Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Lindsay gave birth to Alexander, whose biological father was Carlos. Lindsay and Carlos, who were both fifteen years of age at the time of Alexander's birth, were never married. Lindsay planned to place the child for adoption, but Carlos objected and sought custody. The county court found that Carlos did not timely file his objection to the adoption and that Carlos was not a proper party to bring an action because he was a minor. The court of appeals dismissed Carlos' appeal, finding that the county court's order was not a final order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the county court lacked jurisdiction over the action, which was brought solely in the name of a minor, and therefore, the Court also lacked jurisdiction. View "Carlos H. v. Lindsay M." on Justia Law

The district court dissolved the marriage of Jennifer Dalbey, Appellant, and Matthew Bock. At issue on appeal was whether a trial court in a martial dissolution action has the discretion to order the parties to file a joint income tax return. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order requiring the parties to file a joint tax return, concluding that trial courts do have such discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because a trial court can equitably adjust its division of the marital estate to account for a spouse's unreasonable refusal to file a joint return, resort to a coercive remedy that carries potential liability is unnecessary. Remanded. View "Bock v. Dalbey" on Justia Law

Amy L. was the biological mother of Fianna. In 2001, the district court entered a paternity decree finding Jeffrey B. to be Fianna's father. Several years later, Amy began to suspect that Todd W. was Fianna's father. In 2009, Amy filed an application to modify the paternity decree. Todd sought to intervene in the action, claiming that he was Fianna's father. The trial court allowed Todd to intervene, and it later set aside the paternity decree. The court subsequently entered an order finding that Todd was Fianna's father and awarding custody of Fianna to Todd. Genetic tests confirmed that Todd was the biological father. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in permitting Todd to intervene and in setting aside the paternity decree of 2001. Remanded with directions to dismiss Todd from the action and to proceed on Amy's request to modify the paternity decree. View "Jeffrey B. v. Amy L." on Justia Law

Roger McCannon died in an accident while working for Appellee T.O. Hass Tire Company. Christy Spitz, with whom McCannon lived for several years, sought workers' compensation death benefits. The trial judge dismissed Spitz' claim that she was McCannon's surviving spouse after applying Colorado law to find that Spitz was not McCannon's common-law wife. The review panel affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the trial court was not clearly wrong in finding that the vast majority of objective evidence showed that Spitz and McCannon did not intend to create a common-law marriage and did not conduct their affairs as though a common-law marriage existed.

The county district court entered a decree of dissolution of the marriage of Kevin and Valara Mamot. The court determined that the premarital agreement entered into by the parties, although unconscionable, was valid and enforceable. The court then divided the assets and entered an order regarding child support. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding that the premarital agreement was enforceable, holding that because Valara did not sign the agreement voluntarily, the agreement was unenforceable under the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act adopted by Nebraska, and therefore, the Court did not need to further address whether the agreement was unconscionable.

Karlie D.'s mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Karlie, and Karlie's father later died. The Nebraska Deaprtment of Health and Human Services placed Karlie in foster care, but Karlie's parental grandmother, Martha D., moved to have Karlie placed with her and her husband and to become Karlie's guardian. The juvenile court adopted a transition plan, against the Department's recommendation, which permanently moved Karlie to live with her grandparents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the court's order affected a substantial right of the State, the order was final and appealable; and (2) because Martha was fully capable of caring for Karlie, had established a relationship with her, and was her grandmother, it was in Karlie's best interests to be placed with Martha.

These consolidated appeals arose from a paternity action in which the lower court issued a parenting time order. The district court found that Father was in contempt of the parenting time order and ordered him to pay certain related expenses incurred by Mother. The court also found Mother in "technical contempt" of the parenting time order but did not impose any sanction on her. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in finding both parties in contempt of orders pertaining to parenting time; (2) did not abuse its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction against Father for his contempt; and (3) abused its discretion in not imposing a monetary sanction against Mother for her comparable contempt. Remanded with directions to determine the appropriate sanction to be imposed for Mother's contempt.

While Husband and Wife were married, Wife conceived Child. After Child was born, Husband signed the birth certificate as Child's father. Husband and Wife subsequently divorced, and the district court incorporated the provisions of a custody agreement signed by Husband that acknowledged Husband to be Child's father. Later, Husband underwent a paternity test demonstrating that Husband was not Child's father. Husband then filed a complaint to set aside legal determination of paternity, alleging a decree modifying or setting aside the custody and child support order in the decree of dissolution was warranted on the grounds of fraud or newly discovered evidence, or under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1401 to 43-1418. The district court denied the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Husband could not rely on section 43-1412.01, which gives the court discretion to determine whether disestablishment of paternity is appropriate in light of the adjudicated father's interests and best interests of the child, because he was married to Wife when Child was conceived. Remanded.

Randal R. was the father of Ryder J. The State twice charged Randal for abusing Crue J., Ryder's half brother who was not related to Randal. Randal pled no contest both times. The State moved to terminate Randal's parental rights to Ryder, arguing that the repeated abuse of Crue was grounds for termination even though Randal never abused Ryder. Following trial, the county court, sitting as a juvenile court, terminated Randal's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sufficient statutory grounds existed for the termination; and (2) the State proved that Randal was an unfit parent and termination was in Ryder's best interests.

After the Department of Health and Human Services took custody of Child, Mother filed a motion to require the Department to accept her voluntary relinquishment of Child. The juvenile court subsequently entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. On the same date, the court entered an order overruling Mother's motion to require the Department to accept her relinquishment. Because the court had terminated Mother's parental rights, it found the relinquishment motion was moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the juvenile court should have ordered the Department to accept relinquishment of Mother's parental rights, the relinquishment was moot; and (2) the juvenile court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights.