Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Oregon Supreme Court
Dept. of Human Services v. C. H.
The case involves the Department of Human Services (DHS) assuming dependency jurisdiction over a child, A, born prematurely with special medical needs. Both parents have cognitive disabilities, and due to concerns about their ability to care for A, she was placed in substitute care. DHS provided services to the parents for approximately two years before requesting a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, which the juvenile court approved in August 2022.The juvenile court found that DHS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but the parents did not make sufficient progress to safely care for A. The court noted that the parents' most significant barrier was their lack of follow-through and unwillingness to attend services. The court also determined that there was no compelling reason why adoption would not be in A's best interest.The parents appealed, arguing that DHS failed to make reasonable efforts tailored to their cognitive disabilities and that the agency displayed cultural and racial insensitivity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's judgment, acknowledging DHS's shortcomings but concluding that the totality of DHS's efforts was reasonable.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that DHS's efforts, including multiple referrals to services tailored to the parents' needs, were reasonable. The court also found that the parents' failure to engage in services was a significant barrier to reunification. Additionally, the court determined that there was no compelling reason to conclude that adoption would not be in A's best interest, given the lack of an alternative permanent plan and the child's need for stability. View "Dept. of Human Services v. C. H." on Justia Law
Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
In the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the case involved a mother contesting the juvenile court's decision concerning the permanency plan for her child, A. In July 2019, A was made a ward of the court and placed in substitute care under the Department of Human Services (DHS). Despite DHS's efforts, the juvenile court determined that the mother had not made sufficient progress to allow A's safe return home.The mother argued that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard, asserting that she had made significant progress. The court, however, determined that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that the mother's progress was inadequate for A’s safe return home.The court held that the juvenile court's "sufficient progress" determination is a legal conclusion rather than a factual finding. It concluded that the record developed in this case was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's legal conclusion that the mother's progress was insufficient to make possible A's safe return home. As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the juvenile court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B." on Justia Law
In re: Sause and Schnitzer
This case concerned the parentage of a child conceived through assisted reproductive technology (ART). Jordan Schnitzer wanted to have a son. Because he was single, he planned to use his own sperm, an egg donor, and a gestational carrier. Cory Sause contributed her eggs. A gestational carrier gave birth to a boy, S. Afterward, the gestational carrier, her spouse, and Schnitzer agreed that Schnitzer—and not the gestational carrier or her spouse— was S’s intended parent, and a declaratory judgment was entered to that effect. Schnitzer and Sause, however, disagreed about whether Sause was also S’s parent and about whether Schnitzer could prevent Sause from having a relationship with S. The trial court concluded that Sause was S’s legal parent based on her undisputed genetic connection to S; a divided Court of Appeals reversed. The Oregon Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court and concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, Sause’s genetic connection to S did not establish her legal parentage of S. The Supreme Court also concluded that Sause may have contracted with Schnitzer for certain non-parental rights with respect to S. "The extent of those rights is an issue that the trial court did not reach due to its conclusion that Sause was a parent." The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings to declare the legal parentage of S and to determine the extent of Sause’s nonparental rights with respect to S. View "In re: Sause and Schnitzer" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Oregon Supreme Court
Skinner & Skinner
In 2014, wife filed for dissolution of her marriage to husband. At the trial to divide the parties’ assets and establish support awards for both wife and a child, wife requested, in relevant part, $750 per month in transitional spousal support for 60 months and $750 per month in maintenance spousal support for an indeterminate period. The trial court entered a general judgment (the “original 2014 judgment”) awarding wife $750 per month in transitional spousal support for 60 months, to begin on the date of the 2014 judgment (May 1, 2014), and $500 per month in maintenance spousal support for an indefinite period to begin immediately after the transitional support ended (June 1,2019). Wife appealed, challenging both the monthly amount and the delayed commencement of the maintenance support. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding the trial court misapplied ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C) and thus incorrectly calculated wife’s maintenance support and postponed the maintenance support payments until after the transition support ended. On remand, the trial court increased the maintenance support award to $1,000 per month for 60 months, after which time the maintenance award would decrease to $750 per month. The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review centered on whether interest accrued on the support payments that were increased retroactively following the husband’s appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the award of interest was improper. The Supreme Court concluded wife was entitled to statutory interest at nine percent per annum on the additional amount that the trial court added to the monthly support award in the original judgment, calculated from the dates that those payments would have been due. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court, and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Skinner & Skinner" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Oregon Supreme Court
Dept. of Human Services v. F. J. M.
Father challenged a juvenile court’s order requiring him to undergo a psychological evaluation and follow its recommendations. ORS 419B.387 authorized a juvenile court, following an evidentiary hearing, to “order [a] parent to participate in the treatment or training” that “is needed by [the] parent to correct the circumstances that resulted in wardship or to prepare the parent to resume the care of the ward” and that “is in the ward’s best interests.” Father contended the psychological evaluation did not qualify as “treatment” and that, even if it did, it was not “needed” by father. Thus, the issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Courr’s review centered on the meaning of those terms in ORS 419B.387 and whether that statute authorized the juvenile court to order the psychological evaluation here. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court’s order was authorized under ORS 419B.387. View "Dept. of Human Services v. F. J. M." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Oregon Supreme Court
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
Petitioner Bruce Querbach sought to overturn a final order of the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) which determined that reports to DHS that petitioner had abused two children were “founded.” The circuit court, reviewing the order as an order in other than a contested case, assumed that the “reasonable cause to believe” standard in that rule was a “probable cause” standard. After holding a trial to develop the record for review, as required by Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 996 P2d 958 (2000), the circuit court concluded that only two of DHS’s four “founded” determinations could be sustained under that standard. On petitioner’s appeal and DHS’s cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the circuit court’s application of a “probable cause” standard and, instead employing the “reasonable suspicion” standard that it had used in an earlier, similar case, concluded that not just two, but three of DHS’s “founded” determinations had to be sustained. Appealing to the Oregon Supreme Court, petitioner argued that “probable cause” was the correct standard for determining that a report of abuse is founded and that none of DHS’s “founded” determinations hold up when the record on review was considered under that standard. Petitioner also argued that, given that the circuit court found that the DHS investigation and analysis into the reported abuse was incomplete and flawed in various respects, the “founded” determinations had to be set aside. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that three of the four “founded” dispositions were supported by substantial evidence. View "Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law
Dept. of Human Services v. P. D.
Two juvenile dependency cases were consolidated for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review because they presented the same issue on review: whether the juvenile court’s dependency judgments establishing jurisdiction and wardship over each of parents’ two children exceeded the scope of the court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751, one of the statutes in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as enacted in Oregon. Before issuing its decision in “J.S.II,” the trial court became concerned that these cases might have become moot, because the juvenile court had terminated its jurisdiction and the wardships during the pendency of the appeal. Having considered the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Supreme Court conclude that these cases were not moot. And, for the reasons discussed in J. S. II, the Supreme Court held the juvenile court had authority under ORS 109.751 to issue dependency judgments making the children wards of the court and placing them in foster care, but that it did not have authority to order parents to engage in specified activities to regain custody of the children. View "Dept. of Human Services v. P. D." on Justia Law
Dept. of Human Services v. J. S.
Two juvenile dependency cases raised an issue of the scope of a juvenile court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751, which was part of Oregon’s enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Parents were residents of Washington who were living temporarily at a motel in Oregon. The juvenile court asserted temporary emergency jurisdiction over their 15-month-old son after police, investigating the death of his infant brother, found him living in squalid and dangerous conditions in the motel room. The court later entered several dependency judgments concerning that child as well as another child later born to Parents in Washington. Parents challenged the juvenile court’s authority under ORS 109.751 or any other provision of the UCCJEA to issue dependency judgments making their two children wards of the court in Oregon. On Parents’ appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court, holding that the juvenile court had properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction as to both children under ORS 109.751 and did not exceed its temporary emergency jurisdiction when it issued dependency judgments as to the children. Only mother filed a petition for review, which the Oregon Supreme Court allowed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s denial of mother’s motions to dismiss the dependency petitions, because the juvenile court had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to enter dependency judgments as to the children. However, the juvenile court exceeded the scope of its temporary emergency jurisdiction, and therefore we vacate certain parts of the dependency judgments. As a result, the appellate court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Dept. of Human Services v. J. S." on Justia Law
Dept. of Human Services v. C. M. H.
The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review centered on the nature and scope of the “exclusive original jurisdiction” that ORS 419B.100(1) conferred on the juvenile courts over specified categories of “case[s] involving a person who is under 18 years of age.” The question arose from petitioner’s challenge to a juvenile court judgment that deprived her of legal-parent status as to S, a child over whom petitioner had claimed a right to custody. According to petitioner, the court’s judgment of “nonparentage” was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the juvenile court did not determine that S actually fell within one of the categories specified in ORS 419B.100(1). The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s challenge to the judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. Here, it was undisputed that this case involved a child who was the subject of a petition alleging that she fell within one of those categories and requesting that the juvenile court exercise its authority to address those allegations. And it was undisputed that proceedings to address the petition were pending when the juvenile court ruled on petitioner’s parentage status. The Supreme Court concluded the allegations and relief sought in the pending petition were sufficient to bring the case within the subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. C. M. H." on Justia Law
M. A. B. v. Buell
Petitioner M.A.B. applied for a Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) protective order against respondent on October 9, 2017. Respondent and petitioner were married in 2014. Together, they had a son, J, who was born in 2015. During the marriage, respondent suffered from depression, for which he took medication. He sometimes also drank to excess. Petitioner testified that respondent raped her twice: once in March 2017 and once in May 2017. The incident in May included respondent dragging petitioner away from J while petitioner was breast feeding. In June 2017, petitioner expressed her unhappiness with the marriage. Respondent replied that, if petitioner left or divorced him, he would kill her and take J. In July 2017, petitioner took J, moved in with her parents, and filed for dissolution. After the separation, respondent made frequent attempts to contact petitioner by phone, email, and text message. At prearranged meetings, respondent regularly exhibited anger toward petitioner. After a hearing, the trial court continued the protective order in its entirety. On appeal, respondent conceded that the trial court’s findings were sufficient to establish that he had abused petitioner within 180 days of petitioner seeking the protective order. Respondent argued, however, that the evidence was insufficient to establish the two other elements: that petitioner was in imminent danger of further abuse from respondent and that respondent presented a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the evidence was insufficient to show that petitioner was in imminent danger of further abuse from respondent. The court, as a result, reversed the trial court’s order without considering whether respondent represented a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety. Because the appellate court did not consider whether respondent represented a credible threat to petitioner’s physical safety, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the appeals court to determine that issue in the first instance. View "M. A. B. v. Buell" on Justia Law