Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal from a district court order denying a motion to modify alimony and to reinstate child support the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in finding the it did not have jurisdiction to reinstate support as to a handicapped child beyond the age of majority but that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to modify alimony in this case.Citing Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.0045(1)(a), the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to award support for the parties' adult handicapped child because he had reached the age of majority and because support payments had already ceased. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court has jurisdiction to award adult child support after the age of majority under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125B.110; (2) the district court failed to make the necessary findings under section 125B.110; and (3) Appellant did not demonstrate that there was a change in circumstances to warrant modifying the parties' alimony agreement. View "Davitian-Kostanian v. Kostanian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's modification of physical custody in this custodial action but reversed the court's parenting time allocation and vacated its award of attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court abused its discretion in part.In this opinion, the Supreme Court (1) provided a definition of sole physical custody to ensure custodial orders are properly characterized; (2) directed district courts to retain their substantive decision-making authority over custodial modifications and parenting time allocations; and (3) clarified when reassignment of a case to a different judge on remand is appropriate due to the requisite fairness demanded in ongoing child custody proceedings. As to the case before it, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's decision to modify physical custody; (2) the district court abused its discretion by improperly characterizing its custodial award as primary physical custody when it was in fact sole physical custody. View "Roe v. Roe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that the record did not support the district court's findings of parental fault or that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest.Father was abusing prescription drugs and illegal substances when Child was removed from his care. For the first sixteen months of the protective custody action, Father consistently visited child and completed the required parenting classes. By the time of the trial on the Department of Family Service's (DFS) motion to terminate Father's parental rights Father had been sober for several months and successfully participating in the drug court program. After learning that successful completion of the program would take Father at least another eight months the district court proceeded with the termination trial and subsequently terminated Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when there is evidence that a parent has been successfully attempting to overcome an addiction to substances, the district court can lawfully continue the termination proceedings to allow the parent to make further progress and complete their case plan; and (2) substantial evidence did not support the district court's findings in this case. View "In re Parental Rights as to G.R.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Grandparents' petition for visitation after concluding that one of the parents provided them with reasonable visitation, holding that the district court properly denied the petition for visitation.On appeal, Grandparents argued that the requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.050 that "a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child" was satisfied in this case because one parent denied them visitation entirely and that the district court's finding that the visitation they received was reasonable was incorrect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Grandparents' visits with the children must have been denied or unreasonably restricted to warrant relief in a petition for visitation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Grandparents' visits with the children in this case were not denied or unreasonably restricted. View "Ramos v. Franklin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Wife's complaint alleging legal malpractice arising from legal advice given in the course of drafting an estate plan, holding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.After a decree of divorce issued divorcing Husband and Wife Husband appealed. The Supreme Court partly reversed the divorce decree, determining that assets in the parties' spendthrift trusts created in a separate property agreement could not be levied against through court order, that the separate property agreement was valid, and that the parties' property was avidly separated into their respective separate property trusts when it was executed. Wife subsequently filed a legal malpractice complaint against Attorney, who previously assisted the parties in creating their estate plan, seeking $5 million in damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the legal malpractice claim was transactional and that that the statute of limitations barred the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no need to toll commencement of the limitations period for transactional malpractice claims; and (2) Wife's legal malpractice claim was transactional, and therefore, the litigation-malpractice tolling rule did not apply. View "Nelson v. Burr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court finding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B.393(3)(c) violates due process, holding that the statute does not infringe on the fundamental liberty interest a parent has in the care and custody of his or her child and thus does not violate due process.Section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves a child welfare services agency from its duty to provide reasonable efforts to reunify a child with his or her parent if a court finds that the parents' parental rights were involuntarily terminated with respect to the child's sibling. A court master recommended that the district court find section 432B.393(3)(c) unconstitutional because, for purposes of terminating the parent-child relationship, it could lead to a presumption that the parent is unfit without any consideration of present circumstances. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order, holding (1) insofar as section 432B.393(3)(c) relieves an agency of making reunification efforts it does not infringe on a parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of his or her child and therefore does not violate due process; and (2) although the district court erred, the petition must be denied as moot. View "Washoe County Human Services v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court setting aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (NRCP 60(b)), holding that Nevada Arbitration Rule (NAR) 19(C) bars a district court from setting aside a judgment confirming gan arbitration award under NRCP 60(b).On appeal from a district court judgment confirming an arbitration award under NRCP 60(b), Appellant argued that NAR 19(C) barred the district court from applying NRCP 60(b) to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the judgment, holding that NAR 19(C) barred post-judgment relief under NRCP 60(b). View "Arce v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

In this opinion considering whether an indemnification provision in a property settlement incident to a divorce decree was enforceable where the divorcing veteran agreed to reimburse his or her spouse if the veteran elected to receive military disability pay rather than retirement benefits, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the spouse's motion to enforce the reimbursement provision of the divorce decree, holding that there was no error.After noting that federal law precludes state courts from dividing disability pay as community property in allocating each party's separate pay, the Supreme Court held (1) even if the parties agreed on a reimbursement provision that the state court would lack authority to otherwise mandate, state courts do not improperly divide disability pay when they enforce the terms of a negotiated property settlement as res judicata; and (2) a court does not abuse its discretion by awarding pendente lite attorney fees under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.040 without analyzing the factors set forth in Burnzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969). View "Martin v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court admitting a will to probate that was drafted by or for the decedent in Portugal and was written in Portuguese, where the decedent was domiciled in Maryland and the subject property at death was a house in Nevada, holding that the district court did not err in applying the will at issue to the decedent's entire estate.After the decedent died in Nevada, Respondent, the decedent's surviving spouse, filed a petition for general administration of the estate and to admit the will to probate. Appellant filed an objection to the petition, asserting that the will could not be probated in Nevada because it was signed in a foreign country. The district court admitted the will to probate. The Supreme Court affirmed, (1) the laws of relevant foreign states must be taken into consideration when evaluating the identity of an "authorized person" for the purpose of implementing the Uniform International Wills Act (UIWA), codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 133A; (2) even if it is executed in a foreign county, a will that fails to comply with the UIWA can be probated in Nevada if it complies with Chapter 133; and (3) Appellant was not entitled to a will contest during the proceedings below. View "In re Estate of Sweet" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court establishing child custody, visitation, and child support holding that the district court erred by exceeding the cap set forth in NAC 425.150(1)(f).Father in this case had a monthly income of approximately $38,000, and Mother's monthly income was approximately $5,000. Mother sought an upward adjustment to Father's child support obligation. The district court ordered Father to pay $3,500 per month in child support. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 425.150(1)(f) plainly caps the limit of any upward adjustment to Mother's monthly obligation amount; and (2) the district court did not err by basing an upward adjustment on NAC 425.150(1)(f), but the court did err by ordering an upward adjustment in excess of the other party's total obligation. View "Matkulak v. Davis" on Justia Law