Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The district court entered a divorce decree granting Diane Mizrachi and Eli Mizrachi joint legal and physical custody of their minor child. The decree provided that Eli would have the child for the “Jewish holidays” every year. Diane subsequently filed a motion to clarify the decree as to the holiday parenting time schedule. After a hearing, the district court concluded that there was not a clear understanding between the parties at the time of an agreement regarding holiday parenting time and then granted Diane’s request to clarify the meaning of the term the "Jewish holidays” as used in the divorce decree. Eli appealed, arguing that, by interpreting the term “Jewish holidays” in the manner that it did, the district court in essence modified the divorce decree without considering whether the modification was in the child’s best interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court clarified, rather than modified, the parties’ divorce decree; and (2) while it was proper for the court to clarify the decree, the court did not apply the proper procedure in doing so. Remanded. View "Mizrachi v. Mizrachi" on Justia Law

Mother and Father divorced while living in Nevada with their minor child. Mother eventually obtained sole custody and moved to England. Father, in the meantime, moved to Turkey. Father subsequently filed a motion to modify child custody and support. Mother filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court denied Father’s motion to modify child custody and granted Mother’s motion to dismiss, concluding that it lost jurisdiction to modify its decree when the parents and the child moved away from Nevada. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) while the district court lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody, the court should have considered Father’s argument that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the court retained jurisdiction to ensure that another, more appropriate, forum existed to resolve the dispute; and (2) because the district court failed to exercise this jurisdiction, the cause is remanded for further proceedings. View "Kar v. Kar" on Justia Law

Mother and Father shared joint legal and physical custody of their two minor children as stated in a stipulated order. One provision of the order provided for “teenage discretion” in determining time spent with either parent when a child reaches the age of fourteen, and another provision conferred authority to resolve disputes to a “parenting coordinator” and authorized the district court to issue an order that defines the coordinator’s role. Father later filed a motion to modify the original stipulated child custody order, arguing that the two provisions at issue should be rendered void because they were against public policy. The district court denied modification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither contractual provision was against the best interest of the children, which is the paramount public policy concern in child custody matters, and the parenting coordinator provision did not improperly delegate decision-making authority. View "Harrison v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Father and Mother divorced in 2011. In 2013, the district court ordered Father to pay additional child support for failing to previously pay child support. In 2014, Mother filed a motion to modify custody and enforce the 2013 order. After a hearing, at which Father represented himself, the district court awarded Mother primary physical custody of the child. The district court then held Father in contempt of court for failing to pay child support. The court sentenced Father to a total of eighty days in jail and stayed the contempt sentence on the condition that Father “follow the Orders of the Court.” The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a contempt order that does not contain a purge clause is criminal in nature, and because the district court’s contempt order did not contain a purge clause, the district court violated Appellant’s constitutional rights by imposing a criminal sentence without providing Appellant with counsel; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by basing its decision to modify custody on Appellant’s failure to comply with a court order and by failing to consider and set forth its findings as to the Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.480(4) factors for determining the child’s best interest. View "Lewis v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Appellant, as the custodial parent, sought child support payments from respondent. The district court entered a child support order; appellant subsequently moved for enforcement and alleged that respondent had child support arrearages; and respondent, who had received public assistance during a portion of the time she owed support, asserted that her child support obligation should be suspended under NRS 425.360(4). The court concluded that the provisions of NRS 425.360 are only implicated when public assistance has "creat[ed] a debt for support to the Division" of Welfare and Supportive Services of the Department of Health and Human Services. It does not apply to suspend child support payments owed by one parent to another. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for recalculation of child support arrearages. View "Valdez v. Aguilar" on Justia Law

After respondent received a judgment for child support arrears and penalties against appellant in Nevada, as well as an award of attorney fees, appellant appealed the order. Under NRS 125.040(1)(c), a district court has discretion in a divorce suit to require one party to pay an amount of money necessary to assist the other party in carrying on or defending the suit. The court held that a district court has jurisdiction to award attorney fees pendente lite for the costs of an appeal pursuant to NRS 125.040. In this case, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding such fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Griffith v. Gonzales-Alpizar" on Justia Law

Mark Anderson filed a complaint for divorce from Sophia Sanchez. The parties agreed to mediation to discuss the distribution of their assets and debts. The parties reached a settlement agreement and signed a written Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) memorializing their agreement. As to certain property (the Wilson property), the MOU stated that it was owned by the parties’ trust and that the property would be awarded to Mark in exchange for a payment to Sophia representing half of the property’s net value. Mark subsequently moved to set aside the MOU as unenforceable, arguing that his sister, Cheryl Parr, had an ownership interest in the Wilson property and that the MOU should be set aside based on the parties’ mutual mistake that the property was community property subject to division. The district court ruled that the MOU was enforceable and denied Mark’s request to join Cheryl in the action. The court then entered the divorce decree adopting the parties’ MOU. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the MOU was enforceable with respect to the parties’ disposition of the Wilson property; and (2) the district court properly denied Mark’s request to join Cheryl in the action for the purpose of adjudicating any interest she may have in the property. View "Anderson v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Washoe County Department of Social Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights as to his three minor children. Father filed a demand for a jury trial. The district court denied Father’s demand, concluding that the right to a jury trial in a parental termination proceeding is not guaranteed by the Nevada Constitution, common law, or statute. After a bench trial, the district court terminated Father’s parental rights to his three minor children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Father’s demand for a jury trial in the termination of parental rights proceeding, as neither the Nevada Constitution nor the United States Constitution guarantees a jury trial in a termination of parental rights proceeding; and (2) substantial evidence supported the district court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights to the three minor children. View "Jesus F. v. Washoe County Dep’t of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Kerstan and Michael Micone divorced in 2009. The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their two minor children, and Kersten received primary physical custody of both children. In 2013, the parties’ daughter, I.M., moved to her grandparents’ house in Reno, where she currently resides. In 2014, Michael sought primary physical custody of I.M. The district court awarded primary physical custody of I.M. to her grandparents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the grandparents custody of I.M. because the grandparents were neither parties to nor intervenors in the custody suit, the court failed to notify the Micones that it was considering the grandparents as a custodial option, and the court did not make the requisite findings to overcome the parental preference. View "Micone v. Micone" on Justia Law

The State filed an amended abuse and neglect petition alleging that Mother’s two minor children needed the State’s protection. Mother’s case plan included a provision that she must randomly submit to drug testing. The district court ordered, instead, that an agent of the Department of Children and Family Services could require Mother to take a drug test if the agent reasonably believed that Mother was under the influence of a controlled substance. Mother filed a motion to amend her case plan, arguing that the drug-testing requirement infringed on her constitutional rights. The district court denied Mother’s motion. Mother subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the portion of the district court’s order establishing the drug-testing requirement in her case plan. The Supreme court granted the petition, holding that because the district court did not make any findings to support the drug-testing requirement in the case plan, there were no explicit factual findings to show why this action step in Mother’s case plan was justified, and a writ of mandamus was warranted. View "Manuela H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law