Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

After 29 years of marriage and three children, appellant Sharmeen Islamkhan (“wife”) filed for divorce. She sought review of the denial of her motion to vacate void judgment in which she asked the trial court to vacate its order modifying certain provisions of the parties’ final divorce decree. Wife argued that, prior to entry of the modification order, appellee Shoeb Khan (“husband”) filed a notice of appeal of the final divorce decree which acted as supersedeas and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to modify the appealed order. The Georgia Supreme Court granted wife’s application for appeal and asked the parties to address a series of questions related to the issue of whether supersedeas had attached. After review, the Court found that the divorce decree entered by the trial court was not a final judgment and, as a result, husband’s failure to follow the procedures set forth in OCGA 5-6-34 (b) for obtaining interlocutory review rendered his notice of appeal nugatory. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of wife’s motion to vacate. View "Islamkhan v. Khan" on Justia Law

Husband Timothy Frost and Wife Hwa Frost were married in 1980 when Husband was in the U.S. Army and stationed in Korea country. The couple relocated to Georgia upon Husband’s retirement from the military after seventeen years of service. Husband was then-employed, but Wife was not, claiming to be disabled. Husband filed for divorce in 2013. After a bench trial, the court entered an order granting the divorce, declaring a division of marital property, awarding alimony to Wife, and denying Wife’s request for an award of attorney fees. As part of the alimony award, the trial court granted Wife one-half of Husband’s military retirement pay until Wife died or remarried. The Supreme Court granted Wife’s application for discretionary appeal in order to examine whether the trial court erred in awarding a portion of Husband’s military retirement pay as alimony, subject to termination upon Wife’s death or remarriage, as opposed to treating it as a marital asset subject to equitable division. After review, the Supreme Court found that the order declaring that payment of Husband’s military retirement benefits “shall continue until [Wife] dies or remarries” was contrary to law and was reversed. Upon remand, the trial court was instructed to award to Wife her equitable portion of Husband’s military retirement benefits as part of the equitable division of marital property that will survive Wife’s death or remarriage. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Frost v. Frost" on Justia Law

Jennifer Bales (Mother) and Steven Lowery (Father) divorced in 2013. The divorce decree: awarded them joint legal and physical custody of their two daughters; said that “[c]ustodial time shall be shared between the parties to allow for the children to have equal time with both parents and the parents shall cooperate with each other to reach this goal,” but specified that the girls would reside with Mother during the school year; and gave Mother final decision-making authority in matters involving the girls’ education. The decree also included a default visitation schedule that gave Father the girls for “the entirety of the summer break from school” except for one week, but required him to return the children to Mother five days before the start of the new school year. The decree also included an unusual provision giving Husband the right to “take temporary physical custody immediately” should “Wife be incarcerated for any reason” or should “either of the minor children advise both parents that she wishes to reside on a full time basis with [Husband].” Both parties were unemployed at the time of the divorce, and in light of the time-sharing arrangement contemplated by the divorce decree, neither was ordered to pay the other child support. At some point, Father moved to Baldwin County, and Mother moved to Henry County. Mother allowed the parties’ older daughter, Jamie, to reside with Father in Baldwin County and attend school there during the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but disagreements about custodial time and the girls’ proper care eventually arose, and Mother decided not to allow Jamie to reside with Father in Baldwin County and attend school there during the 2015-2016 school year. Instead, Mother decided that, as provided in the divorce decree, Jamie would reside with Mother and attend public school in Henry County with her younger sister. Father refused to return Jamie to Mother at the end of the 2015 summer school break. Mother appealed the trial court’s order denying her petition for habeas corpus seeking the return of her older daughter from Father. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the petition and therefore reversed. View "Bales v. Lowery" on Justia Law

The trial court issued an order finding appellant-Husband in willful contempt of the parties’ final order of divorce after a jury trial. Based on the jury’s verdict regarding the division of property, the divorce decree required Husband to pay appellee Wife one-third (1/3) of the gross of his pension funds until Wife remarried, though a portion of the pension funds payable to Wife was to be withheld for the payment of taxes. The jury declined to award alimony to Wife. Neither party appealed the jury’s verdict or the final decree of divorce. Wife moved for contempt when appellant failed to pay her the proportionate increase in the pension funds. Shortly after Wife filed her motion for contempt, Husband filed a motion for “termination of alimony” because he alleged Wife remarried and because he alleged he made overpayments of the pension funds to Wife. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Husband in willful contempt of the divorce decree, concluded Husband owed certain pension payments, and ordered Husband to repay the amount owed in monthly installments. In addition, the trial court awarded Wife attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted Husband’s application for discretionary review to determine whether the trial court’s final ruling was in error. On appeal, Husband maintains that the payments at issue were not marital property, but, rather, constituted periodic alimony; and, because the jury expressly denied alimony to Wife, Husband contended he did not owe Wife and could not be held in contempt. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed. View "Coursey v. Coursey" on Justia Law

Appellant Joseph Triola (husband) was ordered to pay appellee Janet Triola (wife) temporary alimony, and the final judgment, in part, ordered husband to pay wife an $18,000 arrearage owed under the temporary alimony award. The Supreme Court granted husband’s application for discretionary appeal to consider whether the award of temporary alimony and arrearage provision in the final decree, should have been reversed because the first temporary alimony order was made by a judge who entered the award after the effective date of his resignation and the second temporary alimony order, identical to the first, was made by a successor judge who did not conduct an independent review of the evidence before entering the award. The Supreme Court agreed the alimony award and the arrearage should have been reversed. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Triola v. Triola" on Justia Law

Eddie Amoakuh (“Father”) appealed a trial court order finding him in contempt, modifying child custody and child support, and awarding attorney’s fees. Father and Mariama Issaka (“Mother”) were divorced in 2010; at that time they had three minor children. Under a 2012 court order modifying the prior child custody arrangement, the two children who were still minors moved to the United Kingdom with Mother, who became their primary physical custodian; Father was granted visitation during the summer months, and at any time he was in the United Kingdom, or in the place of “Mother’s residence.” Father’s child support obligation was set at $150 per month. In 2014, Mother had become a resident of Ghana; one child was still a minor, and a dispute arose over the logistics regarding the exercise of Father’s summer visitation with that child. Father traveled from Ghana to the United States with the child, and entered her in school in Georgia. Mother filed a petition for a finding that Father was in contempt of the 2012 order, and requested that custody of the minor child be modified so that she be sole custodian, and that child support be modified accordingly; Father counterclaimed, seeking a finding that Mother was in contempt of the 2012 order, and a modification of custody to name him the primary physical custodian of the child. After a hearing, the trial court granted Mother’s petition, denied Father’s request and found Father to be in contempt of the 2012 order. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed on the issue of attorney fees, finding that the trial court did not take Father's financial circumstances when awarding fees. Accordingly, the case was reversed with respect to the fee issue, and the matter remanded for consideration of this issue. View "Amoakuh v. Issaka" on Justia Law

Husband Dustin and Wife Keisha Davenport were divorced by final decree; Husband appeared pro se in the divorce proceeding. Wife, who had counsel, paid for a court reporter to record the bench trial. Husband did not participate in paying for the takedown. After the trial, Husband hired a lawyer, who filed a motion for new trial and a motion to compel production of the trial transcript (which Husband was then willing to pay for), asserting that the trial court failed to make a ruling at the start of the trial that Husband expressly refused to share the takedown expense. In response, Wife claimed that Husband had expressly refused to participate in the takedown after being given an opportunity to do so. At the hearing on the motion to compel, no transcript of the trial or of the discussion of the takedown was presented. The court entered an order summarily denying Husband’s motion to compel. Husband filed a notice of appeal directed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal due to Husband’s failure to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures. The trial court then held a hearing on Husband’s motion for new trial, and the court denied that motion. Husband filed an application for discretionary appeal with the Supreme Court, which was granted to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Husband’s motion to compel production of the trial transcript in the absence of a finding that the court made a ruling at the start of the trial that Husband refused to participate in paying takedown costs. The Supreme Court found the record on appeal would support a finding that Husband refused to participate in the reporting of the divorce trial. But the record did not support a finding that the trial court ruled on the takedown costs issue at the start of the trial. Thus, Wife failed to show that Husband was not entitled to a transcript, and the trial court’s order denying Husband’s motion to compel production of the trial transcript was reversed. Moreover, as a result of the trial court’s denial of Husband’s motion to compel, he was unable to cite the trial transcript in raising challenges to the divorce decree in his motion for new trial. The trial court's denial of Husband’s motion for new trial was vacated and the matter remanded with direction to enter an appropriate order granting Husband a transcript at his expense, after which he could seek review of the divorce decree by amending his new trial motion to reflect the contents of the trial transcript. View "Davenport v. Davenport" on Justia Law

Wife Karen Horton was granted a discretionary appeal of her divorce from Husband Christopher Horton. The appeal was granted in order to consider whether the superior court erred in determining as a matter of law that the house titled in Husband’s name was his separate property, and whether it erred in awarding Husband attorney fees under OCGA 9-15-14. The parties were married for approximately 19 months later. They had met on a dating site for older adults. The parties appeared for trial and stipulated: (1) the marriage was irretrievably broken; (2) Wife owned her home in Savannah prior to the marriage; (3) Husband owned the House at issue here prior to the marriage; (4) the mortgage balance on the House was $152,062.81; (5) Wife would retain the benefits from her retirement plan, which she accumulated prior to the marriage; (6) Husband would retain a $985 monthly annuity, which he began receiving prior to the marriage; (7) each party would retain the vehicle and other personal property in his or her possession and be responsible for his or her own health insurance; and (8) there was no marital debt. At some point during the marriage, Husband contemplated filing for bankruptcy, and deeded the house to Wife so that it would not be included in the bankruptcy estate. Wife contended that she spent $15,000 to remodel the House. Among other things, Wife argued that the jury could find that all or part of the House was marital property because Husband deeded it to her and because of the mortgage payments she made during the marriage and the amount she spent on remodeling. The superior court granted Husband’s motion and dismissed the jury. Husband was awarded attorney fees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Horton v. Horton" on Justia Law

These appeals arose from an October 2009 order on a petition for contempt filed by Denita Jones (“Wife”). In the order, the trial court found Nolan Jones (“Husband”) in willful contempt regarding his child support obligations, calculating his arrearage at over $119,000. The Georgia Supreme Court granted both parties’ respective applications for discretionary appeal to address various aspects of this order. After review, the Court affirmed the trial court’s general finding of contempt, however, it concluded that the trial court erred in revisiting previously adjudicated arrearages and reversed the order to the extent it did so. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the court erred in calculating the most recently accrued arrearage. That portion of the order was reversed and remanded for a re-determination of that arrearage consistent with the terms of the parties’ divorce decree. In light of these dispositions, the Court also reversed the order to the extent it directed Husband to purchase a life insurance policy. Finally, the Court concluded that the trial court’s attorney fee award was not excessive and therefore affirmed that portion of the order. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2009, Brett Beveridge filed an action for divorce against his wife, Vivian Hoard. One child was born of the marriage, and the primary issue in the case involved custody of the parties’ minor child. Following a ten day trial, the trial court issued a final order granting the parties joint legal and physical custody with equal parenting time. Both Hoard and Beveridge filed cross-motions for attorney fees and expenses. In an October 2014 order, the trial court denied Hoard’s fee motion and granted Beveridge’s motion. Hoard subsequently filed an application for discretionary appeal which the Supreme Court granted pursuant to Rule 34 (4). Because the Court concluded the trial court made sufficient findings to sustain the full amount of the fee award under OCGA 19-6-2 (a), it affirmed. View "Hoard v. Beveridge" on Justia Law