Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether former foster parents had standing to petition to adopt a child placed for adoption by the Department of Social Services (DSS) with a different family. Upon review of the trial court record in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the former foster parents possessed neither statutory or constitutional standing, and therefore vacated the order that granted the parents' petition, and remanded custody of the child to DSS for adoptive placement. "[R]ecognizing that children develop rapidly, and that stability and attachment are important components in their growth and development, [the Court directed] DSS to consider [the] child's present best interests in placing her for adoption." View "Youngblood v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Svcs" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married for thirty years. Following the onset of serious health problems (for both), they separated. A family court judge was tasked with identifying and dividing the marital estate upon dissolution of the marriage. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether trust distributions could be considered marital property. The Court ruled that they can in limited circumstances. Further, the Court affirmed the family court's division of the marital estate, but reversed the inclusion of one tract of timber. The Court also reversed the reservation of alimony to the wife and modified that portion of the order that required the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees and costs. View "Wilburn v. Wilburn" on Justia Law

William E. Terry, Jr. appealed a family court order holding him in contempt for failing to vacate the parties' marital residence as required under the temporary order. The appeal was manifestly without merit, and the Supreme Court affirmed pursuant to Rule 220, SCACR. Because Appellant erroneously believed that the filing and service of a notice of appeal from the family court's temporary order divested the family court of jurisdiction from considering the contempt matter, the Court elected to address and clarify the effect of an attempted appeal from a family court temporary order: "Perceived errors in family court temporary orders are to be redressed as they always have, at the final hearing. For issue preservation purposes, any such challenge must be placed on the record at the commencement of the final hearing. The family court has wide discretion in fashioning equitable relief, including the authority to make adjustments in the equitable distribution and otherwise to remedy an error in the temporary order. If a party desires to challenge the family court's final resolution of the matter, the aggrieved party may appeal from final judgment." View "Terry v. Terry" on Justia Law

After finding a card for flowers for another woman in her husband’s car, Petitioner Gail Jennings confronted him. Respondent M. Lee Jennings confessed he had fallen in love with someone else, and although he refused to divulge her name, he admitted the two had been corresponding via e-mail for some time. Gail confided this situation to her daughter-in-law, Petitioner Holly Broome. Broome had previously worked for Jennings and knew he maintained a personal Yahoo! e-mail account. She accessed his account by guessing the correct answers to his security questions and read the e-mails exchanged between Jennings and his paramour. Broome then printed out copies of the incriminating e-mails and gave them to Thomas Neal, Gail’s attorney in the divorce proceedings, and Brenda Cooke, a private investigator Gail hired. Broome was sued civilly for hacking Lee Jennings' Yahoo! e-mail account. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Broome on all claims, including violation of the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA). The court of appeals reversed, finding that the e-mails she obtained from hacking Jennings' account were in electronic storage and thus covered by the SCA. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. After opening them, Jennings left the single copies of his e-mails on the Yahoo! server and apparently did not download them or save another copy of them in any other location. The Court therefore declined to hold that retaining an opened e-mail constitutes "storing it for backup protection" under the Act. "We emphasize that although we reject the contention that Broome's actions [gave] rise to a claim under the SCA, this should in no way be read as condoning her behavior. Instead, we only hold that she is not liable under the SCA because the e-mails in question do not meet the definition of 'electronic storage' under the Act." View "Jennings v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Margaret Mims (Mims), as guardian ad litem for her son Edward, filed a complaint against the Babcock Center and others alleging Edward sustained physical injuries and was mistreated while under their care. The circuit court dismissed the complaint based on issues related to timeliness of service and the application of S.C. Code Ann. 15-3-20(B) (2005). Mims appealed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court concluded the trial court erred in finding Mims's amended complaint should have been dismissed for failure to serve it within 120 days of filing the original complaint. Moreover, the Court agreed with Mims that, contrary to Defendants' assertion, Rule 15(a), SCRCP does allow the filing and service of an amended complaint without leave of court, even if the original complaint has not been served, because a party may amend her pleadings once without leave of court before a responsive pleading is served, and no responsive pleading had been served by Defendants prior to Mims's service of the amended complaint. To the extent the trial court found an alleged absence of proper service resulted in a lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and a failure to prosecute, the Court reversed these findings as they were premised on the perceived error regarding service. View "Mims v. Babcock Center" on Justia Law

This case involved a contest over the private adoption of a child born in Oklahoma to unwed parents, one of whom is a member of the Cherokee Nation. After a four day hearing in September 2011, the family court issued a final order on November 25, 2011, denying the adoption and requiring the adoptive parents to transfer the child to her biological father. The transfer of custody took place in Charleston, South Carolina, on December 31, 2011, and the child now resides with her biological father and his parents in Oklahoma. THe adoptive parents appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the family court which denied the adoption and awarded custody to the biological father. View "Adoptive Couple v. Cherokee Nation" on Justia Law

Appellant Lisa Argabright and Respondent Wayne Argabright were formerly married, are now divorced and share joint custody of their minor daughter. Appellant appealed the family court's issuance of a restraining order enjoining her from permitting any contact between her boyfriend, a convicted sex offender, and the parties' minor daughter. The family court further required Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney's fees and the guardian ad litem fees. Appellant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was the only person available to supervise contact between Child and the boyfriend. And given Appellant's pattern of deception and pursuit of her own interests over those of Child, an order entrusting Appellant to ensure no future unsupervised contact between Child and the boyfriend would be suspect. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order. View "Argabright v. Argabright" on Justia Law

Kristi McLeod (Mother) and Robert Starnes (Father) divorced in 1993. Mother received custody of their two minor children, and Father was required to pay child support. Despite rather sizable increases in Father's income, Mother never sought modification of his child support obligation. In August 2006, the parties' older child, Collin, reached the age of majority and enrolled as a college student. Father wholly supported his son's to attend college, and agreed to repay all of Collin's student loans upon graduation. Father took it upon himself to unilaterally decrease his weekly child support to which Mother later acquiesced in consideration of Father's assurances that he would support the son while he was in college.  However, Father did not uphold his end of the bargain, nor did he regularly pay a percentage of his bonus as promised. Mother filed suit in March 2007 seeking an award of college expenses, an increase in child support for the couple's other child, plus attorney's fees and costs.  Father counterclaimed, asking that the court terminate: (1) his child support for the eldest son because he had attained the age of majority and graduated from high school; (2) his support for the younger child upon graduation from high school; (3) and the requirement that he pay a percentage of his annual bonus as child support.  He also denied that he should be required to pay any college expenses for his oldest son.  A temporary order was filed in June 2007 that set child support for the younger child, ordered Father to contribute towards college expenses, and left intact the thirty-five percent of Father's annual bonus payable as support. The court dismissed Mother's claim for college expenses on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Less than two years ago, the Supreme Court decided "Webb v. Sowell,"(692 S.E.2d 543 (2010)), which held that ordering a non-custodial parent to pay college expenses violated equal protection. The Court granted permission in this case to argue against that precedent so that the Court could revisit its holding in "Webb."  In his holding in this case, the Court concluded that "Webb" was wrongly decided and remanded this case for reconsideration in light of the law as it existed prior to "Webb."

Susan Chisholm (Wife) appealed the court of appeals' reversal of the family court's grant of attorney's fees. She argued that the court of appeals incorrectly held the family court erred by solely considering beneficial results in determining the award because the court of appeals had remanded that issue for that very reason. Moreover, Wife contended that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the family court's award. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the appellate court's holding.

Appellant Sean Taylor appealed an order which terminated his parental rights to his six-year-old daughter on three grounds: willful failure to visit, willful failure to support, and because the child had been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous twenty-two months.  Following a review of the record, the Supreme Court held that Respondent Charleston County Department of Social Services (DSS) did not meet its burden with respect to the first two grounds, and that the child's placement in foster care for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months was not a sufficient ground for termination of Appellant's rights under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the family court's decision and directed DSS to implement a plan to reunify Appellant with his daughter, or to place the child with her grandparents until reunification could be achieved.