Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Appellate Division rejected the contention that consecutive commitments were not authorized by Family Court Act 454 (3) and concluded that "[g]iven the father's failure to contest the amounts due and his willful refusal to voluntarily pay them despite repeated opportunities afforded to him over more than three years, we find no abuse of discretion in the determination to run the sentences consecutively[.]" At issue is whether Family Court, in revoking two prior suspended orders of commitment, was authorized to order consecutive six-month sentences for each to run consecutively with a third six-month sentence imposed for a current violation. The court concluded that it was within the discretion of the Family Court judge to impose consecutive sentences for each willful violation. Willful violators of Family Court orders should not in effect be given immunity for past violations — conduct which would have justified incarceration at the time — solely because the trial court exercised restraint in fashioning a remedy that provided yet another opportunity to meet support obligations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Matter of Columbia Cnty. Support Collection Unit v. Risley" on Justia Law

Child lived with his paternal Grandparents beginning when he was less than ten days old and continuing until he was almost ten years old. In 2006, Child’s Mother was granted primary physical custody, but Child continued to reside with Grandparents. In 2012, after Father sought custody from Mother, Mother refused to return Child to Grandparents following a visit. Grandparents commenced this proceeding seeking primary physical custody of Child. Family Court granted joint custody to Grandparents and Father, with primary physical custody to Grandparents and visitation to each parent. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed Grandparents’ petition, concluding that Grandparents lacked standing to seek custody. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Grandparents established their standing to seek custody of Child by demonstrating extraordinary circumstances, namely an extended disruption of Mother’s custody. Remitted. View "Suarez v. Williams" on Justia Law

During the course of the parties’ matrimonial proceeding, Supreme Court issued an order (the “January 2010 order”) requiring Defendant to deposit in escrow the proceeds of the sale of properties which were the subject of a prior equitably distribution determination in favor of Plaintiff, Defendant’s former spouse. Plaintiff filed a motion to hold Defendant in civil and criminal contempt for Defendant’s failure to comply with the order. After a hearing, Supreme Court found Defendant in contempt of court for failing to comply with the January 2010 order. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence adduced at the hearing established a sufficient basis for the civil contempt judgment, and therefore, the Appellate Division properly affirmed Supreme Court. View "El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan" on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were married in 1997. A week before the wedding, they each separately signed a prenuptial agreement. Neither party was present when the other executed the document, and the signatures were witnessed by different notaries public. In the acknowledgment relating to Husband's signature, a key phrase was omitted. As a result, the certificate failed to indicate that the notary public confirmed the identity of the person executing the document. In 2010, Husband filed for divorce. Wife commenced a separate action seeking a divorce and a declaration that the prenuptial agreement was unenforceable. Supreme Court denied Wife's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding (1) the certificate of acknowledgment was defective, but (2) the deficiency could be cured after the fact, and the notary public affidavit raised a triable question of fact as to whether the prenuptial agreement had been properly acknowledged when it was signed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prenuptial agreement was invalid where, even assuming a defect in a certificate of acknowledgment could be cured, the notary public's affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable question of fact as to the propriety of the original acknowledgment procedure. View "Galetta v. Galetta" on Justia Law

Father was an inmate in New York's correctional system. Father, who had acknowledged paternity of a child prior to his imprisonment, sought visitation with the child, who was then three years old, after Mother refused to bring the child to the prison. The family court granted Father's petition for visitation and awarded Father periodic four-hour visits at the prison with the child. The appellate division affirmed. Mother appealed, arguing that the lower courts employed an incorrect legal standard in reviewing the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower courts used the appropriate legal standard, applying the presumption in favor of visitation and considering whether Mother rebutted the presumption through showing that visitation would be harmful to the child. View "Granger v. Misercola" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the family court determined that Father and Mother abused their two-year-old child and that they neglected and derivatively abused three of their other children. The family court dismissed the petition of the Commissioner of the City Administration for Children's Services insofar as it alleged severe abuse against their infant son, concluding that severe abuse under N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law 384-b(8)(a)(i), which requires a finding that Father acted "under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, could not be established in view of the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Suarez unless an eyewitness testified to the manner in which the harm was inflicted. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the phrase "circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" does not mean the same thing for purposes of N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law 384-b(8)(a)(i) as it does under the Penal Law; and (2) a showing of diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship is not prerequisite to a finding of severe abuse under Family Court Act 1051(e) where the fact-finder determines that such efforts would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. View "In re Dashawn W." on Justia Law

In a parental rights case, at issue was whether the Family Court could direct continuing contact between parent and child once parental rights have been terminated pursuant to Social Security Law 384-b. The court concluded that, absent legislative warrant, the Family Court was not authorized to include any such condition in a dispositional order pursuant to Section 384-b. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "Matter of Hailey ZZ. (Ricky ZZ.)" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree, as well as burglary, endangering the welfare of a child, and two weapons offenses. At issue was whether it was possible for a parent who had custodial rights to a child to be guilty of kidnapping that child. The court held that it was possible, and that it happened in these circumstances, where defendant used his baby daughter as a hostage, threatening to kill her if the police approached him. View "People v Leonard" on Justia Law

Husband and wife divorced after almost 30 years of marriage and their settlement agreement set forth a comprehensive division of marital property. At issue was whether husband had presented facts sufficient to support the reformation or setting aside of the agreement based on a claim of mutual mistake pertaining to an investment account. The court concluded that husband failed to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211 and therefore dismissed the amended complaint.

Plaintiffs sued the former spouse of Stephen Walsh, who was a defendant in related actions brought by plaintiffs, alleging that the property derived from Walsh's illegal securities activities went into the former spouse's possession under the parties' separation agreement and divorce decree. At issue, in certified questions to the court, was whether the former spouse had a legitimate claim to those funds, which would prevent plaintiffs from obtaining disgorgement from her. The court held that an innocent spouse who received possession of tainted property in good faith and gave fair consideration for it should prevail over the claims of the original owner or owners consistent with the state's strong public policy of ensuring finality in divorce proceedings.