Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mother sought to modify the child custody and support provisions of a decree of dissolution, claiming there had been material changes in (1) Father's emotional, mental, and lifestyle circumstances, requiring a modification or suspension of his parenting time with the parties' minor child, and (2) Father's financial circumstances, necessitating a modification of child support. The district court ordered Father to obtain certain medical records from two health care providers located outside Nebraska for eventual production to Mother. Father appealed, challenging the district court's authority to issue the order. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no final, appealable order before the Court, and therefore the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction. View "Furstenfeld v. Pepin" on Justia Law

When Appellant was a minor ward, The Department of Health and Human Services adjudicated Appellant's two daughters under Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247(3)(a) because of Appellant's neglect. As part of Appellant's reunification plan with her children, the juvenile court required Appellant to continue her high school education. The Department subsequently placed Appellant's children in a foster home, and Appellant aged out of the juvenile court system. The juvenile later changed Appellant's rehabilitation plan and required her to actively pursue a high school diploma or a GED diploma. Appellant appealed, arguing that the requirement to pursue a high school or GED diploma was not reasonably related to correcting the conditions that caused the adjudication. The court of appeals determined that this order was not appealable because it merely continued the court's previous orders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court's later order did not continue the terms of the previous rehabilitation plan but, instead, imposed a materially different requirement for Appellant's reunification plan with her children. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Mya C." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that Violet was a minor child who came within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) due to the faults and habits of her biological mother, Abigael. The State also filed a motion for a protective custody hearing. Abigael filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that although Violet was born in Nebraska, she had never actually lived in Nebraska. The juvenile court dismissed the petition, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Violet had lived in Iowa since her discharge from the hospital after she was born. The Supreme Court dismissed the State's appeal, holding that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. View "In re Interest of Violet T." on Justia Law

Father initiated a paternity action seeking an order declaring him to be the biological father of Child and awarding him visitation with Child. In her answer, Mother alleged that Father's paternity claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Mother also filed a counterclaim asking for a termination of Father's parental rights based on abandonment. The district court determined Father's paternity claim was not time-barred and entered an order terminating Father's parental rights. The supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court properly found grounds for abandonment; but (2) Mother did not meet her burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights would be in the best interests of Child. Remanded. View "Kenneth C. v. Lacie H." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of false reporting and was sentenced to probation for eighteen months. Defendant was directed to have no contact with her husband without the court's permission as a condition of probation. Defendant appealed her sentence. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the sentence in part, holding that the county court erred in prohibiting Defendant from having any contact with her husband, as the broad prohibition on Defendant's contact with her husband was an unreasonable infringement upon Defendant's fundamental rights arising from marriage; and (2) affirmed the sentence in all other respects. Remanded for resentencing to permit the county court either to remove the condition or to tailor it more narrowly to the factual circumstances of the case and the rehabilitative goals sought to be achieved. View "State v. Rieger" on Justia Law

Kelly and William were the biological parents of two children in the care and custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). After the children had been in the custody of DHHS for nearly twenty-eight months, the juvenile court found that no further reasonable efforts were required in support of reunification and that the primary permanency objectives for the children should be changed from reunification. On plain error review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court did not plainly err in finding that reasonable efforts in support of reunification were no longer required and that the primary permanency objectives for the children should be changed from reunification. View "In re Interest of Samantha L." on Justia Law

Based on genetic testing, Michael was found to be Child's father. The district court awarded sole custody to Jessica and ordered Michael to pay monthly child support. Michael subsequently requested that the court modify his child support, claiming that he had entered school full time and had no income. The court concluded that there had been a material change in circumstances but that Child still required support. The court then calculated a lower child support based on Michael's earning capacity. Jessica later sought to modify Michael's child support obligation. After a trial, the court increased Father's child support based on his new earning capacity. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding a material change in circumstances; (2) calculating Michael's child support obligation; (3) refusing to make the modification retroactive; and (4) declining to order Michael to contribute toward childcare expenses. View "Freeman v. Groskopf" on Justia Law

Brydon was a minor child. After Brydon's mother died, Silvija, Brydon's maternal grandmother, sought to be appointed Brydon's permanent guardian. Eric, Brydon's adjudicated father, was allowed to intervene in the proceedings. The county court appointed Silvija as Brydon's permanent guardian but rejected her request for adoption and for permanent in loco parentis status. The court subsequently awarded Silvija attorney fees and assessed them to Eric and Brydon's estate. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the part of the county court's order that assessed Silvija's attorney fees against Eric, holding that in a guardianship proceeding for a minor, a court cannot assess a petitioner's costs against another party; and (2) affirmed the county's court's decision not to confer permanent in loco parentis status to Silvija. Remanded. View "In re Guardianship of Brydon P." on Justia Law

Petitioner was a pregnant sixteen-year-old who sought authorization for an abortion with consent of a parent or guardian. In general, an abortion can only be performed on a unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen with the consent of both the pregnant woman and one of her parents or a legal guardian. The district court denied Petitioner's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a waiver of consent under the provision of Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-6903(3) for abuse or neglect by a parent or guardian, the pregnant woman must establish that a parent or guardian has abused or neglected her; (2) Petitioner did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that she was a victim of abuse or neglect under section 71-6903(3); and (3) Petitioner failed to establish that was sufficiently mature and well informed to decide on her own whether to have an abortion. View "In re Petition of Anonymous 5" on Justia Law

Michael and April are the biological parents of Avalyn, born out of wedlock in 2002. A court ordered Michael to pay child support but did not order visitation. In 2005, the state took temporary emergency custody of Avalyn after April attempted suicide. The county sought an adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), but did not give Michael notice. Avalyn was placed in foster care with her maternal grandmother in April’s home. Michael claims that because he was paying support through the state, caseworkers knew or should have known how to contact him. About six months after the disposition he received notice and intervened. The court placed Avalyn with Michael until November 2007, when the parties stipulated that Avalyn should be placed with April but divide her time between her parents. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Michael alleged that in failing to notify him of the juvenile proceedings, the defendants interfered with constitutional rights to familial integrity, substantive due process, and equal protection and that the Nebraska statutes were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that claims against state defendants for monetary damages were barred by sovereign immunity; qualified immunity shielded employees from liability in their individual capacities because they did not violate a clearly established right. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were not barred. In a juvenile proceeding alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard for a child’s known adjudicated or biological father who is providing substantial and regular financial support; the statutes at issue are not facially unconstitutional, but cannot be constitutionally applied to avoid notification. View "Michael E. v. State" on Justia Law