Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Kourtney Morrow filed a complaint for divorce from Craig Morrow and a motion for child custody. A hearing on the motion was set to be heard by Judge Robert Teuton. On April 20, 2012, Kourtney served Craig with the summons, complaint, and motion. On May 4, 2012, Craig made his first appearance and filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Teuton. The matter was reassigned to Judge Cynthia Steel, who rejected the peremptory challenge and transferred the matter back to Judge Teuton, ruling that the time to file a peremptory challenge had expired on April 30, 2012, ten calendar days after Kourtney served Craig with the complaint and motion. Craig filed a petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the time to file a peremptory challenge cannot expire until a party has made a first appearance. The Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the requested writ, holding (1) the time to file a peremptory challenge begins to run upon proper notice of a hearing and may expire regardless of whether a party has appeared in the action; but (2) the ten-day window in which to file a challenge excludes intermediate nonjudicial days, and thus, the instant peremptory challenge was timely filed. View "Morrow v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After allegations arose of sexual abuse and sexual risk involving A.B., A.B.'s Mother and Father were reported to child protective services. Following an investigation, the Department of Family Services (DFS) filed an abuse and neglect petition in the juvenile division of the district court, seeking to have A.B. declared a child in need of protection. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on the petition before a dependency master, after which the dependency master filed her findings of fact, recommendations, and order of approval. The master found A.B. was a child in need of protection and that Mother had neglected A.B. Upon Mother and Father's objection, the juvenile court held a hearing and dismissed the abuse and neglect petition, finding that the juvenile court improperly admitted hearsay testimony at the previous hearing. The Supreme Court denied the subsequent petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the juvenile court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in sustaining the objection to the dependency master's findings and dismissing the abuse and neglect petition. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

During divorce proceedings between Husband and Wife, Husband sought an interest in Wife's separate property and requested spousal support. After three evidentiary hearings, the district court entered a divorce decree in which it found that Husband was not entitled to any interest in Wife's separate property. The court also declined to award spousal support to either party. Husband appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the decree regarding the property division, holding that the district court's separate property decisions were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) reversed and remanded as to the district court's rejection of the spousal support request, holding that the court failed properly to consider that issue, as (i) Husband was not afforded an opportunity to present any evidence relating to spousal support, and (ii) the court's order failed to explain its reasons for awarding no spousal support. View "DeVries v. Gallio" on Justia Law

In this divorce action, Appellant Michael Grisham and Respondent Susie Grisham negotiated based on a draft property settlement agreement (PSA). At the end of an uncontested divorce prove-up hearing, the district court orally accepted the settlement. Michael, however, refused to sign the PSA. After several months, Susie moved for entry of a divorce decree based on the PSA. The district court entered a final written decree incorporating the PSA and denied Michael's motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's procedure complied with applicable district court rules, which obviated any issue as to the statute of frauds, and the PSA otherwise met the requirements for an enforceable contract. View "Grisham v. Grisham" on Justia Law

Several issues came before the Supreme Court in this case concerning a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding: (1) whether an objection to the admission of the entire juvenile file as hearsay preserved the issue for appeal; (2) what the applicable burden of proof imposed upon a parent in order to rebut the parental-fault and child's-best-interest presumptions in NRS 128.109 was; (3) whether substantial evidence supported the family division of the district court's order terminating Appellants Quiana M.B.'s and Arthur L.T.'s parental rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) Arthur waived his hearsay arguments by failing to object to specific portions of the file at trial; (2) after it was determined that a presumption under 128.109 applied, a parent could rebut that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence; and (3) substantial evidence supported the district court's order terminating Quiana's and Arthur's parental rights. View "In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N." on Justia Law

Marie Liapis filed a complaint for divorce against petitioner Theodore Liapis, in which she also sought disposition of the couple's property, permanent spousal support, and her attorney fees and costs. Theodore answered Marie's complaint and later retained Mark Liapis, the couple's son, as his attorney. A settlement conference was scheduled, and each party filed a statement in preparation for that conference. In her statement, Marie objected to Mark's representation of Theodore. Because of the issues raised concerning Mark's representation of Theodore, the district court vacated the scheduled settlement conference and gave Mark time to determine whether he would continue as Theodore's counsel. Mark informed Marie's counsel that he did not intend to withdraw as counsel for Theodore. Marie subsequently filed a motion to disqualify Mark, asserting three bases for his disqualification: (1) Mark's representation of Theodore and his pecuniary interest in their estate created an appearance of impropriety; (2) even though Mark had never represented her, there was an "inherent conflict of interest" because it was unclear "how [Mark] would be able to zealously represent [Theodore]" when he "professe[d] to still love both his parents;" and (3) Mark should be disqualified because he was a potential witness in the case. Because appearance of impropriety is no longer recognized by the American Bar Association, and the Supreme Court has not recognized the appearance of impropriety as a basis for disqualifying counsel except in the limited circumstance of a public lawyer, the Court rejected that conclusion when the alleged impropriety is based solely on a familial relationship with the attorney. The Court also concluded that absent an ethical breach by the attorney that affects the fairness of the entire litigation or a proven confidential relationship between the nonclient parent and the attorney, the nonclient parent lacked standing to seek disqualification under RPC 1.7. View "Liapis v. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

After a trial, the district court entered a summary order terminating Father's parental rights to his minor child. The district court's written order, drafted by the State, closely followed the termination petition submitted by the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). Father appealed, contending that the district court's order failed to set forth specific factual findings, and therefore, the decision to terminate his parental rights was not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) express findings of fact are required in parental rights termination proceedings; and (2) neither the district court's order nor the record in this case contained findings of fact to support the district court's conclusions. Remanded to the district court to enter its findings.

Warren West's wife gave birth to a girl born with severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation. West's wife died during the procedure. West relinquished the infant for adoption and subsequently retained attorney Christopher Gellner to bring a wrongful death and personal injury claim on the infant's behalf. While litigation was ongoing, Dale Haley was appointed as the infant's guardian ad litem. The parties reached a settlement before going to trial. The district court approved the overall settlement but unilaterally altered the distribution. Gellner and Haley filed a petition for extraordinary writ, asserting that the district court lacked the statutory authority to unilaterally alter the distribution, and even if it had such authority, the court abused its discretion in making the alteration it did. The Supreme Court denied in part and granted in part the writ petition, holding (1) because Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.200 authorized the district court to modify the proposed compromise in the minor's best interest, the redistribution of settlement proceeds was proper; but (2) the district court should have provided explanation for the allocation of fees between Gellner and Haley.

Under a 1998 divorce decree granted to Husband and Wife, Husband was obligated to pay wife $1,300 a month in child support. Husband voluntarily ceased paying child support in 2000. In 2007, Wife filed a motion to establish a fixed monthly child support obligation for Husband without regard to the formula adopted in the decree, to calculate arrears, and to reduce those arrears to judgment. The district court granted Wife's motion, set Husband's monthly child support obligation at $1,300, calculated arrearages, and reduced them to judgment. When Wife filed her motion, neither the parties nor the children resided in Nevada. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction by modifying its child support order when the parties and their children did not reside in Nevada. Remanded.

Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to her two children in the district court. The district court ordered that the tribal social services have custody over the children. The tribal court then ordered the adoption of the children. Mother subsequently asked the state district court to set aside her relinquishment under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The district court denied Mother's petition. At issue on appeal was whether, under section 1919 of the ICWA, a tribal-state agreement respecting child custody proceedings may vest a Nevada district court with subject matter jurisdiction to take a relinquishment of parental rights under circumstances where section 1911(a) of the ICWA would otherwise lay exclusive jurisdiction with the tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ICWA, in keeping with the fundamental principles of tribal autonomy, allows for tribal-state agreements for concurrent jurisdiction even when the tribe would have exclusive jurisdiction absent an agreement.