Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A married couple created a revocable trust during their marriage, transferring three properties into it. Both spouses were designated as co-trustees, sole beneficiaries, and settlors of the trust, retaining the right to amend or revoke it together. Following their separation and eventual divorce, they sold two of the properties and retained the third in the trust. Each party then asserted claims for equitable distribution of marital property. In a pretrial order, both parties stipulated that all necessary parties were properly before the court, that the three properties were marital property, and agreed on how the properties and proceeds would be divided.The District Court, Brunswick County, entered an equitable distribution order based on these stipulations. The defendant appealed, arguing that the revocable trust was a necessary party under Rule 19 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the trust was not joined. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the order. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s actions, holding that the trust was not a necessary party because, through their stipulations, the parties effectively revoked the trust. The Court of Appeals also found a clerical error in the order, remanding for correction.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed whether a revocable trust must be joined in an equitable distribution proceeding when all settlors are already parties. The court held that Rule 19 does not require joinder of a revocable trust in such circumstances, as a judgment against the settlors binds the trust without affecting others’ rights. The decision of the Court of Appeals was modified and affirmed on this basis. View "Face v. Face" on Justia Law

A married couple divorced after nearly twenty years together. During the marriage, the husband founded and operated a law firm as a sole practitioner. When the parties separated, they could not agree on how to divide the value of the law firm, specifically its “goodwill”—an intangible asset reflecting expected future client patronage. An appraiser, hired with the parties’ consent, determined that the law firm had significant value, consisting of both “enterprise goodwill” (attributable to the firm itself) and “personal goodwill” (attributable to the husband's reputation and skills).In District Court, Mecklenburg County, the trial judge accepted the appraiser’s valuation, distinguishing between enterprise and personal goodwill but classifying both as marital property subject to division. The court ordered the husband to pay the wife half the total value of the goodwill. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that North Carolina courts had not previously distinguished between types of goodwill and that all goodwill associated with a professional practice should be treated as marital property.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to determine how personal and enterprise goodwill should be classified in equitable distribution during divorce. The Supreme Court held that only enterprise goodwill—value that exists independent of the practitioner and can be transferred to others—may be treated as marital property. Personal goodwill, which is inextricably tied to the individual’s skills and reputation and represents future earning capacity, cannot be classified as marital property for purposes of equitable distribution. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this point, remanding for proceedings consistent with its decision while leaving the treatment of enterprise goodwill undisturbed. The Court noted its holding is limited to equitable distribution and does not affect alimony considerations. View "Sneed v. Johnston" on Justia Law

A woman filed for a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against her estranged husband, alleging incidents of sexual abuse, physical injury, and emotional mistreatment in the months before her complaint. She submitted a written statement detailing these allegations, which accompanied her unverified complaint. The parties had separated prior to the incidents described. An ex parte DVPO was initially granted, and after continuances, a hearing was held where both parties testified. The woman expanded upon her written allegations during her testimony, describing specific incidents and the emotional impact of her husband’s conduct. The husband denied any abuse or injury. The trial court reviewed the written statement, marking out portions it found unsupported, and entered a one-year DVPO, concluding that acts of domestic violence had occurred and that the woman was in danger of serious and immediate injury.After the DVPO was issued, the husband filed a motion under Rule 60 to set it aside, which was denied by the District Court, Durham County. He appealed, arguing that the trial court’s findings were insufficient, as they incorporated the wife’s written statement rather than independently setting out findings. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that competent evidence supported the findings and that the incorporation-by-reference method was permissible given the trial court’s credibility assessment and review of testimony. The dissent argued that the trial court failed to make specific findings as required by Rule 52 and would have vacated the DVPO.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the appeal. It held that the trial court’s method of incorporating the written statement—after hearing testimony and marking up the statement—complied with Rule 52. The trial court’s findings were sufficient in form, and competent evidence supported the issuance of the DVPO. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Jay v. Jay" on Justia Law

A young child, Alice, made several allegations of sexual misconduct against her father over the course of multiple years, beginning in 2021. These allegations were investigated on several occasions by county departments of social services, but none found substantiating evidence, and some investigators suspected that Alice’s mother coached her to fabricate accusations. The parents, who never married, were engaged in an ongoing custody dispute. The Carteret County District Court ultimately awarded primary custody to Alice’s father, finding the mother’s denials of visitation willful and her testimony untruthful. Additional reports of abuse were made thereafter, including by Alice’s school counselor and a therapist. These led to further investigations and court actions, but again no evidence of abuse was substantiated.The District Court in Carteret County dismissed a subsequent juvenile petition alleging abuse, neglect, and dependency, relying on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, finding the issues had already been litigated. The Court of Appeals vacated this order, holding that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of the previously adjudicated abuse allegations but not new allegations arising after the prior custody and interference proceedings. The appellate court remanded for further proceedings on the new allegations.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to clarify the application of collateral estoppel. The Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel did not bar the Department of Social Services’ juvenile petition because the Department was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the prior child custody or interference proceedings. Additionally, the prior court findings did not “actually determine” the relevant abuse issues for collateral estoppel purposes. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, also noting the Department’s conflict of interest in this matter. View "In re A.D.H" on Justia Law

The case concerns two young siblings, E.H. and R.H., whose parents brought E.H., a three-week-old infant, to the hospital with a fractured arm. Medical examinations revealed multiple acute fractures on E.H.’s body, which doctors concluded were caused by nonaccidental trauma, likely from shaking or similar abuse. Both parents denied any knowledge of how the injuries occurred and provided no plausible explanation. They were E.H.’s sole caretakers, and there was no evidence that anyone else had access to the child. The Department of Social Services (DSS) intervened, taking both E.H. and his older brother R.H. into custody.The District Court of New Hanover County adjudicated E.H. as abused and neglected and R.H. as neglected, finding that the parents’ inability to explain E.H.’s injuries and refusal to accept responsibility created an injurious environment for both children. The court found that, given the parents’ lack of accountability, there was a substantial risk of similar harm to R.H. The parents appealed. The North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the adjudication for E.H. but, in a divided opinion, vacated the neglect adjudication for R.H., reasoning that the trial court relied solely on E.H.’s abuse without specific findings predictive of probable neglect for R.H. The majority remanded for further findings, while the dissent argued the trial court’s findings were sufficient.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding R.H. The Supreme Court held that when a child is severely abused and the parents cannot plausibly explain the injuries or assure that abuse will not recur, a trial court may find that other children in the home are at substantial risk and thus neglected. The Court also emphasized that appellate courts should not address issues not raised by the parties. The adjudication of R.H. as neglected was reinstated. View "In re E.H. & R.H." on Justia Law

A mother and father, after separating, entered into a consent order in 2017 granting them joint legal and physical custody of their two children, one of whom has a serious medical condition. The order required cooperation regarding the child’s medical care. In 2020, following ongoing disputes and allegations of contempt by the father, the parties agreed to a modified custody order that maintained joint custody but appointed a parenting coordinator to help manage escalating conflict, particularly regarding the children’s medical needs.Subsequently, the father repeatedly disagreed with the parenting coordinator’s decisions, refused to comply with directives about the children’s therapy and medication, and engaged in hostile conduct toward the coordinator. The mother moved to modify custody again, alleging the father’s actions endangered the children’s welfare. The District Court, Wake County, found that the father’s conduct—including failure to administer medication and interference with therapy—adversely affected the children’s health and welfare. The court issued temporary and then permanent orders granting the mother primary physical custody and final decision-making authority on major issues.The father appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate majority held that the findings did not support a conclusion of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the children’s welfare, reasoning that the children were insulated from parental conflict.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that an escalating pattern of conflict and a parent’s unwillingness to communicate or cooperate regarding the children’s health, education, and welfare can constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification of a custody order. The Court found the trial court’s findings supported both the existence of such a change and that modification was in the children’s best interests. The case was remanded to reinstate the trial court’s modified custody order. View "Durbin v. Durbin" on Justia Law

Respondent, the mother of a two-year-old child named Layla, has a history of alcohol and illegal drug abuse. Both respondent and Layla tested positive for methamphetamine and THC at Layla's birth. Respondent admitted to using marijuana and unprescribed Valium on the same day she gave birth to her twin children. Layla lived with respondent and respondent's girlfriend, in a home that respondent claimed was infested with rats. A social worker from Swain County Department of Social Services (DSS) observed respondent behaving erratically and under the influence of drugs. Despite signing a safety plan that prohibited unsupervised contact with Layla, respondent violated the plan within days.The District Court of Swain County adjudicated Layla as a neglected juvenile based on respondent's continued drug abuse, erratic behavior, and failure to follow the safety plan. The court's findings included respondent's drug use, the unsafe living conditions, and the violation of the safety plan. Respondent appealed the adjudication order to the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the trial court's order, stating that the trial court's findings lacked specific factual details about how respondent's actions impaired or risked impairing Layla's welfare. The appellate court required additional findings to support the conclusion of neglect.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the conclusion of neglect. The court emphasized that while specific written findings of a substantial risk of impairment are not required, the trial court's findings must logically support the conclusion of neglect. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's findings, including respondent's drug abuse and unsafe living conditions, adequately supported the adjudication of Layla as a neglected juvenile. View "In re L.C" on Justia Law

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between Carol Sperry Smith and Dale Preston Smith. The key issue is the classification of a tract of land located at 4080 Racetrack Road in Grifton, North Carolina. Dale Preston Smith purchased this property before the marriage. The parties signed stipulations in January 2019, designating the property as marital property. However, Dale later filed a motion to set aside these stipulations, claiming the property was his separate property.In the District Court of Pitt County, the trial court approved a pretrial order that listed Racetrack Road as a disputed property, with Carol claiming it was a mixed asset and Dale asserting it was his separate property. The trial court classified the property as Dale's separate property and distributed it to him. Carol appealed, arguing that the stipulations were binding since the trial court never ruled on Dale's motion to set them aside.The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court's order. The majority held that the pretrial order showed the parties did not agree that Racetrack Road was marital property. The dissenting judge argued that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion to set aside the stipulations meant the stipulations remained binding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court held that Carol invited any error by agreeing to proceed with the equitable distribution hearing without a direct ruling on the motion to set aside the stipulations. Therefore, she could not use this as a basis for a new hearing. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, though it did not adopt its reasoning. The invited error doctrine barred Carol from obtaining a new equitable distribution hearing. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves the father of a four-year-old child, Katy, who was initially placed with him by the Durham County Department of Social Services (DSS) after her mother, who had custody, was found to have substance abuse issues. DSS later discovered the father had a significant criminal history and was arrested for assault. Consequently, DSS recommended placing Katy with her paternal aunt and uncle, which the trial court approved. The trial court also found that both parents acted inconsistently with their constitutional rights as parents, although neither parent raised a constitutional claim during the trial.The Court of Appeals reviewed the case and, in a divided opinion, reversed the trial court's decision. The majority held that the trial court lacked authority to place Katy with anyone other than her father, as there were no allegations or findings that he was unfit or had acted inconsistently with his constitutional rights. The majority also ruled that the constitutional issue was preserved for appellate review because the father opposed DSS's recommendation. The dissent argued that the trial court's findings on the constitutional standard were premature and unnecessary.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and focused on whether the constitutional issue was properly preserved for appellate review. The Court held that a parent must explicitly raise a constitutional claim in the trial court to preserve it for appeal. Since the father conceded he did not argue the issue as a constitutional violation in the trial court, the Supreme Court determined the issue was not preserved. Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, emphasizing the need for parents to inform the trial court and opposing parties of any constitutional challenges to ensure proper evidence is presented. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

A child, referred to as Liam, suffered severe injuries at one month old, including multiple fractures and bruises, while in the care of his parents. The Onslow County Department of Social Services (DSS) took custody of Liam, who now requires extensive medical care due to cerebral palsy and other conditions resulting from the abuse. Liam was placed with foster parents, Daniel and Jessica Hall, who have provided him with a stable and nurturing environment. Liam's maternal grandfather expressed interest in custody but admitted he could not provide the necessary care.The District Court of Onslow County adjudicated Liam as abused and neglected and held multiple permanency-planning hearings. The court ultimately awarded custody to the Halls, finding that reunification with the parents was not in Liam's best interest due to their inability to explain his injuries and the mother's failure to participate in his medical care. The court also considered but did not find the maternal grandfather a suitable caretaker.The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's order, finding the trial court's findings insufficient under relevant statutory provisions. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new hearing.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's findings were sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements, including considerations of the child's best interests and the feasibility of reunification. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order awarding custody to the Halls and converting the case to a Chapter 50 civil custody proceeding. View "In re L.L." on Justia Law