Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Robert Loppi purchased a life insurance policy from United Investors Life Insurance Co. in which he initially named Marilyn Loppi, his wife, as the beneficiary. In 2008, after Marilyn filed for divorce from Robert, Robert applied to United Investors to change the beneficiary on his life insurance policy to his uncle, David Loppi. In 2009, during the course of the divorce proceeding, the family court entered an interlocutory order ordering that Robert’s life insurance policies be cashed in and that the cash surrender value be divided equally between Robert and Marilyn. Before Robert complied with the interlocutory order, Robert died. Thereafter, United Investors declined to pay the life insurance death benefit to either David or Marilyn. David filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that he alone was entitled to the life insurance policy death benefit. The hearing justice granted David’s petition for declaratory judgment stating that David was entitled to 100 percent of the policy proceeds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Marilyn was not entitled to any portion of the life insurance proceeds at issue. View "Loppi v. United Investors Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions in Family Court alleging that Respondent had abused and neglected his two minor children and sought to terminate Respondent’s parental rights to both children. After consolidating the neglect and termination petitions for trial, the family court granted DCYF’s petitions and terminated Respondent’s parental rights to his two children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not infringe Respondent’s due process rights when she rendered her decision to terminate Respondent’s parental rights immediately after she had appointed substitute counsel; and (2) the trial justice did not err by finding that DCYF had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was unfit to parent his two minor children. View "In re Jake G." on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, the family court issued a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to three of her children. Mother appealed, arguing that both R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7 and Supreme Court precedent with respect to the factors to be considered when addressing a petition for termination of parental rights violate her constitutional right to due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother’s parental rights as concerns her three children, holding that Mother’s contention on appeal had been waived, as Mother did not raise her constitutional argument before the family court. View "In re Shy C." on Justia Law

In 2007, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their two sons. The Family Court terminated the parents’ parental rights, but the Supreme Court vacated the decree. New case plans were subsequently developed for the parents, but when the parents showed no progress and continued their alcoholic lifestyle, the DCYF filed new petitions to terminate both parents’ rights. In 2013, the Family Court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children. The Supreme Court denied and dismissed the parents’ appeals and affirmed the decree of the Family Court, holding that the trial justice did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, competent proof to support the termination of the parents’ parental rights to their children. View "In re Steven D. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former wife of Defendant, filed a complaint seeking protection from abuse from Defendant. A magistrate of the family court entered a temporary order restraining and enjoining Defendant from contacting Plaintiff. The chief judge of the family court affirmed the magistrate’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s conduct was of the type that the General Assembly mandated could be the predicate for the issuance of a protective order; and (2) the magistrate did not exceed her authority in issuing a civil restraining order after determining that the restraining order was necessary to protect Plaintiff from Defendant’s harassment. View "Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh" on Justia Law

After a trial, the family court dissolved the twenty-four year marriage of Husband and Wife. Both parties appealed the family court’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision pending entry of final judgment, holding that the trial justice (1) did not overlook or misconceive the medical evidence relating to Wife’s medical condition; (2) did not err in distributing the property; (3) did not err by retroactively applying a modification of child support; (4) did not err by failing to award Wife lifelong medical coverage and attorney’s fees; and (5) made an inequitable sua sponte modification concerning the termination of alimony. View "Bober v. Bober" on Justia Law

Son was born to Mother, who was incarcerated at the time of the birth. Father was also incarcerated at that time. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents, alleging that Mother and Father had chronic substance-abuse problems and that Son had been placed in the legal custody of DCYF for at least twelve months with no substantial probability that Son would be able to return to the parents’ custody within a reasonable period of time. After a hearing, the hearing justice terminated Father’s parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree terminating Father’s parental rights, holding (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in finding that Father was unfit and that it was improbable that Son would be able to return to Father’s care within a reasonable period of time; and (2) the trial justice did not clearly err in finding that DCYF had met its burden to make reasonable efforts under R.I. Gen. Laws 15-7-7(b)(1). View "In re Lyric P." on Justia Law

In 2006, the family court entered final judgment on a divorce between Sandra Carney and Stephen Carney that incorporated by reference a marriage settlement agreement (MSA) entered into by the parties. In 2011, Stephen filed a motion to enforce the MSA or, in the alternative, to adjudge Sandra in contempt, arguing that Sandra failed to comply with the MSA because she did not pay an equitable distribution to him upon her sale of the parties’ former marital domicile. The trial justice determined that Stephen was entitled to payment from Sandra under the terms of the MSA and gave Sandra until 2012 to produce the amount of $59,375 to Stephen. The Supreme Court reversed in part the order of the family court, holding (1) the trial justice did not make sufficient factual findings on the record with respect to the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement regarding the timing of the payment of the equitable distribution; and (2) the trial justice erred in her calculation of the amount Sandra owed to Stephen for the sale of the house. View "Carney v. Carney" on Justia Law

After John and Anne had been married almost twenty years, John filed a complaint for divorce. Three years later, the parties indicated that they had reached a settlement, which obligated John to provide health insurance for Anne until she reached sixty-five years of age, with a Medicare supplement thereafter. The parties' agreement was read into the record and approved by the trial justice, who ordered it incorporated but not merged into the final divorce decree. However, the parties never executed a written agreement. John later challenged the validity of the marital settlement agreement after Anne moved to enforce the provisions of the agreement respecting John's obligation to pay for health insurance. The family court found that the parties clearly agreed that John was to cover Anne with her health insurance and ordered John to obtain and maintain the health insurance pursuant to the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agreement was sufficient to form a nonmodifiable marital settlement agreement, and therefore, John was bound by its terms. View "O'Donnell v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

After Father's two daughters were committed to the care and custody of the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), DCYF filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Father's parental rights to the children. After a trial on the termination petition, the family court terminated Father's parental rights to both daughters. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in finding there was clear and convincing evidence of DCYF's reasonable efforts towards reunification; (2) the trial justice did not err in finding that there was no substantial probability of the children returning to Father's care within a reasonable period of time; and (3) there was sufficient proof to support the trial justice's finding of abandonment. View "In re Lauren B. " on Justia Law