Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Rose Marie Wall (Mother) appealed a circuit court's ruling that diemissed her petition to find Appellee Christian Poulin (Father) in contempt of a court order. The parties stipulated to payments towards their two children's college expenses. The parties could not agree on the amount of expenses Father would pay for the younger daughter's college expenses, and accordingly, he made no payments. Mother subsequently sought to hold Father in contempt of the divorce decree for failing to pay. On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court erred in ruling "that it did not have the authority to enforce the [college expense] provision in the parties' [divorce decree]" because the provision "clearly provide[s] that each parent [will] contribute to the children's college expenses to the extent each party is financially able after financial aid, scholarships and any children's savings are considered." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the decree indeed ordered the parties to contribute to their children's college expenses, and that the trial court erred in determining it could not enforce that provision of the divorce decree. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Poulin" on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Walbridge appealed a superior court order that denied her petition to establish her homestead right exempt from the mortgage held by Respondents the Estate of Raymond Beaudoin, Jr. and its co-administrators Steven Beaudoin and Raymond Beaudoin, III. Petitioner owned property in Rochester that she purchased with her then-husband. At that time, it was undeveloped land. Petitioner executed a mortgage on the property and released her homestead rights to that property. Allegedly unbeknownst to Petitioner, her husband executed a mortgage deed and promissory note on the property in favor of the decedent Raymond Beaudoin once a home was built there. The mortgage on the property did not list it as part of the homestead of the mortgagor. Petitioner and her husband divorced, and pursuant to the divorce decree, she was awarded all right, title and interest in the property. The property was foreclosed upon. Petitioner filed a petition to establish that her homestead right to the property was exempt from Respondents' mortgage. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that her homestead right in the property was not established until she actually, physically occupied it. She contended that her "obvious intention of present and immediate occupancy of the home . . . followed by [her] actual occupancy within a reasonable time, was equivalent to actual occupancy." The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Walbridge v. The Estate of Raymond A. Beaudoin, Jr." on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Regan (father) appealed an order recommended by a Marital Master (and approved by the circuit court) that among other things: (1) declined to modify his obligations to carry life insurance and pay half of his minor daughter's uninsured medical expenses even though paying these amounts reduced his monthly income below the statutory self-support reserve; and (2) required him to exchange custody of his daughter at a police station, rather than at the parties' homes. Although the court found that the father's reduction in income required reducing his child support obligation, it found "no basis to modify" the father's obligation to pay for half of his daughter's orthodontic expenses, and similarly declined to reduce the amount of life insurance he was obliged to carry. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that payment of the daughter's uninsured medical expenses necessarily reduced the father's income below the self-support reserve and therefore, the trial court's order insofar as it required such payments, erred by ordering the father pay. With regard to the life insurance, because the parties stipulated that the payments were not child support, the trial court "sustainably exercised" its discretion in finding that the monthly insurance payment would not unduly burden the father's ability to support himself. Furthermore, with regard to the custody exchange: the Court concluded that making the exchange at a police station was in the daughter's best interest. View "In the Matter of Susan J. Regan and Steven S. Regan" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court from an interlocutory transfer without ruling from the superior court on the following question: "Does the Due Process Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution (Part I, Articles 2 and 15) or the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution require the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent from whom the State seeks to take custody of a minor child based on allegations of neglect or abuse?" Parents Larry and Sonia M. were served with petitions by which the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) sought custody of their two minor children C.M and A.M. DCYF alleged that the parents were neglecting their children by failing to provide a safe and sanitary home and adequate supervision and by exposing them to domestic violence in the form of threatening and intimidating behaviors by the father. An adjudicatory hearing was held at which the parents were represented by appointed counsel. The court issued an order maintaining legal custody of the children with DCYF and directing the parents to undertake certain measures before the children might be safely returned to them. Each parent filed an appeal to superior court contending that without appointed counsel, their protected liberty interest in raising their children was threatened. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that while due process did not require that counsel be appointed for indigent parents in every proceeding (such as the proceeding at issue in this case), a determination of whether appointed counsel is necessary to adequately reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation should be made on a case-by-case basis in the first instance by the trial court. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the superior court to make that determination. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

Respondent Mostafa El-Sherif, DMD appealed a divorce degree recommended by the Marital Master. He argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it adopted an appraisal valuing his business at $1.2 million for the purposes of the final distribution of property. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Cottrell & El-Sherif" on Justia Law

Petitioner Edeltraud Elter-Nodvin appealed a superior court order that dismissed her claims against Respondents (her daughters) Leah and Madeline Nodvin. The claims sought to impose a constructive trust on insurance and retirement account proceeds that would otherwise pass to her daughters. Petitioner was married to Stephen Nodvin in 1986, and had Respondents. In 2009, Stephen filed for divorce, the couple separated, and Petitioner moved abroad. In October of that year, the family division issued an anti-hypothecation order instructing the parties to refrain from, among other things, disposing of marital property while proceedings were pending. Sometime thereafter, Stephen changed the beneficiaries of certain life insurance policies and retirement accounts from Petitioner to the couple’s daughters. After changing the beneficiaries, Stephen died. In 2011, Petitioner sued her daughters for the insurance and retirement account proceeds. She argued that the circumstances under which her husband changed his beneficiaries justified the imposition of a constructive trust. The daughters, one of whom was still a minor and represented by guardians, moved to dismiss the petition. They argued that Stephen’s change of beneficiaries did not violate the anti-hypothecation order, and, therefore, their status as the named beneficiaries entitled them to the proceeds of their father’s insurance policies and retirement accounts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Stephen's action did not violate the plain language of the anti-hypothecation order. Further, the Court held that the superior court properly dismissed Petitioner's breach of contract and constructive trust claim because she failed to allege facts to establish a contract or a confidential relationship at the time Stephen changed beneficiaries: "while the divorce action was pending, Petitioner could not rely upon Stephen to provide for her based on a spousal obligation. Rather, if she wished to remain beneficiary of the insurance policies, she should have asked the court to order Stephen not to alter them." View "Elter-Nodvin v. Nodvin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lynne DiGaetano, Michael John DiGaetano, Christopher D. DiGaetano, Scott M. DiGaetano, and Shauna Arsenault, appealed a superior court order that granted the motion in limine of Defendant, John M. DiGaetano, to exclude parol evidence. Defendant cross-appealed a prior order of the same court that denied his motion to strike Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal. The matter arose from the distribution of trust proceeds from the death of the parties' parents-grandparents. Paragraph eleven of this trust provided that the trust “may be revoked in its entirety or amended from time to time by an instrument in writing executed by the said Donors jointly or by a surviving Donor.” The patriarch died in 2002, and the matriarch amended the trust in 2003 to establish Defendant as the sole trustee and beneficiary. Following his mother's death in 2006, Defendant sold the trust assets and collected the proceeds. Seeking to establish his right to the proceeds, Defendant petitioned the probate court who concluded that the 2003 amended trust was enforceable, and ruled in Defendant's favor. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they were entitled to a jury trial on the issues of whether the original trust was a contractual "common plan" and whether the matriarch breached that contract when she amended it. Defendant moved to strike Plaintiffs' notice of appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's order denying Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiffs' notice of appeal: The Court was not persuaded by Plaintiffs' contention that the original trust was a contract, the existence of which would be evidence to reform the family trust and to impose a constructive trust in their favor. Plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion and remanded the case to dismiss Plaintiffs' appeal.

Petitioner Ronald Brownell appealed the final decree entered by the Plymouth Family Division in his divorce from Respondent Irene Brownell. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) considered his federal veterans’ disability benefits as income for alimony purposes; (2) treated any potential post-divorce distributions from his mother’s trust as marital property subject to distribution; (3) ordered him to pay the respondent $47,000 from his trust distributions, even though he had dissipated most of it before the divorce; and (4) found him in indirect civil contempt for failing to pay temporary alimony to the respondent and for violating the trial court’s anti-hypothecation order. Finding that the family division did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the final decree.

Respondent Bruce Raybeck appealed a ruling that he was required to continue paying alimony to Petitioner Judith Raybeck. The parties divorced in 2005 after a forty-two year marriage. The divorce decree obligated Respondent to pay Petitioner alimony for ten years, in yearly installments, but would cease should she "cohabitate[...] with an unrelated adult male." Approximately three months before the January 2010 alimony payment was due, Petitioner moved out of her Laconia house and rented it to reduce her expenses. She moved into the upper level of a single family home in Plymouth owned by Paul Sansoucie, a man she had met through an online dating service. Sansoucie lived on the lower level and did not charge Petitioner for rent. She did, however, pay about $300 per month for food and often cooked for him. They also shared living space on the middle level of the house. When the respondent learned that the petitioner lived with another man, he stopped paying alimony. In response, Petitioner asked the family division to enforce the alimony agreement and require the respondent to resume his support payments. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court: "important is the extent of the personal relationship, including evidence of an intimate connection, how the people hold themselves out to others. . . Here too, the age of the couple may be relevant in weighing this factor; for older people, a sexual component to intimacy may not be as significant as it would be for younger couples. In addition, the shared use and enjoyment of personal property is an indication of cohabitation, such as common use of household rooms, appliances, furniture, vehicles, and whether one person maintains personal items, such as toiletries or clothing, at the residence of the other." Because the trial court did not have the benefit of the standard the Court articulated here for determining whether the relationship between Petitioner and Sansoucie amounted to cohabitation, it vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Respondent Jeannie Dube, appealed the final decree in the divorce action initiated by Petitioner Eric Dube. She argued that the Derry Family Division erred when it granted Eric a fault-based divorce. In addition, she challenged the trial court’s division of the parties’ property and its denial of her alimony request. Further, she contested the validity of the stipulated parenting plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: the record did not support the trial court’s implicit finding that Eric was “the innocent party” when testimony showed Eric committed adultery during the marriage; the record supported the trial court's finding that Jeannie did not need alimony; and the record supported the court's unequal division of the marital assets. The Court declined to address Jeannie's challenge to the parenting plan because she did not raise it at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part the trial court's final decree.