Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

B.C., by and through his parent Michelle Cox, appealed from a district court judgment affirming the Department of Human Services (“Department”) decision to deny autism voucher program funding for a gazebo. B.C. argued the Department’s rationale for rejecting the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) recommendation was insufficient, its interpretation of its regulation was unreasonable, and its conclusions of law were not supported by its findings of fact. After review of the agency and trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the agency unreasonably interpreted the regulation, and its conclusions of law were not supported by its findings of facts. The Supreme Court reversed the district court judgment affirming the Department’s denial of the autism voucher program funding for the gazebo. View "B.C. v. NDDHS" on Justia Law

Alonna Knorr, formerly known as Alonna Knorr Norberg, appealed a money judgment entered in favor of Jon Norberg for Knorr’s share of unpaid expenses assigned to her under the divorce judgment. Knorr argued the district court erred by denying her motion to dismiss or vacate the order granting Norberg’s motion to amend the judgment because the parties had a global settlement agreement that resolved the issues in this case. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not adequately explain its decision. The matter was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Norberg v. Norberg, et al." on Justia Law

Braden Allery appealed an order denying his motion for relief from a default judgment modifying primary residential responsibility for the two children he had with Regan Whitebull. In 2019, the district court entered a judgment awarding Allery and Whitebull equal residential responsibility of the children. In March of 2021, Whitebull moved to amend the judgment, asserting a material change in circumstances had occurred because the parties no longer lived in the same area and the children were then both school-aged. Her motion papers were personally served on Allery. The sheriff’s return of service showed he was served in Parshall. Allery did not respond to the motion. The district court entered an order finding Whitebull established a prima facie case justifying modification of primary residential responsibility and ordered an evidentiary hearing. The court served the order and notice of hearing on Allery at a Bismarck address. Allery did not appear at the evidentiary hearing, and Whitebull moved for entry of default judgment. On the day of the hearing, after it had concluded, Allery learned through social media the hearing had been held. Allery sent a letter to the district court the same day, stating that he never received notice of the hearing. He requested the court reschedule the evidentiary hearing and send notice to his current Parshall address. The court granted Whitebull’s motion for default judgment and awarded her primary residential responsibility of the children. Allery moved for relief from the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) requesting the district court vacate the order due to excusable neglect or based on the strong public policy of adjudicating matters on the merits. The North Dakota Supreme Court was not persuaded the district court erred in denying Allery's motion, and affirmed judgment. View "Allery v. Whitebull" on Justia Law

LuAnn Erickson appealed a district court order granting her motion to vacate its previous order recognizing a tribal court restraining order under N.D.R.Ct. 7.2, but concluding that the tribal court restraining order was entitled to full faith and credit under 18 U.S.C. § 2265. Erickson argued that the court erred in granting full faith and credit to the tribal court order, because the tribal court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court failed to provide her reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. Specifically she averred she was not properly served with the tribal court proceedings. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court record did not reflect Erickson was properly served with the tribal court proceedings under the Tribal Code. “Without proper service on Erickson, a hearing should not have been held, and a permanent protection order should not have issued.” Further, because the record demonstrated that Erickson was notified of the protection order proceedings after a permanent protection order was already entered, it follows that she was not afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 2265(b)(2). “Although Erickson responded to Baker’s attorney’s email attaching exhibits, this email was sent to Erickson the day before the hearing. Further, the email did not contain any information that would have informed Erickson a hearing would be conducted the following day. We conclude this is insufficient to satisfy due process requirements.” Therefore, the district court erred in according full faith and credit to the tribal court restraining order. The district court order granting Erickson’s motion to vacate its previous order recognizing a tribal court restraining order was affirmed; however, insofar as the order granted full faith and credit to the tribal court restraining order, judgment was reversed. View "Baker v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Cody Berdahl appealed a divorce judgment entered following a bench trial in his divorce action against Joleen Berdahl. He argued the district court erred in distributing the marital property, in ordering him to pay spousal support to Joleen, and in awarding Joleen credit for attorney’s fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the trial court’s inclusion of property acquired after the parties’ separation was induced by an erroneous view of the law. Therefore, the court’s distribution of marital property was reversed and this issue remanded with instructions to assign value only to property that existed at the time of separation and to equitably distribute the property after taking into consideration the correct value of the marital estate. Further, because the district court’s order was “internally inconsistent” with regard to the award of attorneys’ fees, the Court remanded that issue for further consideration. The Court found no reversible error as to the award of spousal support, and affirmed as to that issue. View "Berdahl v. Berdahl" on Justia Law

A.L. appealed an order terminating his parental rights over A.C. A.L. argued the juvenile court erred in finding the Cass County Human Services Zone engaged in active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”). A.L. also argued the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody of A.C. by A.L. would likely result in serious harm to A.C. The North Dakota Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded for further factual findings on the ICWA requirements and North Dakota law as codified by N.D.C.C. 27-20.3-19. View "Interest of A.C." on Justia Law

S.P.L. appealed a judgment denying his petition to terminate M.T.’s parental rights and adopt K.M.T. He argued the district court erred in denying his request to terminate M.T.’s parental rights and failing to consider whether M.T.’s consent was required for an adoption proceeding. While the North Dakota Supreme Court did not find the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous, the district court erred in failing to make findings regarding whether M.T.’s consent was required in the adoption proceeding. Judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of K.M.T." on Justia Law

Derek Spitzer appealed a second amended judgment entered after he moved to amend a parenting judgment. Spitzer and Kate Anderson had a child, P.T.S., born in 2009. In 2010 the district court awarded Anderson primary residential responsibility and ordered Spitzer to pay child support. In 2013 Spitzer moved to amend the judgment and requested primary residential responsibility. The court awarded joint residential responsibility, but Spitzer had slightly more than 50% of the parenting time. The parties agreed to eliminate Anderson’s child support obligation based on Spitzer’s income and their agreement to share P.T.S.’s expenses. In this appeal, Spitzer argued the district court erred in awarding Anderson primary residential responsibility, claiming there was not a material change in circumstances that adversely affected P.T.S. or resulted in a general decline of P.T.S.’s condition. To this the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed and reversed judgment. View "Anderson v. Spitzer, et al." on Justia Law

Mark Rath appealed after the district court entered a third amended judgment in this divorce action from Kayla Rath (now Jones). After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion in limine; in conducting the hearing; and in allowing written, but not oral, closing arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his requests for new trial and recusal, and affirmed the third amended judgment. However, the Supreme Court determined the district court erred in denying his demand for a change of judge and erred in referring Jones’s motion for a vexatious litigant determination under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58 to the presiding judge, who had previously been disqualified in this case. The Court therefore vacated a May 2021 order determining Mark Rath a vexatious litigant. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that Rath did not meet his burden to show his constitutional challenge to N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58 had merit, so the Court exercised authority under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58(7) to determine Mark Rath was a vexatious litigant under the rule. View "Rath v. Rath, et al." on Justia Law

Bryon Updike appealed a divorce judgment, arguing the district court erred when it calculated child support and when it distributed the parties’ assets and debts. April Updike cross appealed, arguing the court erred when it failed to include a commencement date for the child support obligation. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court did not err when it imputed income to Bryon for purposes of child support, and the court’s property and debt distribution was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court modified the judgment to include a child support commencement date that the parties agreed to on appeal, and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Updike v. Updike, et al." on Justia Law