Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

David and Melinda’s two children lived with Melinda, and David paid child support. The Napa County Department of Child Support Services moved to modify David’s child support obligation. (Fam. Code, 17400). After a hearing, the court found that David’s income, for purposes of calculating child support, was the monthly Social Security disability payment he received, ordered him to pay a portion of that to Melinda as child support, and found Melinda received $796 per month in derivative Social Security disability benefits as the representative payee of the children based on David’s disability, 42 U.S.C. 402(d). Melinda argued these benefits should be treated as part of David’s income when calculating his monthly income for purposes of his support obligation. The court concluded the derivative benefits were the income of the children, not of David, so that the $796 in derivative disability benefits would partially satisfy David’s support obligation. The monthly benefits would be credited first toward his current child support, and any excess would be credited to pay off arrears. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Daugherty v. Daugherty" on Justia Law

The parties were married for 21 years. At the time of trial, husband was 51 and wife was 53. Husband was a practicing attorney with the Army Corps of Engineers. Wife worked at the Bonneville Power Administration. Both parties were beneficiaries of federal retirement benefits. Because wife was eligible for Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) benefits, she was not eligible for Social Security benefits based on her own employment. Husband's civilian federal employment was under the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) and subject to Social Security taxes. The question presented in this case was whether federal law forbid a division of property by which the value of retirement benefits belonging to the nonparticipating spouse is reduced by the present value of hypothetical Social Security benefits to which that spouse would have been entitled if she had been a Social Security participant. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not violate federal law by "considering" Social Security benefits in that way, it affirmed that court's decision. View "Herald v. Steadman" on Justia Law

Parents who adopted special needs children challenged decision by the Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide a lower assistance subsidy for the children than the assistance subsidy that would be paid if the children were in a foster placement. The decision was upheld upon administrative review by DHS and sustained by the district court and Court of Civil Appeals. Parents filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded DHS was attempting to apply a predetermined fixed amount of subsidy without allowing adoptive parents to show greater need up to the amount provided for special needs children in foster care. This was contrary to the policy and purpose of the statutory law providing and regulating financial assistance to people who undertake parental responsibility and care of special needs children. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals was therefore vacated and the district court order sustaining the decision of the Department of Human Services was reversed. The case was remanded to the Department of Human Services for redetermination of the monthly subsidy amount. View "Troxell v. Oklahoma Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

A nursing home resident and her community spouse (husband) were penalized based on husband’s purchase of an annuity for himself using funds from his IRA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, holding that 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(f)(1) precluded the transfer of assets because it exceeded husband’s community spouse resource allowance. Section 1396p(c) requires a state to impose a transfer penalty (a period of restricted coverage) if either spouse disposed of assets for less than fair market value during the look-back period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the transfer occurred before the Ohio agency determined that wife was eligible for Medicaid coverage and section 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) permits an unlimited transfer of assets “to another for the sole benefit of the individual’s spouse.” View "Hughes v. Colbert" on Justia Law

Ryan W. entered the care of the Department of Social Services at age nine as a child in need of services (CINA) and was placed in foster care. After Ryan's parents died, the Department was appointed by the Social Security Administration (SSA) as Ryan's representative payee for Old Age and Survivor's Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefits to which Ryan was entitled. The Department received Ryan's benefit payments and applied them to partially reimburse itself for the current cost of Ryan's foster care. The circuit court determined that the Department violated Ryan's due process and equal protection rights by failing to notify him before applying his OASDI benefits toward the current costs incurred by the Department on his behalf. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a local department of social services, acting in the capacity as an institutional representative payee appointed by the SSA, has discretion to apply a CINA foster child's OASDI benefits to reimburse the Department for its costs incurred for the child's current maintenance; but (2) the department must provide notice to the child that the department applied to the SSA and received such benefits on the child's behalf. View "In re Ryan W." on Justia Law

Former U.S. Forest Service employee King had long-term relationships with two women, both of whom claimed federal survivor benefits upon his death. Kathryn believed she had married King in a civil ceremony in 2002. Diana, who had been legally married to and divorced from King twice, but had continued to live with him until 2002, maintained that she was the common law wife of King at the time he married Kathryn. Before his death, Diana had initiated proceedings in Montana to dissolve their common law marriage. The women subsequently entered settlement agreements and engaged in state court litigation. Kathryn received benefits from May 27, 2004 until February 2007. Diana subsequently received the survivor benefits. Kathryn transferred to Diana the funds that she received ($41,939.13), as she believed was required by a Montana court decree. Kathryn challenged the OPM’s effort to recover the improper payments, having transferred the money to Diana, but the government affirmed its decision and determined that collection of the $41,939.13 would not cause Kathryn financial hardship. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, holding that Kathryn did not meet the definition of “widow” under the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C. 8341(A)(1), and had not proved that she was entitled to waiver for the overpayment. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board failed to credit substantial evidence demonstrating that Kathryn detrimentally relied on the overpayment of survivor annuity funds. View "King v. Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Louis Burden, a Vietnam veteran, served on active duty in the Army from 1948 until 1968. He married Michele in a ceremonial marriage in April, 2004. Two months later, Burden died. In August 2004, Michele applied for dependency and indemnity compensation. A VA regional office denied her claim because she had not been married to Burden for at least one year prior to his death, 38 U.S.C. 1102(a). Michele asserted that she and Burden had been living in a common law marriage for five years prior to his death. The board acknowledged that she had provided some evidence to support her claim, but concluded that it did not constitute the “clear and convincing proof” required to establish a valid common law marriage under Alabama law. The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit upheld the denial. State law, including state law evidentiary burdens, applies in determining the validity of a purported common law marriage View "Burden v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, by and through her adoptive parents, brought this action challenging South Carolina's reduction of monthly adoption assistance benefits, claiming that the reduction violated the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq. The court held in this case that section 673(a)(3) did set forth a privately enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but that the parents have failed to plead any violation of that right by defendants. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hensley v. Koller" on Justia Law

Providers brought suit against the State, asserting that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (CWA), 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq., gave them a privately enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to receive payments from the State sufficient to cover the cost of certain statutorily enumerated components of foster care. At issue was whether Congress, in enacting the CWA, evinced a clear intent to grant foster care providers an individually enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments sufficiently large to cover the costs of each item enumerated in section 675(4)(A). The court held that Congress did not ambiguously confer such a right and, therefore, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Providers' complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Midwest Foster Care, etc., et al v. Kincade, et al" on Justia Law