Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In a contentious guardianship case involving Kathleen June Jones, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), attorney Elizabeth Brickfield, to aid in determining Jones's best interests. The GAL filed a notice of intent to seek fees and costs at her standard hourly rate. The court awarded her those fees over Jones's objection. Jones appealed, arguing that the GAL had no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of a fiduciary, not an attorney.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that Jones waived any argument pertaining to the form of the district court’s order by failing to raise the issue below. The court also held that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program, but this error was harmless because the district court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the complexity of this matter. Lastly, the court held that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL’s fee request and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her requested fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order awarding the GAL fees. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the distribution decisions of the district court in the underlying divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust and affirmed its decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the revocable inter vivos family trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action and that the district court had the authority to distribute the trust's assets; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the trust's assets between the parties as community property. View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in the underlying divorce action, holding that while parts of the decree were legally and factually supportable, other portions contained numerous legal and factual deficiencies.Following lengthy divorce proceedings the district court summarily adopted Respondent's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce without making any modifications. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court committed reversible error in doing so. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) utilizing a party's proposed order does not in and of itself constitute an abuse of discretion; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it granted financial awards for alimony, attorney fees, and expert fees and when it unequally distributed the parties' community property and debt. View "Eivazi v. Eivazi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court sua sponte deciding to remove a protected minor's guardian and terminate the minor's guardianship based upon an ex parte communication, holding that the proceedings and resulting order did not comport with due process.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) has authority to sua sponte remove a guardian and terminate a guardianship even in the absence of a petition seeking removal and termination; (2) violated Defendant's right to due process by failing to give proper notice that it was contemplating removal and termination; (3) abused its discretion by failing to apply the applicable statutes and factors for removal and termination; and (4) made unsupported and clearly erroneous factual determinations in reaching its decision. View "In re D.M.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court declining to backdate the parties' marriage in this case to the date they would have been married but for Nevada's unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage, holding that "the effective date of a marriage will not predate the solemnized marriage itself for property division purposes in a divorce, even if a party asserts that the couple would have married earlier but for the later-held-to-be-unconstitutional ban on marriage between same-sex couples."Appellant and Respondent formally married in California in 2008, when Nevada did not permit same-sex marriages or recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. In 2021, in seeking a divorce, Appellant argued that the district court should backdate the start of his marriage to Respondent to the date their relationship became serious. The district court refused to backdate the marriage and relied on 2008 as the date of the marriage. At issue was the retroactive effect of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Obergefell does not require Nevada courts to backdate a marriage before the couple solemnized their union; and (2) the district court's order accorded with this Court's holdings. View "Candelaria v. Kelly" on Justia Law

In this appeal from a district court order denying a motion to modify alimony and to reinstate child support the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in finding the it did not have jurisdiction to reinstate support as to a handicapped child beyond the age of majority but that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to modify alimony in this case.Citing Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.0045(1)(a), the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to award support for the parties' adult handicapped child because he had reached the age of majority and because support payments had already ceased. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court has jurisdiction to award adult child support after the age of majority under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125B.110; (2) the district court failed to make the necessary findings under section 125B.110; and (3) Appellant did not demonstrate that there was a change in circumstances to warrant modifying the parties' alimony agreement. View "Davitian-Kostanian v. Kostanian" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's modification of physical custody in this custodial action but reversed the court's parenting time allocation and vacated its award of attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court abused its discretion in part.In this opinion, the Supreme Court (1) provided a definition of sole physical custody to ensure custodial orders are properly characterized; (2) directed district courts to retain their substantive decision-making authority over custodial modifications and parenting time allocations; and (3) clarified when reassignment of a case to a different judge on remand is appropriate due to the requisite fairness demanded in ongoing child custody proceedings. As to the case before it, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's decision to modify physical custody; (2) the district court abused its discretion by improperly characterizing its custodial award as primary physical custody when it was in fact sole physical custody. View "Roe v. Roe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that the record did not support the district court's findings of parental fault or that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest.Father was abusing prescription drugs and illegal substances when Child was removed from his care. For the first sixteen months of the protective custody action, Father consistently visited child and completed the required parenting classes. By the time of the trial on the Department of Family Service's (DFS) motion to terminate Father's parental rights Father had been sober for several months and successfully participating in the drug court program. After learning that successful completion of the program would take Father at least another eight months the district court proceeded with the termination trial and subsequently terminated Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when there is evidence that a parent has been successfully attempting to overcome an addiction to substances, the district court can lawfully continue the termination proceedings to allow the parent to make further progress and complete their case plan; and (2) substantial evidence did not support the district court's findings in this case. View "In re Parental Rights as to G.R.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Grandparents' petition for visitation after concluding that one of the parents provided them with reasonable visitation, holding that the district court properly denied the petition for visitation.On appeal, Grandparents argued that the requirement set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.050 that "a parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child" was satisfied in this case because one parent denied them visitation entirely and that the district court's finding that the visitation they received was reasonable was incorrect. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Grandparents' visits with the children must have been denied or unreasonably restricted to warrant relief in a petition for visitation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Grandparents' visits with the children in this case were not denied or unreasonably restricted. View "Ramos v. Franklin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Wife's complaint alleging legal malpractice arising from legal advice given in the course of drafting an estate plan, holding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.After a decree of divorce issued divorcing Husband and Wife Husband appealed. The Supreme Court partly reversed the divorce decree, determining that assets in the parties' spendthrift trusts created in a separate property agreement could not be levied against through court order, that the separate property agreement was valid, and that the parties' property was avidly separated into their respective separate property trusts when it was executed. Wife subsequently filed a legal malpractice complaint against Attorney, who previously assisted the parties in creating their estate plan, seeking $5 million in damages. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the legal malpractice claim was transactional and that that the statute of limitations barred the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no need to toll commencement of the limitations period for transactional malpractice claims; and (2) Wife's legal malpractice claim was transactional, and therefore, the litigation-malpractice tolling rule did not apply. View "Nelson v. Burr" on Justia Law