Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Riddle appealed a district court order denying his motion for new trial. On October 14, 2016, a trial was held to settle the distribution of debts and assets between then husband and wife, Mona and Robert Riddle. Mona and Robert had previously entered a settlement agreement which was rescinded after Mona discovered Robert had concealed disability income and lied about various marital assets. Due to a travel or scheduling conflict, Robert did not attend the trial. Robert did not make any pre-trial motions asking for a continuance or to be telephonically connected during the proceeding. Shortly before the trial began, counsel met in chambers and the district court permitted Robert to phone-in and make arrangements with the clerk to be connected. Robert was able to phone-in during part of the two-hour proceeding, but was disconnected at some point during the trial. Mona testified to various valuations of debts and assets in both her and Robert's possession. Robert did not testify. His counsel did not call any witnesses, offer any exhibits, and did not provide an 8.3 Property and Debt Listing. On February 22, 2017, the notice of entry of judgment was served on Robert. The district court's order analyzed the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and awarded Robert approximately 47% and Mona 52% of the marital estate. On March 16, 2017, Robert moved for a new trial arguing there was an irregularity in the proceeding and newly discovered evidence. The district court denied Robert's motion because he failed to present grounds for new trial provided in N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(1) and (4). Finding no reversible error in the denial for a new trial, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court order. View "Riddle v. Riddle" on Justia Law

Robert Riddle appealed a district court order denying his motion for new trial. On October 14, 2016, a trial was held to settle the distribution of debts and assets between then husband and wife, Mona and Robert Riddle. Mona and Robert had previously entered a settlement agreement which was rescinded after Mona discovered Robert had concealed disability income and lied about various marital assets. Due to a travel or scheduling conflict, Robert did not attend the trial. Robert did not make any pre-trial motions asking for a continuance or to be telephonically connected during the proceeding. Shortly before the trial began, counsel met in chambers and the district court permitted Robert to phone-in and make arrangements with the clerk to be connected. Robert was able to phone-in during part of the two-hour proceeding, but was disconnected at some point during the trial. Mona testified to various valuations of debts and assets in both her and Robert's possession. Robert did not testify. His counsel did not call any witnesses, offer any exhibits, and did not provide an 8.3 Property and Debt Listing. On February 22, 2017, the notice of entry of judgment was served on Robert. The district court's order analyzed the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and awarded Robert approximately 47% and Mona 52% of the marital estate. On March 16, 2017, Robert moved for a new trial arguing there was an irregularity in the proceeding and newly discovered evidence. The district court denied Robert's motion because he failed to present grounds for new trial provided in N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b)(1) and (4). Finding no reversible error in the denial for a new trial, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court order. View "Riddle v. Riddle" on Justia Law

Terry Smith appealed, and Cindie Innis-Smith cross-appealed, an amended judgment granting the parties a divorce, dividing the parties' marital property, and awarding Innis-Smith spousal support. Smith also appealed an order denying his motion to reopen the record to present additional evidence relating to the values of certain items of marital property. Smith argued the district court clearly erred by equally distributing the marital property, claiming the parties' short marriage did not justify an equal distribution. The North Dakota Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s distribution of the marital property. However, because of an alleged substantial change in the values of water depot and mineral interests as part of the marital property, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying Smith's motion to reopen the record to allow the parties to present additional evidence on the values of those property interests. The Supreme Court reversed the court's order denying Smith's motion to reopen, and remanded this case for further proceedings relating to the values of the water depot and mineral interests. View "Innis-Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

Terry Smith appealed, and Cindie Innis-Smith cross-appealed, an amended judgment granting the parties a divorce, dividing the parties' marital property, and awarding Innis-Smith spousal support. Smith also appealed an order denying his motion to reopen the record to present additional evidence relating to the values of certain items of marital property. Smith argued the district court clearly erred by equally distributing the marital property, claiming the parties' short marriage did not justify an equal distribution. The North Dakota Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court’s distribution of the marital property. However, because of an alleged substantial change in the values of water depot and mineral interests as part of the marital property, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying Smith's motion to reopen the record to allow the parties to present additional evidence on the values of those property interests. The Supreme Court reversed the court's order denying Smith's motion to reopen, and remanded this case for further proceedings relating to the values of the water depot and mineral interests. View "Innis-Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

Aron Williams appeals from a two-year disorderly conduct restraining order prohibiting him from having contact with Jennifer Williams. Aron and Jennifer were married in April 2015, have two minor children together, and resided in Jamestown. They separated in April 2016 and were in the process of obtaining a divorce in Stutsman County. After the separation, Jennifer moved to West Fargo. In June 2016, Jennifer filed for a temporary domestic violence protection order against Aron in Cass County, but the parties stipulated to dismissal of the order and the district court in the divorce action ordered that exchanges for Aron’s parenting time with one of the children occur at Rainbow Bridge in Moorhead, Minnesota. In December 2016, Jennifer moved to modify the provisions of an interim order on child support, attorney fees, spousal support, and parenting time in the Stutsman County divorce proceedings. In January 2017, the district court granted the motion and ordered exchanges of the children to occur at the West Fargo Police Department. On January 30, 2017, Jennifer filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Aron in Cass County, alleging he committed several acts intended to adversely affect her safety, security, and privacy. Although Jennifer testified about several acts of alleged disorderly conduct, the district court indicated the only incidents it would consider were those that occurred after the January 13, 2017, amended interim order was entered in the divorce action. Aron’s attorney argued that Aron's words constituted constitutionally protected free speech, and the parties argued the constitutional issue before the court. The trial court found reasonable grounds to believe Aron’s actions constituted disorderly conduct and granted the restraining order. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court erred by failing to address the constitutional issues Aron raised. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for the district court to make a new determination as to whether a disorderly conduct restraining order should issue on the basis of any remaining conduct. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Tina Valeu appealed a second amended judgment denying her motion to modify primary residential responsibility. Valeu and Ernest Strube were married in 2009 and had one child. The parties divorced in 2013. Before the divorce trial, the parties presented a stipulated parenting plan in which the parties agreed Strube would have primary residential responsibility for the child but they would have equal parenting time until the child started kindergarten in fall 2016, at which time Valeu's parenting time would be reduced to every other weekend during the school year and extended parenting time in the summer. The district court adopted the parties' stipulation and incorporated it into the final judgment. In January 2016, Valeu moved to modify the judgment, requesting the court award her primary residential responsibility for the child. She argued the court was required to make an original determination about primary residential responsibility because the parties agreed to a parenting plan in which they would exercise joint residential responsibility. She also argued there were numerous material changes in the parties' circumstances, including that Strube denied the child medical care, her health and well-being increased while the child's condition declined, and the child resided with her significantly more days than he resided with Strube. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Valeu v. Strube" on Justia Law

Brent Thompson appealed the district court's judgment awarding split residential responsibility and requiring Brent to pay spousal support. Brent and Jeanna Thompson married in 1999, and Brent filed for divorce in 2015. The parties had three minor children, C.M.T., C.F.T., and C.L.T. When the parties initially separated in 2015, C.F.T. chose to reside with Jeanna and C.M.T. chose to reside with Brent. C.L.T. went back and forth between the two households. At trial, Brent requested primary residential responsibility of all three children. Each of the children expressed a preference for primary residence. C.F.T. and C.L.T. preferred to reside primarily with Jeanna, and C.M.T. preferred to reside with Brent. The district court entered a divorce judgment dividing the parties' assets and debts, granting split residential responsibility, and awarding Jeanna spousal support. Brent argues the district court failed to make sufficient findings as to factors enumerated in Section 14-09-06.2(1), N.D.C.C. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's award of split residential responsibility and spousal support was adequately supported by the record. “Split residential responsibility is not preferred, but it is not expressly prohibited. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a child is of sufficient maturity to make a sound judgment, the court may give substantial weight to the preference of the mature child. This Court will not reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of witnesses. A district court's determination on spousal support will not be set aside for failure to explicitly state the basis for its findings if that basis can be reasonably inferred from the record.” View "Thompson v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Sandra Glass Lenertz ("Lenertz") appealed the district court's order granting James Glass's Motion for Deposit of Funds With Court and for Satisfaction of Judgment. In 1996, James Glass ("Glass") and Lenertz divorced. The divorce judgment required Glass to pay spousal support. Lenertz remarried in 2002. In 2015, Glass filed a motion to terminate his spousal support obligation. The district court granted Glass's motion and terminated spousal support at the time of Lenertz's remarriage. The district court also granted Lenertz a judgment for $26,903.37 because this was the amount that the court determined Glass owed on unpaid spousal support. Glass only started paying spousal support in 2001; thus he was behind on payments and interest. On the basis of the order granting the motion to terminate spousal support ("Termination Order"), the district court issued an Amended Judgment and Decree ("Amended Judgment"), which granted Lenertz the money judgment of $26,903.37. Glass attempted to satisfy the money judgment by paying Lenertz and obtaining a final satisfaction of judgment. Lenertz refused to accept the $26,903.37 payment because it was conditioned on her signing a final satisfaction of judgment, which she claimed would preclude her from appealing, and the amount did not include post-judgment interest. Glass moved the district court to deposit the $26,903.37 payment with the clerk of court. At the motion hearing, the district court concluded that the amount owed was interest, not principal, and thus post-judgment interest did not accrue. Further, the district court ordered that Glass be allowed to deposit the funds into the court and that a full satisfaction be provided. Lenertz argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the judgment of $26,903.37 awarded to her in the Termination Order was principal and thus she was owed post-judgment interest on that amount. Glass argued that because Lenertz did not raise this issue in her appeal of the Amended Judgment, this argument was barred by the law of the case doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed under the law of the case doctrine. View "Glass v. Glass" on Justia Law

R.W.D. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his two children, K.S.D. and J.S.D. After a review of the juvenile court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded clear and convincing evidence established that the children were deprived, the deprivation was likely to continue, and the children had been in foster care at least 450 of 660 nights. The Court also concluded active efforts to prevent the breakup of this Indian family were made and those efforts have been unsuccessful. However, the Court found nothing in the record to satisfy the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) requirement of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of a qualified expert witness, that continued custody by the parents would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children. Accordingly, though the Court retained jurisdiction over this case, it remanded for testimony from an ICWA qualified expert witness. View "Interest of K.S.D." on Justia Law

A.D., mother of P.T.D., C.R.D., P.A.D., P.P.D., and N.A.D., appealed a juvenile court order finding her five children were deprived under N.D.C.C. 27-20-02(8). These proceedings arose after the State alleged the children were subject to repeated exposure to domestic violence between A.D. and T.D.; A.D.'s methamphetamine and other substance abuse and the presence of controlled substances in the home; T.D.'s suicide attempts; and other mental health issues. After the deprivation hearing, the juvenile court found the children were deprived by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court ordered the children removed from the care, custody, and control of their parents on February 13, 2017. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the juvenile court noted drug use, mental health issues, domestic violence, and other health issues in its order, but it failed to connect those facts to the children's deprivation. The Court remanded with instructions that the juvenile court make adequate findings of fact to determine whether P.T.D., C.R.D., P.A.D., P.P.D., and N.A.D. were deprived children based on the evidence presented at the initial deprivation hearing. View "Interest of P.T.D." on Justia Law