Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in New Hampshire Supreme Court
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In this case, Alexandra Gamble (Mother) and Sean Rourke (Father) are divorced and have three children. They had a final parenting plan approved by the 10th Circuit Court-Portsmouth Family Division, which considered Father's residence in Costa Rica and Mother's in New Hampshire. However, Father later decided to reside in New Hampshire. As a result, Father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, arguing that due to the change in residences, it would be in the children’s best interests to modify the parenting schedule.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the decision of the lower court to modify the parenting plan, citing that the lower court exercised its discretion sustainably. The Court held that the trial court correctly interpreted the parenting plan when it ruled that modification was appropriate under RSA 461-A:11, I(g). This statute allows for modification of a parenting plan if changes in the distances between the parents' residences affect the children's best interest.Mother's argument that her due process rights were violated because the trial court considered grounds not raised by Father was rejected. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not base its decision on these factors. Instead, it found that Father met his burden to modify the parenting plan under RSA 461-A:11, I(g), which was the ground Father had indeed raised.The Supreme Court also rejected Mother's argument that the trial court violated her procedural due process rights by making changes to the parenting plan that were not sought in Father's petition. The Court concluded that the trial court had statutory authority to make these modifications once it found that a statutory predicate circumstance is satisfied, as per RSA 461-A:11, I. View "In re Rourke & Rourke" on Justia Law

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In this case, Alden Satas, the petitioner, sought parenting rights for his ex-wife's biological child from a previous relationship. The couple, Satas and Courtney Crabtree-Satas, the respondent, had married when the child was about two and a half years old. They divorced in 2017 and Satas never adopted the child, but the child continued to live with him for some time after the divorce. In December 2020, Satas filed a petition seeking a parenting plan concerning the child. Crabtree-Satas moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that Satas' status as the child's stepparent ended when the parties divorced. The trial court found that Satas had standing to request parenting rights and responsibilities.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to consider three questions in this case. The first question was whether the trial court erred in finding that Satas was the stepparent of the child, given that the definition of a stepparent implies a current marital relationship, and Satas and Crabtree-Satas had been divorced since 2017. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed that Satas is not a stepparent for the purposes of RSA 461-A:6, V because he was no longer married to the child's mother at the time he filed his petition for visitation privileges. The court thus found that the trial court had erred in ruling to the contrary.The second question asked whether the trial court erred in finding that Satas had standing to bring a petition for parenting rights and responsibilities on the basis that he had established an in loco parentis status with respect to the child. However, since the court had already found that Satas was not a stepparent, it did not need to address this question.The third question concerned whether the trial court violated the respondent's constitutional rights. However, the court did not need to answer this question as it had already resolved the appeal on statutory grounds.In conclusion, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the petitioner's petition. View "In the Matter of Satas & Crabtree-Satas" on Justia Law

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This case involves a minor, J.H., whose father is in jail and whose mother passed away when he was less than three years old. The child's maternal grandmother was appointed as his guardian. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was asked to review an order by the Circuit Court, which prohibited the grandmother from testifying against the father's release from prison at any parole or similar hearings without first obtaining permission from the Circuit Court.The grandmother appealed this order, arguing that it violated her right to freedom of speech. The Circuit Court denied her motion, reasoning that J.H.'s best interests outweighed the grandmother's free speech rights.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Circuit Court's decision in part. The Supreme Court found that the Circuit Court exceeded its statutory authority by restricting the grandmother's ability to testify at the father's parole hearing. The Supreme Court interpreted the relevant statute, RSA chapter 463, and determined that while it does grant the Circuit Court the authority to limit or restrict the powers of a guardian or impose additional duties in the best interests of the minor, it does not permit the court to restrict the guardian from speaking at a parole hearing. The Supreme Court concluded that this restriction was unrelated to the grandmother's role as guardian and was therefore not within the scope of the court's authority. As a result, the case was remanded back to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of J.H." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire was presented with a case involving the mental health of the respondent, D.E. In the case, the Circuit Court had denied D.E.'s motion to dismiss and granted New Hampshire Hospital’s (NHH) petition for guardianship. It also granted NHH’s petition for involuntary admission. D.E. appealed these decisions, arguing that his due process rights were violated by the simultaneous hearing of both the guardianship and involuntary admission petitions, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions as he was not a resident of New Hampshire nor was he lawfully detained there.The Supreme Court held that D.E.'s due process argument regarding simultaneous hearings was not preserved as it was not raised in the trial court and was therefore not eligible for review. However, the court found that at the time the non-emergency involuntary admission petition was filed, D.E. was not lawfully detained and thus the trial court did not have jurisdiction on this basis. The question of whether D.E. resided in New Hampshire, giving the court jurisdiction, was remanded to the trial court for determination.In relation to the guardianship order, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's findings that D.E. was incapacitated and that a guardianship was the least restrictive form of intervention were supported by the evidence. The court also found no error in the trial court's appointment of D.E.'s brother as guardian, despite D.E.'s preference for an independent, professional guardian. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision on guardianship, vacated the decision on involuntary admission, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of D.E." on Justia Law

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Respondent, the mother of J.H. (Mother), appealed a circuit court order finding that she neglected her son, J.H. On appeal, Mother argued the trial court erred because, as a matter of law, she could not be found neglectful when another person was the legal guardian of J.H. In the alternative, she contended the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the neglect finding. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re J.H." on Justia Law

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Respondent, the mother of H.C., appealed a circuit court order that terminated her parental rights after the court found that she had been convicted of a felony assault which resulted in injury to H.C.’s sibling. The issues this case presented to the New Hampshire Supreme Court were: (1) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied in this case when H.C. was born after the date of the felony assault; (2) whether RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied to convictions obtained outside the State of New Hampshire; and (3) whether the trial court erred in finding that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest. Because the Supreme Court concluded RSA 170-C:5, VII(d) applied and that the trial court did not err in ruling that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in H.C.’s best interest, the Court affirmed its decision. View "In re H.C." on Justia Law

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Petitioner Brianna Kauble appealed a circuit court order granting the request of intervenor Herbert Novell for grandparent visitation. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the intervenor lacked standing under RSA 461-A:13 to seek grandparent visitation, the judgment was reversed. View "In the Matter of Kauble" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Dana Albrecht appealed a circuit court order denying his post-final-divorce-decree motion alleging that Respondent Katherine Albrecht was in contempt of the parties’ parenting plan. Petitioner claimed that respondent had violated the parenting plan by, among other things, removing the children from school a few days early for a week-long vacation without first notifying him. The contempt motion was filed in 2019, but not scheduled for a hearing until 2022. In the meantime, numerous other post-divorce disputes and collateral proceedings arose between the parties. The motion was ultimately denied on July 22, 2022. The trial court observed that respondent and children, at that time, were coping with the recent death of a close family member, and that respondent had made appropriate arrangements with the children’s school for the vacation. Such conduct, according to the trial court, violated neither the joint decision-making provision nor the provision requiring the parties to promote healthy relationships between the children and the other parent. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion nor reversible error in that judgment and affirmed. View "In the Matter of Albrecht" on Justia Law

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The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) and Court Appointed Special Advocates of New Hampshire (CASA) appealed a circuit court order denying DCYF’s petitions to terminate the mother’s parental rights over E.R. and H.R. The mother had five children; E.R. and H.R. were the youngest. The fathers of E.R. and H.R. were unknown. In November 2019, the circuit court found the mother neglected four of her children, including E.R. and H.R. The circuit court held a nine-month review hearing in October 2020 and found the mother to be in partial compliance with a case plan filed at the beginning of DCYF's involvement. The court ultimately transferred legal custody to DCYF, and E.R. and H.R. were removed from the mother’s care. In October 2021, the circuit court held a permanency hearing. Both DCYF and CASA recommended adoption as the permanency plan and termination of the mother’s parental rights over E.R. and H.R. In denying the termination, the trial court concluded that while it is in the children’s best interest to remain out of their mother’s care, it is not in their best interest that her parental rights be terminated. DCYF and CASA moved for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied. Finding no abuse of discretion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order. View "In re E.R.; In re H.R." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff David Loik appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for the partition and sale of real estate. At issue was whether the superior court or the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, under the applicable statute, the circuit court and not the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction, it vacated and direct the superior court to transfer the petition to the circuit court. View "Loik v. Loik" on Justia Law