Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent Jeffrey Bart (Husband) appealed, and petitioner Lura Sanborn (Wife) cross-appealed, a final decree of divorce. Husband also appealed the trial court’s order, issued after this appeal was filed, granting Wife’s motion to enforce the temporary decree as to the payment of property taxes on the marital home. The parties were married in 2005 and had one child. Wife worked as a librarian at a private school; Husband was involved in the operation of a family-owned candy business (GSCS) established by his grandfather in 1927. At the time the final decree was issued, Husband was the controlling member of two limited liability companies that owned and operated GSCS and the property on which one of its stores was located. CMJ Associates, LLC (CMJ) was the entity that owned the real property housing one of GSCS’s stores and several residential apartments. Husband argued the trial court erred in: (1) issuing a child support order that provided for “automatic modifications of child support in the future”; (2) adjusting the property distribution to account for marital funds used by Husband for his legal fees, but failing to make the same adjustment for Wife; and (3) modifying the final decree after an appeal had been filed. Wife argued the trial court erred in: (1) determining Husband’s gross income for purposes of child support; (2) dividing the marital estate unequally in favor of Husband; and (3) awarding final alimony with an amount and duration inconsistent with its own findings. After review of Husband's arguments, the New Hampshire Supreme Court: (1) affirmed as to the "escalation clause" allowing automatic modifications of child support; (2) vacated the property settlement for reconsideration; and (3) agreed with Wife that the order was a "was a status quo preservation ruling" within the trial court’s jurisdiction. As to Wife's arguments, the Supreme Court: (1) affirmed as to the calculation of Husband's income; (2) affirmed as to the division of the marital estate; and (3) concurred that the alimony award appeared to be inconsistent with some of the trial court's factual findings. Judgment was therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Lura Sanborn & Jeffrey Bart" on Justia Law

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, R.H., on the ground that he failed to correct, within 12 months, the conditions that led to the circuit court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C that R.H. was neglected by R.H.’s mother (Mother), who had sole physical custody of the child. This appeal presented a narrow question for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review: when does the 12-month period to correct the conditions of neglect or abuse under RSA 170-C:5, III begin to run against a non-accused, non-custodial parent? On appeal, Father argued the 12-month period did not begin until a non-accused, non-custodial parent was provided actual notice of the neglect or abuse finding. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) countered that the 12-month statutory period begins to run from the date of that finding, regardless of actual notice. Because the Supreme Court agreed with Father that the 12-month period begins when a non-accused, non-custodial parent receives constitutionally-adequate notice of both the abuse or neglect finding and the possible impact on parental rights of a failure to correct the conditions leading to that finding, it vacated and remanded. View "In re R.H." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the mother of S.A., B.T., and A.G., the father of A.G., and the father of S.A. appealed a circuit court order terminating their parental rights over their children because they each failed to correct the conditions that led to a finding of neglect within twelve months of that finding. The Vermont Supreme Court determined the trial court erred with respect to the termination of the father of S.A.'s parental rights: under the circumstances presented, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by finding that the father failed to correct the conditions that led to the neglect finding within twelve months of that finding. That judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The trial court's orders with respect to the other parents was affirmed. View "In re S.A." on Justia Law

M.M.’s (juvenile) Father challenged the superior court’s refusal of his appeal of a circuit court decision on a neglect petition brought by the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF). Father argued that the amendment to RSA 169-C:28 (effective July 1, 2020), eliminating the right to appeal final dispositional orders in abuse and neglect proceedings to the superior court for de novo review, did not apply to his case. Father also appealed the circuit court’s final dispositional order directly to the New Hampshire Supreme Court pursuant to that amended statute, arguing that the circuit court should not have considered and issued orders on DCYF’s neglect petition and, alternatively, that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of neglect. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the July 2020 amendment to RSA 169-C:28 applied to Father’s case, barring his appeal to the superior court for de novo review. In its direct review of Father’s appeal of the circuit court’s final dispositional order, the Court concluded the circuit court did not err in considering and issuing orders on DCYF’s neglect petition. The circuit court’s finding of neglect against Father was also affirmed. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

Respondent Ryanne Earley appealed a final divorce decree awarding petitioner Wm. Michael Earley part of her interest in an irrevocable life insurance trust established by her parents. She argued the trial court erred by classifying her interest in the trust as marital property subject to equitable division under RSA 458:16-a (Supp. 2020). Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s decision was contrary to RSA 564-B:5-502 (2019), it reversed in part, vacated the remainder of the property division determination, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Wm. & Ryanne Earley" on Justia Law

Defendant Bryan Luikart appealed a circuit court order which imposed a portion of his suspended sentence. Defendant argue the trial court erred in finding that the State met its burden of proving he violated the good behavior condition of his suspended sentence by committing witness tampering. In 2018, defendant pled guilty to various charges and was sentenced to 90 days’ incarceration, suspended for a period of two years. Conditions on defendant’s suspended sentence included that defendant “complete [a] batterer’s intervention program and be of good behavior.” Following his sentencing, defendant enrolled in his first batterer’s intervention program, but his participation in the program ended on January 24, 2019, for reasons irrelevant to this appeal. As a result of defendant’s departure from the program, the State moved to impose defendant’s suspended sentence on February 8. Defendant enrolled in a second batterer’s intervention program on February 19, and the State withdrew its motion to impose. Three days later, defendant sent an e-mail to his ex-wife. On March 7, the State filed a new motion to impose defendant’s suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion to impose, finding the evidence before it “sufficient to grant the State’s motion, at least generally.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence adduced at the motion hearing failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant committed witness tampering. Witness tampering was the only theory advanced by the State in support of its motion alleging that defendant violated his condition to be of good behavior, and Supreme Court did not interpret the trial court’s ruling as having independently found, from the evidence before it, that the defendant’s behavior amounted to another type of criminal conduct which violated the good behavior condition. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Luikart" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jonathan Merrill appealed a circuit court's final divorce decree, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) including the assets of a spendthrift trust in the marital estate; (2) excluding from the marital estate assets owned by respondent Lea Merrill, and her mother as joint tenants; and (3) incorporating parts of the temporary order into the final decree. After review of the circuit court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded: (1) the circuit court erred in including certain trust assets which erroneously increased the value of the marital estate; (2) respondent’s mother’s condominium was not marital property; and (3) because of the error including certain assets in the martial estate, the incorporation of the temporary order into the final decree had to be vacated: "because the trial court did not consider these expenses in isolation, but rather considered these figures in its equitable division of the marital estate." View "In the Matter of Jonathan & Lea Merrill" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, respondent Robert Blaisdell challenged a circuit court decision granting a motion to dismiss his cross-petition for divorce on fault grounds of adultery alleging sexual intercourse between petitioner Molly Blaisdell, and another woman based upon In the Matter of Blanchflower & Blanchflower, 150 N.H. 226 (2003), which limited the definition of adultery under RSA 458:7, II (2018) to sexual intercourse between persons of the opposite sex. The New Hampshire Supreme Court overruled Blanchflower and reinterpreted the term “adultery,” as it was used in RSA 458:7, II, to include sexual intercourse between a married person and someone other than that person’s spouse, regardless of either person’s sex or gender. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Blaisdell" on Justia Law

Father, petitioner Michael Greenberg, appealed a circuit court order that modified his child support obligation pertaining to shares of vested restricted stock, and ordered him to pay child support arrearages of nearly $91,000 to mother, respondent Anne Greenberg. The shares of vested restricted stock were listed as “taxable benefits” on Father's paystub. Father testified that the restricted stock awards were “part of [his] total compensation,” and that the Internal Revenue Service treated his vested restricted stock as income. Since the parties’ December 2015 divorce, Father has netted $324,856.63 from the sale of vested restricted stock. Pertinent here, the parties’ final divorce decree awarded Father “any stock options he may have an interest in with [his current employer] free of any interest on the part of [Mother].” The uniform support order issued with the decree required Father to pay Mother “28% of any bonus he may receive within 3 days of receipt” as child support in addition to regular monthly child support. Neither the decree nor the uniform support order expressly referred to Father’s restricted stock awards. Father did not include the initial 5,000 shares of restricted stock he received on his financial affidavit submitted during the parties’ divorce proceedings; none of those shares had vested as of the time of the decree. Nor did he voluntarily disclose to Mother when he sold restricted stock. He also did not pay any portion of those proceeds as child support. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held Father's exercised stock options “must be included as income for the purposes of calculating child support” because “such options are analogous to a ‘bonus’” and “are also included within the phrase ‘all income from any source.’” To the extent that Father argued the trial court’s child support order impermissibly modified the parties’ divorce decree, the Supreme Court disagreed. "Even if we were to agree with him that the restricted stock awards were distributed to him in the divorce as property, doing so would not preclude the trial court from treating vested restricted stock as income for child support purposes." View "In the Matter of Michael & Anne Greenberg" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit court from joining DCYF as a party to an ongoing guardianship case and from ordering the agency to provide services for the benefit of private litigants. This petition arose from a guardianship case involving an ongoing dispute between the father of a three-year-old child and the child’s guardians, who were the child’s maternal grandparents. The father alleged the child’s guardians were willfully interfering with his rights to unsupervised parenting time and notice of his child’s medical appointments as established by previous court orders. The circuit court credited the father’s allegations and expressed concern that the case “has not progressed” since the last hearing in September 2018. The trial court was ordered to provide services on a weekly basis to father, and joined DCYF as a party to the case. DCYF contended the circuit court lacked the authority to join the agency to the private case because no statute authorized the circuit court to do so. The Supreme Court agreed and, accordingly, granted DCYF’s petition for a writ of prohibition. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families" on Justia Law