Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted review of the Division for Children, Youth and Families' (DCYF) petition in its original jurisdiction to determine whether the superior court erred in denying DCYF's motions to dismiss respondent's claims on statute of limitation grounds. While under the care of DCYF, separate individuals sexually assaulted respondent on two separate occasions. The first assault occurred in February 2011, when respondent was approximately 12 years old, after DCYF placed her in the care of a foster family. While living with the foster family, a neighbor’s cousin raped respondent. The second assault occurred in June 2015 when respondent was approximately 16 years olf, after DCYF placed her in a children's home. An employee of the children’s home inappropriately touched, threatened, and raped respondent. In November and December 2018, the respondent filed two complaints alleging, in relevant part, claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious liability against DCYF, all relating to the sexual assaults that occurred while she was in DCYF custody. DCYF moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that they were barred by the three-year statute of limitations provided in RSA 541-B:14, IV. The respondent objected and argued, among other things, that she could not have discovered DCYF’s potential legal fault until December 19, 2016, when an independent audit of DCYF was publicly released that detailed DCYF’s various shortcomings regarding child welfare and safety. The Supreme Court determined the discovery rule in RSA 508:4, I (2010) applied to actions brought under RSA chapter 541-B (2007 & Supp. 2019), and, accordingly, affirmed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth & Families" on Justia Law

Respondents, the mother and stepfather of J.P., a minor child, appealed Probate Court orders: (1) vacating the stepfather’s adoption of J.P. due to lack of notice of the adoption proceeding to the petitioner, J.P.’s biological father; and (2) awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, including the cost of a genetic paternity test, to petitioner. Because the record supported the trial court’s determination that petitioner was entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding under RSA 170-B:6, I(d) (2014), the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the decision to vacate the adoption. The Supreme Court also affirmed its award of attorneys’ fees and costs relating to the petition to vacate the adoption, but vacated and remanded the award of attorneys’ fees and costs relating to genetic testing. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law

Petitioner Matthew Kamil (Husband), appealed, and respondent Robin Kamil (Wife) cross-appealed various circuit court orders in their divorce action. The parties were married in September 2007 and had two children. Husband filed for divorce in 2015, and Wife cross-petitioned. Husband was awarded temporary primary residential responsibility for the children and Wife was awarded supervised visitation. The court also appointed a parenting coordinator. By March 31, 2017, “the parenting evidence was that [Wife] was not allowing the therapeutic reunification plan to succeed.” The court nevertheless continued to order supervised visitation for Wife at a visitation center, and, in January 2018, the court “appointed Tracey Tucker to serve in an evaluative, structured, scripted reunification capacity, focusing on the children’s needs to have safe and appropriate contact with their mother.” After only four sessions, Tucker cancelled the reunification work “when [Wife] made some impulsive and inappropriate comments to [her].” At that point, Wife’s supervised contact with the children ended. Meanwhile, the court held a series of hearings to determine the authenticity and enforceability of a prenuptial agreement executed by the parties approximately one month prior to their wedding. The court ultimately found the prenuptial agreement unenforceable. In October 2018, the circuit court issued a final divorce decree. After choosing a February 2015 asset valuation date, the court awarded Husband the marital residence, awarded Wife the entirety of her Roth IRA, and equitably divided the remaining assets between them. To effectuate the equitable division, Husband was ordered to pay Wife $1,011,359.88. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded Husband failed to meet his appellate burden of demonstrating reversible error with respect to all the issues he raised on appeal. The Court concurred with Wife that with respect to the supervised parenting time visits with Ms. Tucker: while the the trial court had already ordered a plan, it also gave Tucker the sole discretion to determine when and if the parties would resume following that plan. This constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority, and the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the final decree. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Matthew & Robin Kamil" on Justia Law

Respondent Joshua Ndyaija appealed various Circuit Court orders following the parties’ divorce. He argued the trial court erred by: (1) dismissing his motion for contempt against petitioner Crystal Ndyaija; (2) denying his motion regarding parental interference; (3) denying his motion to restrain; (4) modifying his child support obligations for the parties’ minor child; (5) denying his motion to modify the parties’ parenting plan and permanent stipulation, vacating a provision of the parenting plan, and ordering him to pay the petitioner’s attorney’s fees; and (6) granting the petitioner’s motion to approve daycare enrollment for the child. Respondent also argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination under RSA chapter 458-A (2018), and lacked jurisdiction over the divorce action under RSA 458:5 and :6 (2018). After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concludes the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the child custody proceeding under RSA chapter 458-A and the divorce action under RSA 458:5 and :6. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent’s motion for contempt, motion to restrain, and motion regarding parental interference. As for the trial court’s amended uniform support order, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by applying the petitioner’s calculation of respondent’s income in determining his amended child support obligation, declining to adjust the child support obligation, ordering the respondent to pay an arrearage, and ordering him to pay his child support obligation to DCSS by immediate income assignment. However, the Court vacate and remanded the amended uniform support order for the trial court to: (1) consider income from the petitioner’s second job; (2) require petitioner to comply with Family Division Rules 1.25-A(B)(1)(c) and 2.16 by providing four pay stubs per employer or to establish good cause to waive this requirement; and (3) consider the amount of child support the respondent paid during the arrearage period in its arrearage calculation. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by denying the respondent’s requests to modify the parties’ parenting plan and permanent stipulation and vacating paragraph G of the parenting plan. View "In the Matter of Crystal & Joshua Ndyaija" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sean Braunstein (Husband), appealed the final decree and associated orders entered by the Circuit Court in his divorce from respondent Jericka Braunstein (Wife). He argued, among other things, that the trial court erred by including his monthly federal veterans’ disability benefits as income for child support purposes. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Braunstein" on Justia Law

Respondent, the father of the juvenile (Father), appealed a superior court order denying his motion for permission to file a late appeal of an adverse ruling issued by the Circuit Court on an abuse and neglect petition brought by petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). The superior court found that Father failed to demonstrate “good cause” for filing a late appeal. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held as a matter of law, that it was “reasonable and just” to grant Father’s motion to file his appeal late. Father filed his partially-assented-to motion to file a late appeal on April 17, 2019, before the parties had ever appeared in the superior court. Father did not file his appeal earlier because his attorney was on maternity leave when the dispositional order was entered, and “[t]here was a misunderstanding between father and [his] counsel’s office regarding the filing of the appeal.” The attorney for the child and the attorney for Mother assented to Father’s motion. According to the superior court, the parties preferred that Father’s and Mother’s cases “be tried together.” Under these circumstances, the Court concluded there was good cause, as a matter of law, to grant Father’s motion to file a late appeal. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re D.O." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed a circuit court order denying her petition to modify or terminate the guardianship of respondents over her minor biological daughter, K.B. The guardianship was granted by a court of the State of Connecticut in 2010. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over this petition to modify another state’s child-custody determination, it vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "In re Guardianship of K.B." on Justia Law

Respondent Christine Summers (Mother) appealed, and petitioner Steven Summers (Father) cross-appealed a circuit court order which modified the parties’ prior parenting plans. On appeal, Mother contended the trial court unreasonably failed to grant her equal parenting time after finding that she was sober, had complied with the court’s prior orders, and had a strong bond with the parties’ children. In his cross-appeal, Father argued that the trial court lacked statutory authority to modify the parties’ prior parenting plans because Mother neither pleaded nor proved a statutory ground for modification. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order. View "In the Matter of Steven Summers & Christine Summers" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cynthia Clark appealed a circuit court order dismissing her petition to adopt a four-year-old child, A.D. In April 2016, the child was reunited with her mother with whom she resided until December 2016. During that time, petitioner sometimes babysat. Pursuant to court orders, the child’s father was allowed to have only supervised visitation with the child; those visits were to be arranged through, and supervised by, a parent aide. However, unbeknownst to DCYF, while babysitting the child, petitioner allowed the child’s father to visit and stay overnight. In September, the child’s father informed petitioner he believed that the child was not safe with the mother and that he wanted to be reunited with the child. Although petitioner, as a social worker, was a mandatory reporter, she did not contact DCYF about the father’s safety concerns. Rather, unbeknownst to DCYF, she began a personal relationship with the father who, at the time, was 19 while petitioner was 47 years old. Text messages between petitioner and the child’s father indicated he was a regular visitor to petitioner’s home and that he was involved in her personal life. In December, the child was removed from her mother’s care and was again placed with petitioner for foster care. A permanency hearing in the parents’ ongoing neglect case was scheduled to take place in March 2017. Shortly before it took place, DCYF learned of the relationship between petitioner and the child’s father. DCYF informed the court, and the court ordered that the child be removed from petitioner’s care and placed with another foster family. In June 2017, approximately three months after the child was removed from her care and before the parental rights of the child’s parents had been terminated, petitioner sought to adopt the child. In November, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s petition on the ground that petitioner lacked standing. The court observed that the child had never been placed with petitioner “for the purposes of adoption,” that she had been removed from petitioner’s care “for cause,” and that the child had not been in petitioner’s care and custody “for a year and a half.” Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. View "In re A.D." on Justia Law

Petitioners M.F. and C.N., unmarried, cohabitating adults, jointly petitioned to adopt M.F.’s minor biological son, J.W. The Circuit Court ruled that RSA 170-B:4 (2014) did not authorize such an adoption and dismissed the petition. On appeal, petitioners argued the trial court erred because they were eligible to jointly adopt J.W. pursuant to RSA 170-B:4, II and III. Finding no error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law