Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Before the Supreme Court was whether an action for separate maintenance and support could be pursued when the parties were still living together. Eileen (Wife) and Clifford (Husband) Theisen were married in 1980. At the time of this action, the parties owned three properties: the marital home, which was in Wife's name, and two rental properties, both of which were in Husband's name. Wife had filed for divorce on two previous occasions, at least one of which was premised on the fault ground of physical cruelty. Wife filed this action for separate maintenance alleging Husband "has engaged and continue[ed] to engage in a course of conduct making it unreasonable and unfair to require [Wife] to continue to live with him." Husband counterclaimed for equitable distribution of the marital assets and debts as well as attorney's fees. Husband further made motions to dismiss Wife's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Both of Husband's motions were premised on the fact that Husband and Wife were not living separate and apart. He also moved to cancel the lis pendens placed on his rental properties. The court found it "ha[d] the jurisdiction to order separate support and maintenance, [but it did] not have the authority to do so when the parties [were] living together." Accordingly, the court dismissed her complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the family court because Wife failed to allege that she and Husband were living separate and apart at the time of filing. Furthermore, because Wife's lis pendens and claim for attorney's fees hinged on the validity of her complaint, the Court found no error in the family court's denial of that relief.

Petitioner Brian DiMarco sought a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision that affirmed, as modified, a family court's contempt order against him.  Petitioner was subject to a court order to make monthly child support payments to Cheryl DiMarco (Mother).  According to Petitioner, he had made child support payments for over ten years before Mother filed for an increase in 2006.  The family court instead decreased the support order and ordered the payments be made through the court beginning on April 1, 2008.  Petitioner asserts he timely attempted to make the first payment to the court, but the court lacked record of the order and could not accept the payment. In May 2008, the clerk of the family court filed a Rule to Show Cause because Petitioner was behind on his child support payments. The hearing was scheduled for June 25, 2008. On June 23, 2008, Petitioner paid the arrearage, bringing his child support account to a zero balance. On the morning of June 25, Petitioner did not appear on time for the Rule to Show Cause hearing. The judge issued a warrant for Petitioner's arrest.  No testimony was taken on whether or not Petitioner had failed to pay child support.  Shortly thereafter, Petitioner arrived at the courthouse.  During the hearing, everyone who spoke noted Petitioner did not owe any outstanding child support at that time. During his argument, Mother's attorney stated, "I think the court needs to very much impress upon him taking the law into his own hands and not showing up, not being here on time it's just, just it's driving everyone nuts." From the bench the judge held Petitioner in civil contempt, suspended confinement and a levied a fine. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals because the sanction ordered by the family court violated Petitioner's rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals said "the family court's contempt sanction has elements of both civil and criminal contempt."  The civil element of the sanction, the court found, was that the incarceration would not be imposed unless Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00 to the court.  The criminal element was that if Petitioner failed to pay the $250.00, he would be incarcerated for a definite period of time.  To remedy the family court's unclear sanction, the court of appeals modified the order and held Petitioner must pay the $250.00 in court costs, and if he failed to do so by the deadline established, then he would be incarcerated for twelve months.  In doing so, the court of appeals crafted a sanction that violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights.

The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) initiated termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings against M.R.C.L. (mother) and R.L. (father). Child was removed from mother and father's home in May 2007 due to allegations of physical neglect, after both parents tested positive for crack cocaine. Child, who was one year old at the time, was placed in a pre-adoptive foster home with two of her siblings. After a merits hearing, the family court ordered mother and father to complete a treatment plan, including a drug and alcohol assessment and a parental assessment, and to maintain safe and appropriate housing. Mother and father did not complete the treatment plan. The Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) testified that, in her opinion, it was in child's best interest to terminate mother and father's parental rights and allow the foster parents to adopt child. The family court terminated mother and father's parental rights, generally finding (1) mother and father willfully failed to visit the child; (2) mother and father willfully failed to support the child; and (3) termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appealed the termination, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding DSS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that mother willfully failed to support or visit the child. Because the Court of Appeals found DSS failed to prove any statutory ground for TPR, it did not reach the issue whether TPR was in the best interest of the child. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the family court's finding that mother willfully failed to support the child. Specifically, considering all the facts and circumstances of this case, DSS showed by clear and convincing evidence that mother willfully failed to support child. The Court held the family court properly found TPR was in child's best interest.

Appellant "J. Doe" brought an action against Respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) alleging various theories of negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart. This case arose from the physical and sexual abuse of then three-year-old J. Doe (also "the victim"). "F. Doe" is the victim's guardian ad litem and great uncle. F. Doe and his wife (aunt) often kept the victim for months at a time. According to the aunt, both of the victim's parents physically abused him beginning when he was three months old. In August 1997, after arriving at her house, the aunt examined the victim and found two "wide strips" of bruising on his buttocks. She did not contact the police or the Department of Social Services (DSS) or seek medical treatment. Instead, she took two photographs of the victim's buttocks. Several days later, the aunt took the roll of film to Wal-Mart to be developed. When the aunt retrieved the photos, a photo technician informed her she had destroyed some of the photos because of a store policy requiring the destruction of photos depicting nudity. The aunt claimed the employee told her she was required to "destroy them," which the aunt believed meant the employee had destroyed the photos and the negatives. The aunt left the store with the remainder of the photos and all of the negatives, but erroneously believed the negatives depicting the victim's buttocks had been destroyed. The father pled guilty to first degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. In 2003, Appellant filed suit arguing the victim's injuries from the sexual abuse were a result of Wal-Mart's failure to report the suspected physical abuse depicted in the photos as required by the Reporter's Statute and/or Wal-Mart's negligent hiring and supervision of its employees and its violations of approximately twenty internal company policies. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart was proper because there could be no civil liability under the state Reporter's Statute and Wal-Mart owed no duty to the victim. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

In March 2000, Theodora Miles sought a divorce from James Miles. Prior to the final hearing, the parties reached an agreement on many issues pertaining to the division of the marital property, health insurance, child support and custody. Six years later, Mr. Miles sought to modify the settlement agreement due to a "substantial change in circumstances." In particular, Mr. Miles sought a reduction in his child support payments, and to stop paying for his ex-wife's health insurance. The issue before the family court was whether the agreement to provide the health insurance was a modifiable support obligation or a non-modifiable agreement similar to a division of property. The family court found "unambiguously" that the health insurance was not support. The court denied Mr. Miles' modification. The appellate court affirmed the family court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Miles argued that both the family court and the appellate court were wrong in holding the health insurance was a support obligation. The Supreme Court reversed both lower court decisions, holding that the agreement provided a "modifiable incident of support in the form of health and dental insurance as a matter of law." The record reflected that the change in Mr. Miles' circumstances merited a modification because his earning capacity diminished significantly since the divorce decree, while Mrs. Miles' circumstances substantially improved. The Court remanded the case to the family court for further proceedings.

In this divorce action, the Supreme Court was asked to review two decisions of the appellate court involving the valuation of the marital home and an award of expert witness fees. Both issues involve determinations of fact. "An appellate court should approach an equitable division award with a presumption that the family court acted within its broad discretion. The family court should be reversed only when the appellant demonstrates an abuse of discretion," not for determinations of fact. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's reversal of the family court because there was no clear demonstration of an abuse of that discretion. The Court reinstated the ruling of the family court.

Appellant Essie Simmons and Respondent Rubin Simmons divorced in 1990. The parties entered into a settlement agreement that was approved by the family court. Central to the agreement was the requirement that Mr. Simmons give Ms. Simmons a half or third of his Social Security benefits, depending on his age when he retired. When he retired, Mr. Simmons did not pay his ex-wife. She sued, but the family court declined to hear the complaint, finding that it could not hear a case that primarily dealt with Social Security benefits. Mr. Simmons appealed the dismissal, and the appellate court reversed. The court voided the division of Mr. Simmons' benefits, holding that the Social Security Act specifically precluded parties from dividing benefits under the settlement agreement. Because the agreement was partly voided by the court, Ms. Simmons sought to reopen the matter entirely. The family court dismissed again, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to revisit the agreement. On appeal, the Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the family court could revisit the now partially voided agreement. Upon careful review of the arguments and applicable legal authority, the Court held that "basic principles of equity suggest[ed] that all issues should be revisited by the family court." The Court recognized the practical difficulties confronting the family court, but the Court noted, "that challenge pales in comparison to [Mr. Simmons'] suggestion that we simply end this matter with the remnant of the agreement remaining valid." The Court reversed the decision of the lower court and remanded the case to the family court for further proceedings.

Craig Reeves was the biological father of "Baby Boy Roe." The biological mother of the child was sixteen when she found out she was pregnant. She attempted to include Mr. Reeves in the pregnancy from the onset, but he was dating another woman, and the record reflected he clearly was not interested in becoming a parent. The mother contacted an adoption agency about placing the child up for adoption and settled on Appellants "John and Jane Roe." At some point, the mother began to have reservations over her decision to give the baby up for adoption. At some point, Mr. Reeves had a change of heart over his involvement with the mother and her pregnancy. He bought some diapers and periodically bought things for the mother, but nothing to the extent that Appellants had done. the father lived with his parents, and converted some extra space in his home as a makeshift "nursery," fully expecting to take the baby home with him once it was born. Mr. Reeves went to the hospital to see "his" son when born, but the hospital informed him that the mother was a "no information" patient, and he was turned away. The next day, the mother signed an adoption consent form, and Appellants took the child home. Mr. Reeves brought suit in family court, arguing that the baby could not be adopted without his consent. The court found that his consent was needed, and ordered the child be returned to his custody. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Reeves "did not fully grasp the opportunity to come forward and demonstrate a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood through prompt and good faith efforts." The Court held that Mr. Reeves' contributions were not sufficient compliance with state law to establish his right to consent to the adoption. The Court reversed the family court order pertaining to the father's consent, and awarded immediate custody of the child to Appellants.

George Grumbos (Husband) contested the family court's decision to impute certain income to him when it granted his wife Demetra Grumbos' temporary and permanent alimony. In its final order, the family court found both parties were underemployed, and both were able to work. Based on his past W2s, the court imputed $4,500 per month to the Husband, which was more than he was actually earning at the time. In assessing the parties' debts, the court considered three promissory notes the Husband executed, loaning his brothers and parents over $100,000. Based on these findings, the court awarded the Wife $630 per month as alimony. The Husband challenged the court's calculation of the Wife's alimony award. The Supreme Court found that the family court properly weighed the testimony and evidence, and accurately assessed the Husband's income. However, in its holding, the Court found that the family court erroneously made the Husband pay the Wife's attorney's fees. The Court affirmed the alimony award, but reversed the award of attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant-Defendant Tyquan Jared Amir Jones was charged as a juvenile with murder, armed robbery and unlawful possession of a pistol. The family court waived jurisdiction and ordered Defendant be treated as an adult. Defendant plead to a lesser charge pursuant to a plea agreement. On appeal, Defendant argued the family court erred in waiving jurisdiction because it did not properly apply state law in its order, and that statements he made to police should not have been used against him because his mother was not present when he signed the waiver of rights form. The Supreme Court found that the family court properly considered all of the Kent factors in deciding to waive jurisdiction. The Court also found that Defendant never argued the statement was involuntary at trial. Finding no reversible errors, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.