Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Grandmother and Grandfather filed a petition for adoption seeking to adopt Child. Grandfather had dementia, so Father, who was Child's father and Grandparents' son, sought to participate in the adoption proceedings on Grandfather's behalf and object to his mental capacity to pursue the adoption. After a hearing, the county court entered an order finding that Father did not have standing in the adoption case. At issue on appeal was whether Father could stand as Grandfather's "next friend" and participate in the proceeding. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction because Father's appeal was not taken from a final, appealable order; (2) Father could not appeal on his own behalf because he had asserted no personal stake in the controversy; and (3) Father could not appeal on Grandfather's behalf because the court's dismissal of Father did not affect any of Grandfather's substantial rights.

Two children were adjudicated and placed in the care and custody of their paternal Grandparents after their parents neglected them. Grandparents were eventually appointed the children's guardians. Subsequently, the children's Father, after completing drug court and obtaining counseling, sought to have the guardianship terminated and his children returned to him. The county court, finding that Father was not an unfit parent, ordered that the guardianship terminate. Grandparents appealed, arguing that the county court erred in incorrectly placing the burden of proof upon them instead of upon Father and applying the incorrect standard of proof in focusing upon parental unfitness instead of the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court (1) correctly applied the parental preference principle, which serves to establish a rebuttable presumption that the best interests of a child are served by reuniting the child with his or her parent, and properly reasoned that the guardianship should be terminated in the absence of clear and convincing evidence by the Grandparents that Father was an unfit parent; and (2) correctly concluded that given the evidence, Father had not been proved unfit.

Thomas M. was adjudicated to be a juvenile who had committed acts which would constitute a felony and misdemeanors and who was mentally ill and dangerous. The juvenile court ordered Thomas to be placed in the custody of DHHS and committed to detention. The court then ordered DHHS to identify appropriate placement, including counseling, for Thomas. The court subsequently found DHHS in contempt of the order. In a second order, the court stated that DHHS would be in contempt of court if it did not provide satisfactory evidence that certain future billings related to Thomas' placement were timely paid. DHHS appealed both orders. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the issues surrounding the first order were moot but could be considered under the public interest exception; and (2) the second order was not a final, appealable order because it did not affect a substantial right of DHHS.

Susan Schwerdtfeger became pregnant by in vitro fertilization, and after giving birth, she and Teri Latham lived with the child for five years. The parties then separated and Latham moved out of the home. After Latham's visitation with the child stopped, Latham brought an action seeking custody and visitation, alleging that she had standing based on the doctrine of in loco parentis. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Schwerdtfeger and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred when it concluded that the doctrine of in loco parentis did not apply to the facts of this case, and therefore, Latham had standing to seek custody and visitation of the child; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact whether Latham should be granted custody and/or visitation of the child.

In preparation for filing for a dissolution action, Elizabeth Johnson prepared several documents, including a petition for dissolution, a voluntary appearance for her then-husband, Kari Johnson, and a proposed dissolution decree. Kari signed the voluntary appearance and proposed decree. Elizabeth filed the petition for dissolution and Kari's voluntary appearance in the district court. The district court held a hearing that Kari did not attend, but the court found that the voluntary appearance signed by Kari established personal jurisdiction. The district court entered the decree, which required Kari to pay child support and alimony to Elizabeth. Kari moved to vacate the decree of dissolution, arguing that the decree was void because the court did not have personal jurisdiction over Kari when Elizabeth failed to serve Kari with process and Kari never waived service. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the voluntary appearance waived service, and thus, the court had jurisdiction.

In 2006, Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved pursuant to a decree of dissolution, which included a provision providing that Husband was awarded a profit-sharing plan, and Wife was awarded a portion of the plan. By 2008, when no QDRO had been entered to facilitate transfer of the funds, the district court entered an amended QDRO, which awarded Wife interest on her portion from 2006 to 2008. The court of appeals affirmed. During the appeal process, Wife did not execute on the QDRO. Wife then filed motions to reopen the case and to enter an amended QDRO, arguing that the QDRO should provide for interest that had accrued during the appeal of the prior orders. The district court ordered the case reopened and entered an amended QDRO that provided for interest from the date of the decree of dissolution through the 2010 date of the hearing on the motions. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it extended Wife's award of postjudgment interest through the 2010 date because Wife was entitled to postjudgment interest from the date of the decree until she received her share of the profit-sharing plan.

After Alicia L. gave birth to Jaime, Cesar C. and Alicia signed an acknowledgment of paternity form acknowledging that Cesar was Jaime's biological father. The signatures were notarized. Cesar and Jaime lived together for two years. Cesar filed a complaint to establish paternity, custody, and child support with respect to Jaime. Cesar then filed a motion for temporary custody, which the court granted. After genetic testing excluded Cesar as being Jaime's biological father and after Alicia filed a separate complaint, the court awarded custody of Jaime to Alicia based on its application of the parental preference doctrine. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the district court erred when it failed to give proper legal effect to the notarized acknowledgment of paternity. In the absence of a successful challenge directed at the acknowledgment, the acknowledgment had the effect of establishing that Cesar was the legal father of Jaime and matters of custody and child support should have been considered within this legal framework. Remanded.

Jamyia, a minor child of Navajo decent, was removed from her parents' home after doctors discovered that Jamyia suffered injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome. The juvenile court entered a dispositional order that terminated the parents' parental rights. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the State had not proved it made active efforts pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1505(4) to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts had been unsuccessful; and (2) the State was required to provide active efforts to both parents to prevent the breakup of the family within the meaning of the statute when aggravated circumstances were present. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to reach the active efforts issue, and it erred when it reversed the juvenile court's determination that the State had satisfied the statute before terminating the parents' parental rights.

After it was discovered that Katrina R., who was fifteen years old at the time, sent nude photographs of herself to her boyfriend's cellular phone, Katrina was adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(b) as a child who deports herself so as to injure or endanger seriously the morals or health or herself or others. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Katrina serve six months' probation, that she be placed in the legal custody of The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and that she participate in counseling and community service. DHHS appealed the order, contending that the juvenile court erred in simultaneously committing Katrina to DHHS and placing her on probation in the same juvenile court case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that is within the juvenile court's statutory power to issue a dispositional order for juveniles adjudicated under section 43-247(3)(b) that includes both legal custody with DHHS and supervision by a probation officer.

Wilberth Martinez-Ibarra was found to be the biological father of a minor child born to Patricia Mayorga in 2007. Mr. Martinez-Ibarra and Ms. Mayorga entered into a parenting plan, and Martinez-Ibarra was ordered to pay child support and cash medical support. At that time, neither parent was employed full time, so no health insurance was available for their child. Mr. Martinez-Ibarraâs support obligation totaled $472, with an additional $77 per month as a cash medical support payment. The trial court noted that the parenting plan provided that Ms. Mayorga was responsible for the first $480 of non-reimbursed medical expenses for the child. The court credited this $480 to Mr. Martinez-Ibarra. In the end, the court adjusted Mr. Martinez-Ibarraâs total support and cash medical payments to $37 per month. The State, on behalf of Ms. Mayorga, challenged the courtâs math. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred when it gave Mr. Martinez-Ibarra a credit when calculating the amount of cash medical support owed. The Court reversed the decision, and remanded the case with instructions on how to recalculate Mr. Martinez-Ibarraâs support obligations.