Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Susan B. and appellee Melissa D. became romantically involved in 1997 and "considered [them]selves to be as fully committed to one another as any married couple." Melissa took Susan's last name as her own (at that time, same-sex marriage became legal until 2010). Melissa became pregnant by sperm donor in 2002, and gave birth to Madelyn. When Madelyn was six years old, Susan and Melissa's relationship ended. Melissa and Madelyn moved in with Eugene D., who Melissa later married. Susan and Melissa agreed upon a schedule for regular visitation. Susan continued to be actively involved in Madelyn's life. Susan paid weekly child support and, in addition, helped with the cost of Madelyn's extracurricular activities. She also provided Madelyn with food, clothing, and gifts. In February 2013, Melissa stopped cashing Susan's child support checks. Susan averred that she nevertheless continued to send them. When Susan attempted to pick up Madelyn for her weekly visitation, she was informed that Madelyn no longer wanted a relationship with her. Melissa did not return Susan's subsequent phone calls, and Susan was unable to contact Madelyn directly through online social media because Madelyn's settings had been changed. Melissa filed a motion to terminate Susan's guardianship over Madelyn, asserting that the guardianship was "no longer necessary because Madelyn no longer wishe[ed] to have a relationship with Susan." Represented by counsel, Susan moved for an immediate hearing. Melissa objected, noting, "We have begun the process of my husband, Madelyn[']s stepfather, adopting her." The court denied the motion and Susan's subsequent motion to reconsider. On appeal, Susan argued, in part, that the family division erred by: (1) terminating the guardianship without a hearing or opportunity to conduct discovery; (2) ruling that the legal standard for termination of a guardianship had been satisfied; (3) dismissing her parenting petition; and (4) denying her motion to intervene in the adoption case. Melissa counters that the guardianship was created to allow Susan to provide health insurance for Madelyn and to further "the daily practicalities of child-rearing." She argued that since "Madelyn's sustenance is being adequately met by her new family," the guardianship was no longer necessary. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's termination of Susan's guardianship over Madelyn, and reversed the dismissal of Susan's parenting petition. The Court vacated the trial court's motion to intervene in the adoption proceedings, and stayed the adoption proceedings until the matter of guardianship was resolved. The Court then remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of Madelyn B." on Justia Law

Husband Marcus Hampers and Wife Kristin Hampers challenged a post-divorce circuit court on the husband’s motion to modify his child support and alimony obligations and on the wife’s petition for contempt. The husband asserted the trial court erred by: (1) applying a standing order requiring him to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the wife for any proceeding or matter related to the divorce decree and subsequent amendments; and (2) failing to calculate "gross income" for child support purposes under RSA chapter 458-C by using "net" figures for investment income to account for losses and expenses as well as gains. Wife asserted the trial court erred by: (1) calculating child support based upon the husband’s 2009 income and tax return when his 2010 income information and tax return were available; and (2) ordering her to repay sums that she had received in excess child support. Because "[i]t is for the trial judge to determine whether claimed expenses meet [established] criteria," and the trial court did not address the claimed expenses in this case, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the trial court to make that determination. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court erred by using the husband’s 2009 income for purposes of calculating his "present income." Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Marcus Hampers & Kristin Hampers " on Justia Law

Respondent, Cory Lounder appealed a superior court order denying his petition to modify child support. He argued that the trial court erred by concluding that his incarcerated status made him ineligible for a reduction in support. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further consideration. "Because incarceration may cause a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to warrant modification, the trial court must consider incarceration when determining whether to modify a child support order. This does not, however, preclude a court from determining that a parent has remaining sources of income such that modification is unwarranted." There was no evidence in the record from which the trial court could have found that respondent was voluntarily unemployed: he was involuntarily terminated from his employment following his arrest and incarceration. Likewise, there was no evidence that his motive for committing the crime which led to his incarceration was to avoid his child support obligations. "While a trial court has discretion to impute income upon a finding of voluntary unemployment, it cannot impute income without such a finding." View "In the Matter of the State of New Hampshire and Lounder " on Justia Law

Respondent-wife Kimberly Lyon (now McConnell) appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment to petitioner-husband John Lyon, and denying her petition to bring forward and modify alimony. On appeal, she argued that the trial court applied the wrong standard to her petition by requiring her to show a substantial change of circumstances. She contended that to prevail on her petition, she must show that she has a continuing need for alimony and that the Husband has a continuing ability to pay. Although the Supreme Court agreed with Wife that the "substantial change of circumstances" test was not the correct one to apply to her petition, the Court disagreed with the standard that she articulated on appeal. Because the trial court did not apply the correct standard when it ruled on Wife's petition, the Court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Matter Lyon " on Justia Law

Respondent, the father of G.G., appealed a superior court order which, after de novo review, upheld a finding by the 10th Circuit Court – Portsmouth Family Division that the respondent had abused and neglected G.G. Respondent challenged the superior court’s denial of his request to cross-examine or subpoena G.G. after the court admitted her videotaped interview into evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that given the plain language of the pertinent statutes and the court’s inherent authority to control the proceedings before it, trial courts have the discretion in abuse and neglect proceedings to determine whether any witness, including the child, should be compelled to testify. The record was unclear as to whether the trial court adequately considered the competing interests of respondent and the child. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded this case for further proceedings: "[w]hen the court is considering whether to compel G.G. to testify in this case, the court may wish to consider whether she testified at the respondent's criminal trial and, if so, whether her testimony in the criminal proceeding would suffice for the instant proceeding." View "In re G.G." on Justia Law

Respondent, father of Deven O., appealed a circuit court order that terminated his parental rights to Deven on abandonment and failure to support grounds. The circuit court denied a motion for reconsideration where the father asserted he had no legal obligation to support the child because he was neither listed as father on the child's birth certificate nor had been ordered by a court to pay support. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, finding that the father indeed made efforts to communicate with the child, and even filed a parenting petition to request visitation time. With regard to abandonment, the Court found that the circuit court faulted the father for not instituting the parenting petition when the mother made it difficult for him to do so. As such, the Court concluded the mother failed to prove statutory grounds for termination of the father's parental rights, and reversed the circuit court's termination order. View "In re Deven O." on Justia Law

Petitioners, Barbara and George G., appealed a circuit court that denied their petitions to terminate the parental rights of the mother, Amelia T., over her three children, Faith T., Arom T., and Jacoby T. They argued that the trial court erred in: (1) concluding that they failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother substantially and continuously neglected to pay for necessary subsistence, education, or other care; (2) failing to balance the best interest of the children and the totality of the circumstances; and (3) dismissing their petitions. Finding that the trial court did not err in denying the termination petitions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Faith T." on Justia Law

Respondent Sophia-Marie H's father appealed a circuit court order that terminated his parental rights. He argued the evidence presented at trial did not support the court's findings that (1) he failed to support, educate and care for the child; and (2) that termination of his rights was in Sophia-Marie's best interests. Sophia-Marie’s guardian ad litem (GAL) submitted a detailed final report that recommended that the termination petition be denied. At the hearing, the GAL testified that this was not an easy decision: the father appeared to be a changed man and "made an effort to turn his life around [and] he want[ed] to be involved in [his] daughter's life." To the extent that the court relied upon the father's failure to pay child support during his incarceration as evidence that the mother met her burden, the Supreme Court concluded this was error. The GAL testified that if termination was ordered, Sophia-Marie would miss out on having a relationship with her father. For these reasons, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in finding termination of the father's parental rights was necessary. View "In re Sophia-Marie H." on Justia Law

The Estate of Richard Wilber appealed appeals a probate court decision allowing the Estate of Josephine Wilber to claim a statutory share under RSA 560:10 (2007) of certain real property named in his will. Finding that the lower court erred in allowing the claim, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "In re Estate of Richard B. Wilber" on Justia Law

Respondent Cheryl C. appealed a circuit court order that granted a special petition to terminate her guardianship over her grandchildren Raven G. and Salem G. filed by the children's biological mother, petitioner Jessica B. Following a hearing in January 2008, at which both parents appeared and testified, the court found that respondent had established by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the temporary guardianship was in the best interests of both children because their parents, petitioner and Stacey G., engaged in domestic violence and in the illegal use of controlled drugs while the children were in their care. The court ordered that the temporary guardianship would remain in effect until petitioner and Stacey G. complied with a number of conditions to "demonstrate[] that they are responsible enough to act as parents." In May 2008, after another hearing, the court found that neither the petitioner nor Stacey G. was complying with the conditions imposed by the court. The court made the guardianship permanent and provided for supervised contact between the children and their parents at respondent's discretion. Petitioner was subsequently incarcerated for several months as a result of a criminal conviction and then released on probation. In January 2010, she filed a motion seeking appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL). A GAL was appointed, and the parties worked out an agreement allowing gradually increased contact between petitioner and the children. In February 2011, petitioner moved to terminate the guardianship, asserting that she had complied with all of the conditions set forth by the court in January 2008. Respondent objected to terminating the guardianship. Stacey G. also opposed termination, but argued that he should be given unrestricted and unsupervised time with the children. The court held a hearing; petitioner admitted that she had not complied with a January 2008 order but argued that the court should permit her to integrate the children into her life rather than continue the artificial relationship imposed by the guardianship. The GAL testified that he believed it would be in the best interests of the children to terminate the guardianship gradually. The respondent and Stacey G. took issue with the GAL's recommendation, arguing that he had limited contact with the children and was biased. The respondent's expert witness concluded that both children had been physically and sexually abused by petitioner and opined that forcing the children to spend time with their mother would be emotionally devastating for them and recommended that any such contact be supervised by a professional. Upon review of the issue of whether the guardianship should have been continued, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court applied an erroneous burden of proof, and therefore vacated its order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re guardianship of Raven G." on Justia Law