Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The parties, Peggy Albritton and Mark Kopp divorced in 2011. The final divorce decree incorporated a settlement agreement and child support addendum wherein Husband agreed to pay child support while the daughter was a full-time high school student. Daughter was enrolled as a senior in high school for the 2014-2015 school year, during which she turned 18 years old. Due largely to learning disabilities and medical issues, the daughter was a few credits shy of being able to graduate high school in a timely manner. In order to graduate, daughter needed to complete two semesters of advanced math, and one semester of economics followed by one semester of government. Accordingly, Wife enrolled daughter as a fifth-year senior for the 2015-2016 school year. Initially, daughter was registered in advanced math and economics for the fall semester but, in October 2015, she added two elective courses to her curriculum. Around this time, Husband ceased paying child support, claiming that daughter was not enrolled in enough classes to qualify as a “full-time high school student” as required in the parties’ divorce decree and related documents. Wife filed a motion for contempt based upon Husband’s failure to pay the required child support. The trial court denied Wife’s motion, and she appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying her motion. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial court erred by effectively modifying the settlement agreement concerning Husband’s child support obligation, as the parties’ adult daughter was, in fact, attending school full time as contemplated by the settlement agreement. View "Albritton v. Kopp" on Justia Law

Glen and Danielle Rollins divorced in December 2013, and they agreed at that time to submit to binding arbitration of their respective claims to certain furniture and furnishings in the marital home. The arbitrator rendered an award in July 2014, and Glen promptly moved for judicial confirmation. While his motion was pending, in August 2014, the trial court ordered Danielle to account for some of the furniture and furnishings that the arbitrator had awarded to Glen that he could not find. Dissatisfied with her accounting, Glen filed a motion to hold Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order. In April 2015, the trial court found Danielle was in willful contempt of the August 2014 order in at least one respect, and it entered an initial contempt order that directed Danielle to show cause why she ought not be incarcerated for her contempt. Danielle appealed the initial contempt order, both by filing an application for discretionary review with the Supreme Court, and by filing a notice of direct appeal. In May 2015, the Supreme Court denied the application for discretionary review. The direct appeal was not docketed until November 2015. In December 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal, explaining that any appeal of the initial contempt order had to come by application, and noting that it already had denied an application for discretionary review. In the meantime, the trial court held a final hearing on the motion for contempt and entered a final order on November 24, 2015, finding Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order in additional respects, directing her to immediately surrender any property awarded to Glen, ordering her to pay Glen for any such property that had gone missing or was damaged, and ordering her to pay fines for 34 separate instances of contempt. The trial court also awarded Glen attorney fees. Danielle then applied for discretionary review of the final contempt order, and the Supreme Court granted her application. Danielle argued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a final contempt order while her direct appeal from the initial contempt order still was pending with the Supreme Court. The Supreme agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

Wife appealed an adverse judgment in an action for contempt. The record shows Wife and Husband were divorced on June 20, 2011. Neither party was represented by counsel during the divorce. The final divorce decree was a perfunctory, one-page form document which incorporated a form separation agreement that was found on the Internet, printed and signed by both parties then notarized. The separation agreement was not fully filled in and/or marked where appropriate; but it purported to require Husband to pay $513 per month as alimony and $647 as child support. In addition to the final decree and separation agreement, the record also contains an unsigned, two-page typed document, drafted by Husband, which was filed with the trial court on May 10, 2011, at approximately the same time the separation agreement was executed. This document states that the parties “wish” to hold onto the marital home until the economy improved, that Wife will occupy the home, and that the combined alimony and support payment was sufficient to pay the mortgage on the home. This document was not referenced by or incorporated into the final decree of divorce. Husband stopped making mortgage payments sometime after the divorce was finalized, the bank foreclosed on the marital home, and Wife was evicted. Wife filed this contempt action alleging Husband was required to make the alimony and child support payments to her directly, rather than by depositing the money into a joint bank account. The trial court declined to hold Husband in contempt, determining that the documents filed in the divorce did not require Husband to make his support payments directly to Wife, that the two-page typed document was not a part of the divorce decree and that, even if that document was a part of the divorce decree, it was too vague to be enforceable. The trial court determined that the two-page typed document did not obligate Husband to pay the mortgage. In addition, since the minor child was no longer living with Wife and was in Husband’s custody, the trial court held that Husband’s child support payments were to be immediately extinguished. Finally, the trial court denied Wife’s request for attorney’s fees and request for consequential damages stemming from her eviction from the marital home upon foreclosure. Wife’s main assertion of error was that Husband should have been held in contempt because he failed to pay the alimony and the child support payments to her directly, but rather deposited the payments into the parties’ joint bank account. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s denial, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brown v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal of a superior court’s orders setting aside, in part, a final judgment and decree of divorce, and amending the final judgment of divorce. After a proceeding in which Wife was held in contempt, she filed in late 2013, a motion to set aside the March 2009 judgment and decree claiming, inter alia, that in his 2008 financial affidavit, Husband failed to disclose his interest in certain real properties. Husband opposed the motion to set aside, contending that the three-year statute of limitations barred any such claim under OCGA 9-11-60 (f). The trial court held that the three-year “statute of limitations” of OCGA 9-11-60 (f) was tolled until Wife became aware that Husband possessed certain previously undisclosed funds. However, the Supreme Court found that motion to set aside the judgment under OCGA 9–11–60 (d) was filed more than three years after the 2009 judgment. Because the motion to set aside the judgment was filed outside he exclusive time limitation for such a motion, the trial court’s order setting aside the judgment, as well as its subsequent order, was reversed. View "Myles v. Myles" on Justia Law

In 2006, appellant Carla Christian and appellee Ben Christian, Jr. signed a Separation Agreement. The agreement was approved by a trial court in 2008. Carla filed a complaint for divorce in 2013. By October 2014, she moved for partial summary judgment, asking the trial court to rule that Paragraph VII of the Agreement entitled her to one-half of Ben’s retirement, 401(k) and other employment benefits as valued on the date of divorce. In early 2015, the trial court denied the motion, calling it an attempt to replace an “or” with an “and” in the language of the Separation Agreement. The trial court found no ambiguity in Paragraph VII and did not consider any parol evidence Carla sought to introduce to explain the paragraph further. The court later reconsidered its prior holding, and ruled that Carla was entitled to one-half of Ben’s 401(k) and retirement pension plan or one-half of his other employment benefits. Months later, the court issued a “clarifying” order, holding that Carla was “entitled to choose from the 401(k) or other employment benefits.” Carla appealed once the final divorce decree was entered. The Supreme Court reversed in part, vacated in part and affirmed in part. The Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the date of valuation under Paragraph VII was the date of the Separation Agreement rather than the date of the divorce. The Court vacated the trial court’s ruling that the Paragraph was unambiguous “as a matter of law,” because it found two viable interpretations of it. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Christian v. Christian" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal to address whether the trial court erred when it denied enforcement of the parties’ post-nuptial agreement. In 2014, Brenda Murray (Wife) initiated divorce proceedings against Gary Murray (Husband). The parties, who had been married for approximately 34 years, began discussing the prospect of divorce several months prior. Though Husband indicated his desire to divorce, Wife wanted to save the marriage and, to that end, wrote Husband a letter of apology renouncing her rights in the marital estate. Wife claims that she wrote this letter at Husband’s behest and that its terms reflected what Husband wanted it to say. Husband subsequently engaged counsel to draw up a formal post-nuptial agreement providing for the disposition of the couple’s marital property upon dissolution of the marriage by divorce or death, which was favorable toward Husband. The parties signed the Agreement on June 5, 2014. Several months after the Agreement was executed, and following unfruitful attempts at marriage counseling, Wife filed for divorce in October. Husband moved to enforce the Agreement, and Wife objected, claiming that Husband had induced her to sign the Agreement with the promise that he would tear it up as soon as she signed it, making her believe her execution of the Agreement was merely a symbolic gesture of love and devotion that would have no practical effect. Husband, on the other hand, contended that he merely promised to destroy the Agreement if and when he “was comfortable they were in love again.” Following a hearing, the trial court denied Husband’s motion, finding the Agreement unenforceable. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the trial court properly found that the postnuptial agreement was unenforceable and affirmed. View "Murray v. Murray" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the appellee-mother’s complaint for modification of the divorce parenting plan for her 17-year-old child. Appellant-father contended that the trial court: (1) erred in denying his motion to dismiss the modification action; (2) impermissibly modified his visitation rights to require him to arrange visits with his daughter at times that are mutually agreeable; and (3) improperly awarded the mother $46,593.05 in attorney fees and costs. Aside from what the Supreme Court concluded was a scrivener’s mistake in the order awarding attorney fees, it found no reversible error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Dallow v. Dallow" on Justia Law

Appellee Mother’s parental rights were terminated on January 14, 2013. Since Mother was indigent, she was represented by appointed counsel during the termination proceedings at juvenile court. In a letter that was apparently written prior to the issuance of the final termination of rights order, trial counsel told Mother that he could not represent her in an appeal, that she was not entitled to indigent defense for the discretionary appeal of a civil case, and that she should contact the public defender if she had questions or needed the appointment of another lawyer. On February 13, 2013, Mother, who was acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal in the juvenile court; but, months later, the juvenile court dismissed the notice of appeal because Mother was required to seek review by discretionary application. Mother, now represented by a new attorney, filed an “application for an out-of-time discretionary appeal,” requesting review of the January 2013 termination of rights order. Having decided it could grant the application for out-of-time discretionary review, the Court of Appeals went on to consider the merits and ultimately affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court granted the Georgia Division of Family and Children Services’ (“the State’s”) petition for certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that an appellate court had the authority to excuse the untimely filing of a discretionary application in a civil parental termination case. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment so that the appellate court could issue an order dismissing Mother’s application for out-of-time discretionary review. View "In the Interest of B.R.F. f/k/a B.R.M." on Justia Law

In November 2001, Appellant Doug Jackson (“Father”) and Appellee Lisa Sanders (“Mother”) divorced in Florida. The final judgment and decree of divorce required Father to pay Mother $1,005 per month for the support of their infant son, based on Father’s then-current annual salary of $250,000. Subsequently, both parties relocated to the Atlanta area, and a decree was entered in Cobb Superior Court in 2007, incorporating the same child support requirement. Subsequently, Father moved for modification of custody and child support, and Mother counterclaimed, seeking an upward modification of child support. The trial court held a bench trial in March 2014 and thereafter entered a final order granting Mother’s motion for directed verdict on the custody modification and granting Mother’s request for an upward modification of child support. The court determined that it was proper to apply OCGA 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B), which addressed the scenario when a parent “fails to produce reliable evidence of income,” thus impeding the trial court’s ability to fairly and reasonably calculate and allocate the parties’ respective child support obligations. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded on this issue, finding that while it was not an abuse of discretion to apply the statute, it was error to not calculate the father's income as mandated by that statute. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. View "Jackson v. Sanders" on Justia Law

After 29 years of marriage and three children, appellant Sharmeen Islamkhan (“wife”) filed for divorce. She sought review of the denial of her motion to vacate void judgment in which she asked the trial court to vacate its order modifying certain provisions of the parties’ final divorce decree. Wife argued that, prior to entry of the modification order, appellee Shoeb Khan (“husband”) filed a notice of appeal of the final divorce decree which acted as supersedeas and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to modify the appealed order. The Georgia Supreme Court granted wife’s application for appeal and asked the parties to address a series of questions related to the issue of whether supersedeas had attached. After review, the Court found that the divorce decree entered by the trial court was not a final judgment and, as a result, husband’s failure to follow the procedures set forth in OCGA 5-6-34 (b) for obtaining interlocutory review rendered his notice of appeal nugatory. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of wife’s motion to vacate. View "Islamkhan v. Khan" on Justia Law