Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In an appeal from a final divorce decree, respondent William Muller challenged the trial court's rulings apportioning the equity in the marital home and imputing $68,000 in annual income to him for child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court partly affirmed, partly vacated, and remanded the case for further proceedings: "[b]ecause the mortgage interest at issue here belongs to a third party, the family division lacked the jurisdiction to invalidate it. Our holding today does not imply that the family division lacks jurisdiction to divide an encumbered asset . . . However, when dividing such property pursuant to RSA 458:16-a, the family division does not have the jurisdiction to disregard or invalidate a third party's claim of interest in marital property." Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's order for the sale of, and distribution of the equity in, the marital home. With regard to the child support issue raised by respondent, the Court found his arguments unpersuasive, and affirmed the trial court's order with respect to that issue. View "In the Matter of Gabrielle Muller and William Muller" on Justia Law

Respondent Joan M. appealed a family division order that terminated her co-guardianship over minor Matthew L. filed by Mary S., Matthew's biological mother and co-guardian. The parties were in a serious relationship from 2004 to 2008. In 2006, Mary became pregnant and gave birth to Matthew in 2007. At that time, the parties petitioned the court to appoint them as co-guardians. In early 2008, however, Mary ended her relationship with Joan and subsequently petitioned the court to terminate Joan's co-guardianship. The motion was denied in late 2009. In 2010, Mary filed a new motion to terminate. While proceedings were pending, the Supreme Court had decided "In re Guardianship of Reena D." (163 N.H. 107 (2011)). The parties agreed that "Reena D." applied to the 2010 motion to terminate guardianship. The trial court ultimately granted termination of Joan's guardianship, and she subsequently appealed. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Guardianship of Matthew L." on Justia Law

Respondent Martin Mason appealed a circuit court order which found that his wife Robin's obligation to pay 50% of his federal income taxes was automatically discharged in her proceedings for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On appeal, Martin argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that Robin's obligation to pay 50% of his 2006 federal income taxes had been discharged in bankruptcy because he failed to make a showing before the bankruptcy court that her obligation was non-dischargeable. Martin also argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law and unsustainably exercised its discretion when it declined to award him attorney's fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that Robin's obligation to pay Martin's 2006 federal income taxes had been discharged in bankruptcy. In light of the Court's reversal of the trial court's order on the merits, Martin became the prevailing party and, therefore, may be entitled to recover costs. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to address this issue. View "In the Matter of Robin Mason & Martin Mason" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kenneth Heinrich appealed the final decree entered by the circuit court in his divorce from Respondent Dorothy Heinrich. He argued that the trial court erred when it determined that his lump sum workers’ compensation settlement was property subject to equitable distribution. Alternatively, he contended that the trial court’s division of this award is inequitable. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of Kenneth Heinrich & Dorothy Heinrich" on Justia Law

Respondent Veronica Goudreau (mother) appealed a circuit court order which granted a request by Petitioners Maurice and Gisele Lemieux, parents and next friendd of Andrew Lemieux (father) to change the name of the mother and father's child. Father and mother conceived while both were still in high school. According to Mother, Father reacted negatively to the pregnancy and told her she was crazy for wanting to keep the child. Mother had a boy, naming him Alexander Bailey Goudreau. Almost immediately after the child's birth, the petitioners filed a parenting petition and an ex parte motion for parenting time with Alexander. The motion contended that "[father] ha[d] been adjusting emotionally to the reality of being a father at the age of 15, and [wa]s prepared, through the assistance of his parents, to accept responsibility and parent his child." The court granted the motion. When Alexander was approximately fourteen months old, as the parties prepared for a hearing on a final parenting plan, the petitioners filed a petition to change Alexander's full name from Alexander Bailey Goudreau to Alexander Bailey Lemieux. At a hearing on the petition, mother testified that she had carried Alexander for nine months, loved him very much, and "deserve[d] just as much as [father] to have [Alexander] have [her] name." Father testified that he was conflicted about becoming a father, but that he was "very satisfied with the road [he] chose, really getting to know [his] son." After the hearing, the court granted the petition in part, ordering that the child's name be changed from Alexander Bailey Goudreau to Alexander Goudreau Lemieux. Mother appealed the trial court's decision. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Name Change of Alexander Goudreau" on Justia Law

Respondent Meagan Carter (Mother), appealed a Family Division decision that awarded primary parenting responsibility of her minor child (Daughter) jointly to the petitioner, Matthew Bordalo (Father), and the intervenors, John and Karen Bordalo, the Father's parents. Finding no "substantial" relationship between the child and her grandparents, the Supreme Court concluded that the first of four factors in the "Broderick" test were not met. The Court further concluded that the trial court's order awarding joint custody did not meet the fourth Broderick criterion either. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Matthew Bordalo and Meagan Carter" on Justia Law

Respondent Grant E. Woolsey appealed Family Division order modifying his child support obligation to the petitioner, Nancy E. Woolsey. Respondent is a self-employed truck driver, and the issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in calculating Respondent's income when the petitioner questioned many of the business deductions petitioner took to reach the income figure used to calculate the support obligation. The court found "that the [r]espondent's claims of financial hardship [were] not credible." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's use of petitioner's gross income from his business in order to calculate his child support obligation. Finding that the deductions were ordinary and reasonable deductions for the operation of his business, the Supreme Court remanded the case for recalculation of petitioner's support obligations. View "In the Matter of Nancy E. Woolsey and Grant E. Woolsey" on Justia Law

Respondent George W. LaRocque (Father) appealed a circuit court order that found in contempt for failure to pay child support, calculating his arrearages to be $102,845.52 as of December 20, 2010, and modifying his child support obligation with an effective date of January 7, 2011. The Father and Petitioner Mary Beth LaRocque (Mother) divorced in February 2000. The divorce decree incorporated their permanent stipulation and uniform support order, and required the Father to pay child support for their two children, alimony for six years, and continue to provide medical coverage for the children. The Mother was awarded the marital homestead, but was required to execute a promissory note and a mortgage in favor of the Father to be paid upon sale of the property or the youngest child reaching age twenty-two. The Father subsequently remarried and his second wife died in October 2010. Following her death, he received $500,000 in life insurance proceeds. On November 8, 2010, the Mother filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the Father had failed to pay the full child support ordered, and had unilaterally reduced his child support payment when their oldest child turned eighteen. The Father objected, arguing that the parties had agreed to waive child support arrearages and to modify child support. He also moved to modify his child support obligation. After a hearing, the trial court found that the parties never entered into such an agreement and held the Father in contempt. An issue on appeal was the characterization of the insurance proceeds Father received, and whether that money could be considered income when determining future modifications of child support. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded the case for a determination as to how the receipt of the life insurance proceeds affected the Father's support and arrearage obligations. View "In the Matter of LaRocque " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was the appeal of a circuit court order which found Respondent John P. Nicholson (Father), to be $28,556, plus interest, in arrears on child support obligations to Petitioner, Kimberly J. Nicholson (Mother). In April 2011, the Mother filed a motion for contempt arguing, among other things, that the Father had unilaterally reduced the amount of support when their oldest child graduated from high school in May 2007 and that he has paid no support at all since April 16, 2009. The Father objected and argued that the final decree entitled him to reduce his child support payments as each child became emancipated because the decree states that child support "shall continue until the children reach the age of 18 or graduates [sic] from high school, whichever shall last occur." He argued that "[t]he parties understood this to mean that the child support would be reduced by $82.00 as each child graduated from high school or reached age 18 years, whichever was later." The Father also argued that the Mother had agreed to this reduction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "pursuant to the plain language of the SO, in calculating the support arrearage, the trial court was obligated to retrospectively recalculate child support as of the dates upon which each of the two older children became emancipated. That the parents failed to obtain a court order modifying the support obligation when each child’s status changed is of no consequence; RSA 458:35-c permits the trial court’s order to specify differently, and it did so." View "In the Matter of Nicholson" on Justia Law

D.B. appealed the Manchester Family Division's finding of delinquency based on misdemeanor sexual assault. D.B. was accused of inappropriately touching and subsequently threatening the female complainant while the two rode home on the school bus. On appeal, D.B. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the complainant’s direct testimony indicated that D.B. put his hand down her shirt and touched her breasts. She further stated that the he put his hand down her pants and “ran it” down to her ankle. This evidence failed to describe in what way the juvenile overcame her with the actual application of physical force. Nor did the surveillance video from the bus support the State’s position. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to charge D.B. with misdemeanor sexual assault within the meaning of RSA 632-A:2, I(a). The Family Division's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re D.B. " on Justia Law