other courts applied a sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the correct appellate standards of review in these cases are the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, depending on the arguments presented by the parties. The Court found that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals erred in applying an abuse-of-discretion standard and remanded the case for review under the correct standard. View "In re Z.C." on Justia Law

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In the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio, Michael Swazey Jr. was indicted for failing to pay child support. He filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment under Rule 12(C)(2) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the statutes he allegedly violated did not apply to him. The trial court declined to consider Swazey's motion on the merits, holding that the arguments raised were not permitted under Rule 12(C)(2) but should instead be presented at the close of the state’s case at trial. Swazey subsequently pleaded guilty to all counts.On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals held that Swazey’s Rule 12(C)(2) motion was proper and should have been considered on the merits. It also held that by entering a guilty plea, Swazey did not waive his right to raise a constitutional challenge on appeal.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' decision, stating that Swazey's motion to dismiss was appropriate under Rule 12(C)(2), and that his guilty plea did not waive his right to raise his constitutional challenge on appeal. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio remanded the case back to the trial court to consider Swazey's pretrial motion. View "State v. Swazey" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court declined to accept this discretionary appeal filed on behalf of H.R. and sanctioned the three attorneys representing H.R. for instituting a frivolous appeal.The underlying dispute involved two motions filed by H.R. to modify a divorce decree regarding a spousal support obligation payable by P.J.E. to H.R. The trial court denied H.R.'s motion to continue the hearing on her motions to modify, and the court of appeal dismissed H.R.'s appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed H.R.'s appeal and sanctioned H.R.'s attorneys with paying P.J.E.'s reasonable attorney fees and declaring them to be vexatious litigators, holding that the three attorneys had repeatedly engaged in frivolous conduct. View "H.R. v. P.J.E." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court denied this action brought by Jennifer Giroux and Thomas Brinkman (collectively, Giroux) challenging an initiative petition to place a proposed constitutional amendment on the November 7, 2023 ballot, holding that Giroux failed to show that Ohio law required invalidating the petition.At issue was a petition proposing a constitutional amendment entitled "Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety." Giroux brought this challenge alleging that the petition did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 3519.01(A). The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that section 3519.01(A) does not require a petition proposing a constitutional amendment to include the text of the existing statute, and Giroux's challenge failed for this reason. View "Giroux v. Committee Representing Petitioners" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Peter J. Corrigan from proceeding in a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction action, holding that Judge Corrigan did not lack jurisdiction to proceed in the case.United Twenty-Fifth Building, LLC sued Jessica Maron, a party to a pending divorce case, alleging that Jessica was interfering with an easement involving a multistory building in Cleveland. Specifically, United argued that Jessica was preventing access to the building's elevator, lobby, and stairwell and delaying the construction of a restaurant in the building. Jessica filed a prohibition petition seeking to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction in United's case because, under the jurisdictional-priority rule, Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed because the case involved property that may be subject to equitable division in her divorce case. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Jessica failed to show that the jurisdictional-priority rule applied under the circumstances of this case. View "State ex rel. Maron v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss the underlying complaint seeing writs of procedendo and mandamus to compel Respondents to proceed to a hearing on an ex parte motion seeking temporary custody of minor children, holding that dismissal was warranted.Specifically, the Supreme Court (1) sua sponte dismissed the claims against Sherrick; (2) dismissed the mandamus claim as to all Respondents based on Relator's failure to properly caption her complaint; and (3) dismissed the procedendo claims against all Respondents because none of the Respondents were properly named as defendants. View "Page v. Geauga County Probate & Juvenile Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed judgment of the court of appeals denying Mother's complaint for a writ of prohibition, holding that Mother was not entitled to relief on her argument that the juvenile division lacked jurisdiction to award custody of Child to Grandfather.A Nevada court issued a shared parenting order establishing Mother's and Father's rights regarding custody of and visitation of Child. The Nevada court subsequently adopted a modified shared-parenting order. Grandfather later filed a complaint seeking legal custody of Child. The juvenile court and gave Grandfather legal custody of Child. Mother filed a complaint for prohibition, alleging that the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to modify the Nevada court's custody order. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court holding that Mother failed in her burden of showing that she was entitled to a writ of prohibition by clear and convincing evidence. View "State ex rel. Harris v. Bruns" on Justia Law

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In proceedings involving divorce and domestic-violence-civil-protection-order (DVCPO) cases that had been pending for more than five years the Supreme Court denied M.D.'s motion to enforce this Court's writ of procedendo but granted his alternative request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Sup. Ct. Prac. R. 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D. had persistently engaged in frivolous conduct in the Supreme Court without reasonable cause.Previously, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and granted M.D. a writ of procedendo ordering Judge Reeve Kelsey to rule on pending motions and to proceed promptly to final hearings in the underlying cases. M.D. moved to enforce the writ or, alternatively, to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court denied the motion to enforce but granted M.D.'s request to declare M.A.D. a vexatious litigator under Rule 4.03(B), holding that M.A.D.'s filings were calculated attempts to prevent Judge Kelsey's compliance with the previously-issued writ of procedendo. View "State ex rel. M.D. v. Kelsey" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition against the Logan County Common Pleas Court and Judge Natasha Kennedy, a judge of the Logan County Common Pleas Court, Family Court Division, holding that Relators, Josephine Davis, John Doe, and Jane Doe, were entitled to the writ.Davis, the biological mother of H.P., consented to the placement of care, custody, and control over H.P. to John and Jane Doe for purposes of adoption. The Does then filed an adoption petition for H.P. Thereafter, Kaidin Whitrock, H.P.'s biological father, filed a complaint to allocate parental rights and responsibilities. The probate court determined that Whitrock's consent to the adoption was not required under Ohio Rev. Code 3107.07(B)(1) because he failed to register as the putative father. The district court reversed, but the Supreme Court reversed. At issue was whether Judge Kennedy could continue to exercise juvenile court jurisdiction without interfering with the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the probate court. The Supreme Court granted Relators' requested writ of prohibition, holding that Judge Kennedy may not continue to exercise jurisdiction over Whitrock's petition to allocate parental rights and his request for a temporary order of parenting time. View "State ex rel. Davis v. Kennedy" on Justia Law