Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Samuel Rathbun appealed a district court order modifying his child and spousal support obligations. Samuel argued the district court erred by not modifying his child support. The Supreme Court concluded a district court erred when it fails to correctly apply the child support guidelines when imputing income to an obligor. The district court's order and judgment was reversed and this case was remanded with instructions that it calculate child support consistent with the child support guidelines. View "Rathbun v. Rathbun" on Justia Law

This case was the result of a long history between Jon Norberg and Alonna Knorr. Once married, they divorced after Knorr alleged Norberg sexually abused her after drugging her with Propofol. Knorr's allegations resulted in criminal charges against Norberg, and a jury acquitted him of all charges in 2012. Norberg appealed the district court order denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law or new trial. He argued collateral estoppel established as a matter of law Knorr's liability for his abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and defamation claims, and it should not have been redecided by the jury. He further argued Knorr's dismissal of her lawsuit prevented her from raising affirmative defenses to his claims. Concluding collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of matters previous determined, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Norberg v. Norberg" on Justia Law

Sandra Glass-Lenertz appealed an amended judgment terminating James Glass's spousal support obligation to her. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating spousal support as of the date of Lenertz's remarriage in 2002. View "Glass v. Glass" on Justia Law

Thomas Solwey appealed a district court order denying his petition to modify primary parental responsibility. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, concluding Thomas Solwey established a prima facie case for modification and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The Court declined his request that the Supreme Court order a different district judge hear the matter on remand. View "Solwey v. Solwey" on Justia Law

Daniel Raak appealed and Danel Jacobs-Raak (now known as Danel Jacobs) cross-appealed a divorce judgment distributing their marital property, and ordering Raak to pay child support. Except with regard to the division of the mineral estate, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err as a matter of law, did not abuse its discretion, and its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. “When the parties agree to a division of property, the district court should explain its reasons for not dividing the property according to that agreement.” The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with respect to the division of a mineral interest for an identical division of that interest or an explanation concerning the division of that mineral interest. View "Jacobs-Raak v. Raak" on Justia Law

Jerry Harvey and Christine Rasmussen divorced in January 2014. The parties had three children together, and Rasmussen was awarded primary residential responsibility of the children. In December 2015, Rasmussen moved to modify Harvey's parenting time and requested the court find Harvey in contempt. In April 2016, the district court granted Rasmussen's motion, modified Harvey's parenting time, found Harvey in contempt, and ordered Harvey pay Rasmussen's attorney's fees and costs. Harvey appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. The district court found Harvey had the ability to pay Rasmussen's costs and fees, but did not make any findings about Rasmussen's need. The court ordered costs and attorney's fees under both the contempt and divorce statutes, but did not provide the required analysis for attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. section 14-05-23. Because the court did not award attorney's fees only for the contempt and it did not make any findings about Rasmussen's need, its findings were insufficient for appellate review. The case was therefore remanded for the district court to make its required findings. View "Rasmussen v. Harvey" on Justia Law

Shane Stolz appealed the district court's order: (1) denying his motion to vacate judgment and the judgment granting Stacy Hildebrand primary residential responsibility of their two minor children; (2) requiring Stolz to make $761 per month in child support payments; and (3) partitioning real property held jointly between them. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion denying Stolz's motion to vacate, the Supreme Court affirmed. However, the judgment incorrectly stated the matter came before the district court "on motion" and "as a stipulated divorce action," rather than an action for partition of real property and for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. The Supreme Court remanded this matter back to the district court to correct the judgment to accurately reflect this action. View "Hildebrand v. Stolz" on Justia Law

Ethan Mattingley and Rebecca Schweitzer had one child, born in 2012. Schweitzer lived in Minot and Mattingley lived in Velva, approximately 22 miles southeast of Minot. In 2014 both parties sought primary residential responsibility of the child. The district court, through Judge Hagar, entered an interim order in February 2015 establishing parenting time and requiring Mattingley to pay $970 per month in child support. Approximately one month after entry of the interim order, Mattingley moved to modify child support. While the motion was pending, Mattingley moved to recuse Judge Hagar. In June 2015, Judge Hagar entered an order decreasing Mattingley's child support obligation. In July 2015, Judge Hagar denied Mattingley's motion to recuse, but subsequently disqualified himself from the case on the same day. Judge Louser was assigned to the case and presided over a September 2015 trial. Before trial, Judge Louser informed the parties she intended to "proceed anew on all issues raised in the initial pleadings" including primary residential responsibility and child support. After trial, Judge Louser informed the parties of a personal conflict and requested the case be assigned to another judge. Presiding Judge Lee assigned himself to the case, awarded primary residential responsibility of the child to Schweitzer and established parenting time for Mattingley. The court found it was in the child's best interests to live with Schweitzer in Minot where the child would be attending school. Judge Lee also addressed Mattingley's motion to recuse and concluded it divested Judge Hagar of authority to proceed in the case. The court vacated Judge Hagar's order modifying child support and reinstated a $970 per month of child support amount under the February 2015 interim order. After filing his notice of appeal, Mattingley moved to modify child support because he lost his job in March 2016. After a hearing the district court reduced Mattingley's child support obligation. Mattingley argued the district court erroneously calculated child support. He also argued the court erred in vacating the June 2015 order modifying child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Judge Lee erroneously vacated Judge Hagar's June 2015 order modifying child support. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Schweitzer v. Mattingley" on Justia Law

Spencer and Rebecca Curtiss were divorced and had two minor children. Spencer was awarded primary residential custody of the children by a district court in Sedgwick County, Kansas. Spencer moved to North Dakota in 2009 and Rebecca moved to North Dakota a year later. In February 2011, Spencer was convicted and incarcerated at the North Dakota State Penitentiary. In March 2011, Rebecca moved the North Dakota district court to amend the divorce judgment to provide her with primary residential responsibility of the children. The district court granted the motion and awarded Spencer supervised parenting time every other weekend at the penitentiary. The district court issued a Second Amended Judgment modifying Spencer's child support obligation in October 2013. In July 2015, Spencer moved the district court to enforce the existing judgment regarding his parenting time, arguing Rebecca was not bringing the children to the penitentiary to visit him. In November 2015, Rebecca moved the district court to modify the Second Amended Judgment to suspend Spencer's parenting time while he was incarcerated. In support of her motion, Rebecca argued that she and the children's therapist believed any visits to the penitentiary were harmful to the children. After a hearing, the district court entered a Third Amended Judgment ordering that, while Spencer was incarcerated, the children were not required to visit him, but if the children wanted to, the parenting time had to be supervised by a professional such as a counselor or a therapist. The district court also ordered Spencer could set up telephone calls and letters through the children's therapist, and that all communication had to be supervised by a professional. Spencer moved the district court to reconsider. The district court denied Spencer Curtiss's motion. Spencer appealed the Third Amended Judgment. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court made no findings as to whether a material change in circumstances occurred, whether suspended visitation was necessary because visitation was likely to endanger the children, and whether modification of the Second Amended Judgment was necessary to serve the best interests of the children. As a result, the Court reversed the district court and remanded with instructions that it make specific findings. View "Curtiss v. Curtiss" on Justia Law

Tina Raap and Lance Lenton divorced in January 2011. They have one minor child. Lenton was a self-employed farmer. The district court awarded Raap primary residential responsibility of the child, and calculated Lenton's child support obligation at $1,458 per month. In the original order for child support, the district court considered Lenton's tax returns from 2005 to 2009 and found that relying only on the information contained in the five-year period of Lenton's tax returns was not representative of Lenton's income, rebutting the presumptively correct amount of his child support obligation. Instead of using Lenton's tax returns, the district court used a Farm Credit Service Statement and determined Lenton held grain in storage that he could sell at any time for profit, calculated the profit from the potential sale, and used that amount to offset his farm losses to calculate his child support obligation. Lenton appealed the 2011 judgment, but did not challenge the district court's calculation of his child support obligation in that action. Lenton argued the district court erred when calculating his child support obligation by not relying on his tax returns, erred by using the R & I document instead of his tax returns, and erred in considering rental and other income in addition to the R & I document. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court to calculate Lenton's child support obligation in accordance with the child support guidelines. View "Raap v. Lenton" on Justia Law