Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal upholding the ruling of the superior court denying the requests of Bianka M., a minor, for an order placing her in her mother’s sole custody and for findings that would enable her to seek “special immigrant juvenile” (SIJ) status under federal immigration law, holding that the superior court erred in concluding that it could not issue either a custody order or findings relevant to SIJ status unless Bianka first established a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over her father and joined him as a party to the action.Bianka entered the United States unaccompanied and without prior authorization. In a family court action, Bianka asked to be placed in the sole custody of her mother, who had left Honduras for the United States years before, and sought findings enabling her to seek special immigrant juvenile status, alleging that her father, who resided in Honduras, abandoned her. The superior court denied the requests. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the superior court erred in requiring Bianka’s father to be joined as a party in her parentage action seeking SIJ findings because he received adequate notice and took no steps to participate; and (2) the action may proceed regardless of Bianka’s perceived immigration-related motivations for filing the action. View "Bianka M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The first clause of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1) authorizes a juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over a child without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child. The court of appeal also concluded that section 300(b)(1)’s first clause does not require such a finding. In this case, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition to declare then seventeen-year-old R.T. a dependent of the juvenile court on the ground that she faced a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness as a result of Mother’s failure or inability adequately to supervise or protect her. The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over R.T. The court of appeal affirmed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a child’s behavior places her at substantial risk of serious physical harm and a parent is unable to protect or supervise that child, the juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction is authorized under section 300(b)(1). View "In re R.T." on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a child dependency proceeding involving two minors. The children were eligible for tribal membership but were not Indian children as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Rule 5.482(c) of the California Rules of Court requires a juvenile court in this scenario to “proceed as if the child is an Indian child” and to take steps “to secure tribal membership for the child.” The juvenile court in this case directed the Department of Health and Human Services to make efforts to secure tribal membership for the children. While the applications were pending, the court proceeded as if ICWA applied, held a hearing, and adjudged the children to be dependents of the court and ordered them placed with their maternal grandmother. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Rule 5.482(c) conflicted with state law. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent it held that related Rule 5.484(c)(2) was invalid and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) Rule 5.482(c) is invalid because it conflicts with the Legislature’s intent to enforce ICWA by codifying its provisions, including the federal definition of Indian child; and (2) Rule 5.484(c)(2) is consistent with state law and valid. View "In re Abbigail A." on Justia Law

The juvenile court removed Isaiah W., a newborn, from the care of his parents and placed him in foster care. The court found the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) inapplicable and did not order the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services to notify any tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Mother did not appeal from the order placing Isaiah in foster care. More than one year later, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed from the second order, arguing that the juvenile court erred by failing to order the Department to comply with ICWA’s notice requirements. The Court of Appeal denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a parent may challenge a finding of ICWA’s inapplicability in the course of appealing from a subsequent order terminating parental rights, even if the parent did not raise such a challenge in an appeal from the initial order; and (2) in this case, the fact that Mother did not allege ICWA notice error in an appeal from the original dispositional order did not preclude her from raising the claim in this appeal. View "In re Isaiah W." on Justia Law